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Dedication 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my folks whose life and wisdom inspired my search for 
stories of ordinary people. 
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Abstract 
Using a social survey of 556 individuals, my dissertation examines how Chinese urban 
residents remember the past and how they think of and act toward current laws. By 
linking Chinese people's different understandings of law with larger cultural themes, this 
project provides socio-legal scholars with the theoretical tool to articulate the complex 
cultural environments in which people experience, think about, and act toward law. In 
addition, the findings also suggest that it is fruitful to deconstruct the concept of law 
based on the social relations it seeks to regulate. Finally, my dissertation further expands 
collective memory research by revising theories on cohort formation and connecting 
memories of the past to attitudes toward present laws. 
In my first empirical chapter, I treat collective memories of the past as a core component 
of culture, situating the study of law in specific historical and cultural context. My survey 
results show that memories most influential in shaping people’s understanding of law and 
the state are those that resonate with nationalist sentiments. This applies especially to 
memories of resistance against foreign invaders. Memories of these events contribute to 
people’s support for laws that strengthen centralized state power.  
The next two chapters examine how people’s perception of law’s legitimacy is associated 
with their tendency to obey the law and mobilize it for dispute resolution. My research 
reveals that Chinese people’s ideas of and potential behaviors toward law vary across 
different social relations. Specifically, family laws are considered to be much more 
legitimate than laws that regulate state-citizen relations or economic transactions. This 
difference in the perceptions of law translates into varying tendencies to report 
compliance or mobilization of the different  types of laws. While the perception of law’s 
legitimacy is positively associated with tendencies to obey and use the law, this is true to 
a much greater degree for family laws than for other types of law. Interestingly, people 
report that they are least likely to litigate for conflict within the family, despite the high 
level of legitimacy they attribute to laws in this social sphere. These chapters also report 
on how legal ideas and potential behaviors vary across respondents.  
These findings have implications for policy makers and activists who seek to change the 
legal system in China. On the one hand, reformers could repurpose these existing cultural 
themes to promote the legitimacy of their causes. On the other hand, the authoritarian 
state of China very shrewdly co-opted these discursive resources as well. The Chinese 
government has invested considerable resources in establishing its image as a rising super 
power and thus taps into the increasing national pride among Chinese citizens. To counter 
such nationalistic narratives could thus be the mission of activists and social reformers. 
Methodologically, my dissertation borrows from the culturalist tradition in collective 
memories study. Bearing in mind the pitfalls of oversimplification, I designed my survey 
to cover a wide range of cultural discourses. This has provided new insights into the 
larger context of contemporary China, context that has been either unduly neglected or 
misunderstood in previous research.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
In 2008 and 2009, the story of Kui Gu made its way into a number of national 
and local media in China (Beijing Youth 2009, Xinnhuanet 2009, Ifeng.com 2008). A 
former successful entrepreneur, Mr. Gu threatened violence against local government 
officials who allegedly authorized the demolition of a newly opened mall financed by 
Gu for lack of a construction permit. In response to Gu’s “radical behaviors,” the local 
government invited him to sue itself and offered to pay for Gu’s legal fees. The 
unusual strategy of the government (i.e., an invitation for a lawsuit against itself) was 
referred to in the title of each newspaper article on the case. Both journalists and 
scholars discussed at length and with optimism the implications of such new 
phenomenon for legal reform and “rule of law” in China.  Very shortly after this 
heated discussion, when I conducted a pilot study for my dissertation research in the 
summer of 2009, I interviewed a retired judge who had a similar dispute with the 
government over demolished real estate. He explained his decision not to go to court, 
saying “the law will always work in favor of the government”. These stories 
illustrates how law assumes considerable significance in the social life of 
contemporary China while revealing its complicated, sometimes even self-
contradictory, implications for the relationship between the state and its citizens. 
More importantly, they raise question regarding the changing relationship between 
Chinese citizens and the law. The profound legal reforms in China have indeed 
attracted the attention of Chinese and international scholars alike, leading to volumes 
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of scholarship on China’s changing legal institutions and emerging legal profession. 
However, in an era when “law matters more than ever” in China, little research has 
been conducted to systematically examine what ordinary Chinese people think of and 
do with the law in their everyday life.  
My dissertation thus seeks to understand the environment and consequences of 
changing laws in China through the eyes of ordinary Chinese people. I build this 
project on the traditions of legal consciousness and collective memory studies. By 
exploring the relationship between the private life of citizens and the law as a public 
arena, research on legal consciousness illuminates the power of law in sustaining, 
constraining and transforming the relationship between the state and individuals 
(Merry 1990, McCann 1994). As “legal culture” constitutes the basis for most 
analyses of legal consciousness, this procedure simultaneously opens up space for 
incorporating cultural specificities of different societies. As we use that space, 
however, we have to guard against the risk of treating legal culture as a given instead 
of an on-going process. Too much “legal culture” work indeed assumes homogeneity 
of national (legal) cultures while ignoring possible variation and subcultures (Saguy 
and Stuart 2008). Another drawback of socio-legal studies in general and of legal 
consciousness research in particular is that almost all studies have been conducted in 
Western countries. The operation of legal consciousness in other cultural contexts is 
underexplored. In addition to a lack of empirical data on less-studied societies, this 
gap also leads to a narrow conceptualization of law and legality that is tightly 
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connected to liberal constitutionalism and centers around individuality, rationality, 
and formal processes.  As a result, many scholars have argued that societies like 
China lack the cultural and political soil for the growth of a modern legal system or 
rule of law (e.g. Lubman 1999). While I am not arguing against critiques of the 
profound problems within China’s current political and legal systems, in this 
dissertation, I am not trying to engage with the debate regarding what specific type of 
legal system China should and could have. Instead, I define law in its broadest sense 
as the set of rules that prescribe appropriate behaviors and are enforced by state-
sponsored violence, regardless of the moral foundations of such rules. Legality thus 
refers to a wide range of institutions, discourses, and practices that define and sustain 
these rules. Based on this broad conceptualization of law, I intentionally avoid using 
such phrases as “rule of law” as they tend to be associated with legal systems and 
cultures arising from (Western) advanced capitalism. However, this is not to say that 
the findings of this research do not provide any insights into China’s legal reform. On 
the contrary, it informs potential policy makers and/or activists of cultural factors that 
may facilitate certain social changes while hindering others. In the conclusion of this 
dissertation, I discuss these implications in more detail. Finally, even though legal 
consciousness literature takes seriously the multifaceted and inconsistent nature of 
legality, there is little discussion on how individuals view and behave differently 
when legality intersects with other social institutions such as the economy, family or 
politics. My dissertation fills these gaps by linking legal consciousness with collective 
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memory research and by situating my research in a cultural setting that is novel to the 
study of legal consciousness—a Chinese city.   
My dissertation research examines the patterns of legal ideas, compliance, and 
mobilization among ordinary Chinese people to determine whether and how these 
patterns are associated with their memories of different periods in Chinese history. 
My survey results show that those memories that are most influential in shaping 
people’s understanding of law and the state particularly affect the formation of a 
national identity. This applies especially to memories of resistance against foreign 
invaders. My research also reveals that Chinese people’s reasons for complying with 
and mobilizing the law vary across different types of law. By linking Chinese people's 
different understandings of law with larger cultural themes and by tracing these 
themes to how Chinese people construct the history of the country, this project 
enriches research on both legal consciousness and collective memory. On the one 
hand, the concept of collective memory helps trace the cultural origins of legal ideas. 
On the other hand, by linking memories to legal consciousness, I add to the emerging 
field of quantitative studies on the connection between memories and ideas and 
attitudes surrounding present social institutions (Griffin and Bollen 2009). In addition, 
I introduce a relational understanding of law, which deconstructs the concept of law 
and legality by the social relations regulated by different legal provisions. In so doing, 
I not only demonstrate the complexity of legal consciousness but also measure its 
variation across social spheres and groups systematically.     
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The Value of a Cultural Approach to Law in Transitional Societies  
Recent decades have witnessed a “cultural turn” in socio-legal studies. In 
response to the growing pessimism about law’s (in)ability to bring about progressive 
social change and social justice, some scholars have urged sociologists with an 
interest in law to move beyond the study of its effectiveness or prescribed functions to 
its real-world effects (Hunt 1985), to be more attentive to “the culturally productive 
role of law,” and to engage in the study of “discourse, narrativity, and language along 
with legal culture, legal ideology and legal consciousness” (Merry 1995: 14).  Such a 
cultural approach sees law as a system of meaning that "affects us primarily through 
communication of symbols—by providing threats, promises, models, persuasion, 
legitimacy, stigma and so on” (Galanter 1983: 127). This does not mean treating law 
only as a set of abstract concepts that inform the values and preferences of legal actors 
and set goals for their actions. Rather, this constitutive perspective views law and 
legal discourses more fundamentally as instruments drawn from a “cultural tool kit” 
(Swidler 1986), deployed by citizens to negotiate and interpret their everyday lived 
experiences and social relations (McCann 1994). Cultural discourses around the law 
and legal institutions thus shape what people view as real and they affect their courses 
of action inside and outside formal legal arenas.   
Such a cultural approach is of special value for understanding social 
institutions in transitional societies. Any institution transplanted from one social 
environment to another must be reinterpreted and reshaped, if it is to be accepted into 
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the receiving society. Studies on different social institutions in various transitional 
societies have revealed the failure of most “off-the-shelf” recipes from the Western 
world for social reforms. This has led some scholars to emphasize the sui generis 
nature of transition and the importance of the local environment (Kurkchiyan 2009). 
Therefore, an approach that takes into account the unique cultures within transitional 
societies contributes to a deeper understanding of how the law functions or fails to 
function. More importantly, social transformation is usually accompanied by a sense 
of cultural disorientation (Sztompka 2004). When new institutions collide with old 
values, people have to make sense of the new in the context of the old. A cultural 
approach is especially valuable under such circumstance as it takes the meaning-
making process in people’s daily life as its central analytical object and projects from 
such process the connection between human beings and their social environment 
(Geertz 1973).  Finally, in most transitional societies, law assumes the responsibilities 
of reconciling the past with the present and the future (Czarnota et. al 2005). This 
suggests that we should take into account the unique history of each country when 
understanding the operation of the legal system or the transformation of legal culture.   
Engaging Law in Transitional China  
This dissertation is written against the background of rapid and profound 
social change in China. China’s move away from a planned economy and recovery 
from political upheavals such as the Cultural Revolution mark it as a transitional 
society where such fundamental social institutions as law are in constant flux (e.g. 
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Nathan 1997, Logan 2008)1. With more than four thousand years of written history, 
China may be the transitional society with the most complicated past (Fan 1994), 
According to official historiography, throughout Chinese history, there are at least 
three major historical periods that produced distinct cultural schemas: the history of 
Imperial China, reaching from ancient times, as early as 1200 BCE into the early 19th 
century (Imperial Era), the recent era of the Chinese republic, beginning with the first 
Opium war in 1840 and lasting through the entire life-span of the first Republican 
(Republic of China) regime in China, and the contemporary history (Communist Era) 
which began in 1949 when the Communist Party took over and established the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).2 In today’s China, contradictory cultural and 
political legacies from previous historical eras continue to shape the legal landscapes 
and law-related behaviors of ordinary Chinese people (Michelson 2007; Minzner 
2011; Landry 2011).3 Therefore, any sociological study that takes Chinese culture 
                                                 
1 “Transitional society” is defined here as a society undergoing fundamental structural 
changes that may (re)shape the basic social relationships, including but not limited to regime 
change, large-scale social reform and political or social instability. In sociological literature, 
most scholars see China as a transitional society. 
2 This categorization is based on mainland China’s official historiography. There are many 
nuances within and between these historical periods, particularly within the “ancient China” 
history that lasted for thousands of years. The starting and ending dates of different 
historical eras are also subject to debate. This paper is not attempting to (re)construct an 
“authentic” timeline of Chinese history but instead to demonstrate how the social process of 
historical construction is consequential for individual memories of the past and how the link 
varies across social groups. 
3 Chapter II provides more detailed description of each historical era, its potential cultural 
legacy, and its implication for legal development in present China. 
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seriously must take into account the implication of its history for current actors as 
well as the implication of current actors for the (re)construction of history through 
legal categorization. Meanwhile, until now, the focal point of studies on Chinese laws 
has been legislation, legal institutions and legal professionals. The everyday lived 
experience of fundamental legal changes among Chinese citizens has hardly been 
properly investigated.  The very few exceptions that look at Chinese people’s 
encounters with the law hint at the complex relationship they have toward the law 
(Gallagher 2006). They further indicate that people’s strategies and experiences are 
shaped by their collective memories about the past (Michelson 2007b). In short, a 
legal consciousness approach that takes the notion of collective memory seriously 
provides a particularly promising entry into this field of study. 
My dissertation thus approaches law in China through a cultural perspective 
that values the lived experience of ordinary people and takes into consideration the 
meaning of China’s rich history to its current residents. The literature on legal 
consciousness combined with the collective memory research tradition provides the 
theoretical frame for constructing such an approach. 
Legal Consciousness  
The central argument of legal consciousness literature is that legality is 
constituted through actions and practices of ordinary people (Ewick and Silbey 1998) 
in addition to its institutional manifestations “in the laws, legal profession, forms, 
acts, processes, etc.” (Silbey 2005: 347).  As part of the cultural movement in socio-
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legal study, legal consciousness scholarship takes the Gramscian (1971) 
conceptualization of “hegemony” seriously. On the one hand, law contributes to the 
crafting of normative and ideological consensus that constrains consciousness. On the 
other hand, the evolution of law is a function not of the evolution of some abstract 
impartial logic of justice but of the very social relations and actions it regulates.4 The 
hegemonic power of law is not to dictate policy but to shape discourses, cultural 
meaning and social identities (Engel and Munger 2003, Sohoni 2007). The efficacy of 
law lies in its taken-for-granted-ness, in what it provides people to think with rather 
than what it makes people think (Swidler 1986, Sarat and Kearns 1993).   
Integrating Bourdieu's (1986) argument about the symbolic power of law with 
Foucault’s (1982) de-centered formulation of power, scholars of legal consciousness 
see law as a cultural system constituted through the actions and practices of ordinary 
people (Merry 1990; Sarat and Kearn 1993; Ewick and Silbey 1998).  While it also 
recognizes the power of written statutes and court rulings, this strand of research 
distinguishes itself from previous socio-legal studies by emphasizing ordinary people 
as active enactors of the law instead of passive objects. Individual participation in 
legality as a cultural system is of primary concern for this body of literature. The core 
                                                 
4 Within this theoretical framework, the debate over whether it is possible to build law or 
rule of law based on Chinese culture becomes less relevant as law itself arises from and 
forms an integral part of culture. The relevant question thus becomes, “what kind of law is 
possible/more likely/more powerful in contemporary China,” which is the core question of 
this dissertation. The answer, I argue, depends on what kind of cultural discourses prevail in 
the minds of Chinese people. 
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question for legal consciousness literature is thus three-fold: 1) in what sense is law 
“cultural” or discursive; 2) how does law set boundaries for individual thoughts and 
actions (in addition to coercive force); and 3) how is law open to redefinition and 
(re)interpretation under specific circumstances?   
The majority of legal consciousness studies revolve around the second and 
third of the three questions and take the first one as a given. While a cultural approach 
toward law forms the basis of most analyses in these studies, the concept of “legal 
culture” is seldom explicitly defined or systematically examined. Many studies make 
fundamental assumptions about how law operates. Some point at a contractual 
relationship between the state and its citizens through law (Merry 1990), others at 
rights-consciousness as the basis for legal mobilization (Morrill et al. 2010). Yet such 
assumptions may not hold in societies that do not share enlightenment traditions. This 
limit is crucial to the field of legal consciousness and cultural legal studies in general 
as it questions one of the underlying assumptions of the literature—the cultural 
specificity of the law. Similarly, most legal consciousness studies do not take into 
account the historical specificity of legal culture and legal consciousness which, as 
previously argued, is crucial to the understanding of the law in transition.   
My dissertation incorporates the concept of legal culture as an analytical target 
instead of leaving it in a black box as an implied prerequisite. To do this in the context 
of a transitional society, I operationalize “cultural process” by linking current actors 
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to the past and introducing another significant body of literature with a cultural 
approach toward its subject: the literature on collective memory.  
Collective Memory  
Inspired by Durkheim’s germinal work (1965) on the social foundation of 
knowledge, Halbwachs (1992) formulates the term “collective memory” to refer to 
visions of the past that are not only commonly “known” but also collectively 
acknowledged and reinforced by members of a collectivity. The concept is usually 
associated with the current identities and interests of the enactors of such past. As 
Hobsbawm (1972) writes, “[t]o be a member of any human community is to situate 
oneself with regard to one's (its) past, if only by rejecting it.” In addition, 
“[c]ommunities… in an important sense are constituted by their past and for this 
reason we can speak of real community as a ‘community of memory,’ one that does 
not forget its past. In order not to forget that past, a community is involved in retelling 
its story, its constitutive narrative (Bellah et. al 1985: 153). At the same time, each 
time the story is retold, a piece from the present is added by the storyteller and 
different pasts may be envisioned for the same community or society. Such tools of 
(re)constructing history are particularly important for collectivities facing changes at 
scales and speeds that challenge their very core values. Collective memory thus 
constitutes an optimal theoretical tool in understanding the fluid identities of 
communities and individuals in societies experiencing fundamental transformations. 
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There has been a long-standing debate over what memories are truly 
“collective”. Some maintain that only materialized objects independent of human 
consciousness such as monuments, rituals and written texts can be the vehicle of 
collective memory (Nora and Kritzman 1996, see also Terdiman 1993). However, 
since the late 1990s and early 2000s, scholars have argued for bringing individuals 
back to the study of collective memory (Wertsch and Roediger 2008). As noted by 
Halbwachs, despite his emphasis on the social nature of collective memory (or any 
kind of memory), the carriers of collective memories are still individuals as members 
of social groups. A more comprehensive approach thus sees collective memories as 
“meaning-making” cultural reservoirs (B. Schwartz 1996) from which everyday folk 
draw resources and to which they contribute (B. Schwartz and Schuman 2005).  
We thus see that the two bodies of literature, that on legal consciousness and 
that on collective memory, can be brought into a theoretically meaningful and 
important conversation. On the one hand, both strands of research emphasize the 
constructed nature and constitutive power of social reality. On the other hand, legal 
consciousness research focuses on the role of ordinary people while collective 
memory research explicates the contested nature of cultural identities and the efforts 
by collectivities in the construction of such identities. One major parallel in the two 
strands of research is the relationship between the institutional manifestation of 
cultural practices and individual consciousness. For socio-legal scholars, the social 
environment of legal consciousness is embodied in the institutional forms of legality 
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such as the written statutes, court proceedings, and legal professions. For collective 
memory researchers, the institutions of collective representations (e.g. historical texts, 
commemoration ceremony, memorial sites, and city and street names) constitute the 
mnemonic structure of individual minds. Both bodies of literature see the social 
environment and human consciousness as both a constraint on and a product of  each 
other. Combining these two strands of research thus provides theoretical tools that 
open the door to identify the intractable relation between the law, its cultural 
background, and individual consciousness. 
When Law Meets Memory 
Savelsberg and King (2007, 2011) address the reciprocal relationship between 
law and collective memory. They illustrate how memories are crystallized into legal 
codes through carrier groups, and how law rectifies certain events as “facts,” 
establishing their content through its rulings. They also argue that collective memory 
and legal institutions do not exist in a social vacuum but along with other fields that 
operate with different institutional logics and thus will either augment or mitigate the 
reciprocal relation between the two. Their arguments are particularly valuable in 
supplementing current theories on legal consciousness as they specifically address the 
issue of law in its cultural and historical context.  Their work is limited however, by 
its institutional focus on both memories and the law. It is not entirely clear whether 
and how the relationships they identify can also be found in the minds of individuals. 
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This is an important question because, as argued above, ordinary people are the 
ultimate enablers and sustainers of social change.  
Building on their work, I collaborated with Professor Savelsberg and 
conducted a pilot study in Chengdu, China in the summer of 2009.  The findings from 
that study frame much of the research presented in this dissertation. We interviewed 
Chinese people engaged in disputes with the local government and identified three 
major cultural themes in the narratives of the subjects: a Confucian model, a Socialist 
State model and an Enlightenment model. Among the three, the Confucian model is 
most strongly rooted in Chinese history and culture. The Socialist State model 
promotes an image of the state as a representative of the poor. Last but not least, the 
Enlightenment model focuses on rights of individual citizens and is competition-
oriented.  The study reveals that these cultural schemas are backed up by political and 
social commemorations of and individuals’ references to events and figures from the 
past. 5 They also tend to be linked to the ways people justify their engagement with 
law. The findings suggest that the reciprocal relationship between legal culture and 
collective memory is also present in the narratives of ordinary people (Liao and 
Savelsberg 2010). Therefore, for my dissertation, I ask more explicit and systematic 
questions about the relationship between a person’s cultural identity primarily based 
                                                 
5 Chapter II discusses in detail the potential connection between these cultural themes, the 
various periods from China’s past, and different types of laws. 
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on but not limited to his/her memories of the past, and his/her understanding of and 
actions toward the law.  
Dissertation Overview 
To answer the questions 1) how ordinary Chinese people remember their 
country’s past, 2) how they think of and act toward law, and 3) how their legal ideas 
are associated with their memories of the past, I conducted a social survey in 
Chengdu. I contextualize this research and report its findings along a series of 
chapters. Chapter II discusses the parts of Chinese history relevant to the development 
of its complex legal cultures -- which was measured in the survey instrument as part 
of people’s memories of China’s past. It further introduces the locale of my 
dissertation research, the city of Chengdu, with information on the cultural, economic, 
legal, and demographic environment of the city. It then moves on to describe the 
study design, data collection process, and analytical strategies. It also provides the 
demographic information for my sample of Chengdu residents. Chapter III identifies 
the historical moments defined as significant by urban Chinese residents, using data 
from a social survey I conducted of 560 individuals. Using collective memories as a 
core indicator of cultural identities, this chapter examines how memories of the past 
vary across social groups. It further connects people’s memories of the past to their 
perception of law’s legitimacy and argues 1) that memories matter to different degrees 
for different types of laws and 2) that it matters how people remember an event. When 
their memories of the event are positive, they are likely to see laws that consolidate 
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the relevant part of national identity symbolized by the event as more legitimate; in 
contrast, when they remember an event negatively, they are more likely to identify 
with laws that conflict with the values related to the event. Chapter IV tests and 
expands theoretical expectations regarding legitimacy and its effect on legal 
compliance. I find that both 1) the level of perceived legitimacy of law and 2) its 
connection to expected legal compliance vary based on the type of social relationships 
targeted by legal regulation (familial, economic, or state-oriented). I also show how 
China’s cultural, political and historical environments contribute to the patterns 
identified in this analysis. Chapter V examines the conflict-resolution processes of 
ordinary Chinese people; in particular, it focuses on the factors that contribute to 
individuals’ preference for mobilizing formal resources. The results indicate that, in 
addition to the social relations regulated by the law, people’s understandings of the 
basic roles of government and law in society and their perceived legitimacy of law 
also contribute to how likely they will turn to either the court or government agencies 
for dispute resolution. Chapter VI concludes with a summary of my major empirical 
findings and elaboration of my theoretical contribution. 
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Chapter II: Case Background and Study Design 
In my dissertation, I try to understand the rapidly changing legal landscapes in 
China through the eyes of ordinary Chinese people by asking and answering such 
questions as “why do they obey the law” and “how do they use the law”? I argue that 
to fully answer these questions, one has to take seriously the historical and cultural 
contexts of the society under study. In addition, one also needs to attend to the 
complex social relations that constitute and are regulated by the law. However, 
current socio-legal studies on China appear theoretically and empirically limited in 
these respects. In this chapter, I provide a brief outline of the historical legacies that 
potentially shape the cultural terrains in which the legal consciousness of ordinary 
Chinese people resides and operates, setting up a background of the empirical 
chapters that follow. I also analyze how different parts of China’s past are potentially 
relevant to the various social relations that Chinese people face today. Finally, I 
describe my research locale, the methods I used to collect data for this project, and the 
demographic features of my sample, transforming the theoretical questions and 
concepts I raise to empirical operationalization.  
With more than four thousand years of written history, China is a transitional 
society with a complex past (Fan 1994). The recent period was especially turbulent. 
Within less than two centuries, China went through the intrusion of colonial powers, 
the bourgeois revolution and the collapse of its last dynasty, warlordism, World War 
II and the Japanese invasion, a civil war, and a series of political upheavals, including 
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the Cultural Revolution, coupled with one of the worst famines in its recent history. 
The sudden turn to a more open and market-driven economy in recent decades saved 
many from the despair of starvation, but failed to lift the country from cultural 
turmoil. Instead, the latest reforms introduce structural and cultural changes that 
further challenge previous premises of social life (Piao 2008, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo shi 2008, Tang and Parish 2000, Walder 1996, Wu 1961).  
As might be expected, China’s legal system has also gone through large-scale 
reforms. Since the late 1970s, China has produced more than 200 new laws at the 
national congressional level, including a new Constitution (Li 2008). Accompanying 
the vigorous legislative effort by the People’s Congress, the Chinese government has 
been intensively involved in the propaganda of “legalization” (fazhihua) and “rule of 
law”(fazhi) (Diamant et al. 2005).   
The scholarly reaction to this massive transformation in China’s legal system 
is mixed. While mainstream Chinese legal scholars have shown enormous confidence 
in emerging “modern laws” as guidance for the country’s economic and political 
development (for a review, see Chen 1996), voices from outside China are critical. In 
fact, few Western observers see the potential of installing the “rule of law” in China 
(e.g. Alford 1999, Lubman 1999). The critique mainly consists of the “forced” and 
instrumental nature of legal change (Diamant et al 2005, Holthuis 2002) and a 
concern over the omnipresence of political power in social and legal life (Tanner and 
Green 2007, Rooij and Lo 2010). Thus the picture of China’s current legal system 
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remains vague and contradictory: on the one hand, many studies have confirmed the 
gap between “law on the books” and “law in action” (Wang 1997). They raise 
questions about law’s capacity to serve as an independent source for the citizenry and 
to exercise restraint on government behavior (Lin 1997, Perry 2001). On the other 
hand, it is undeniable that law matters in today’s China more than it ever has 
(Diamant et. al 2005, Potter 2004).   
Both the proponents and critics of China’s legal reforms, however, tend to link 
their discussion of law and “rule of law” with western conceptions that are flexible 
and controversial in nature (Dowdle 1999). From this perspective, China’s legal 
reform is framed as an attempt to “catch up with the rest of the world” (Vermeer and 
d’Hooghe 2002: viii). The future of China’s legal reforms are seen to hinge on 
China’s integration into the international system and its exchange of material and 
cultural goods with other (Western) societies. Such a formulation captures the 
Chinese government’s effort to gain legitimacy at the international level but neglects 
Chinese culture's unique definitions of law and legal institutions (Potter 2004). It also 
ignores how institutional changes are interpreted and implement in local communities 
(Liu 2006). The richness of Chinese history provides abundant raw materials for 
creating a “Chinese identity” to motivate political opinions and actions. Each of 
China’s major historical periods was marked by a unique legal system and culture 
(Head 2009), which are also in constant transition. This leaves the Chinese public 
with conflicted values and creates a sense of cultural disorientation that powerfully 
  
 
20 
 
 
 
impacts their understandings of important social institutions such as that of law. 
Therefore, any sociological study of Chinese law that takes culture seriously must 
consider history's impact on contemporary actors and contemporary actors' 
(re)construction of history. This following section briefly outlines the cultural 
landscape of China with a focus on its complex legal cultures.  
Complex History and Colliding Legalities 
 Based on official historiography of mainland China, China’s written history is 
roughly divided into three major sections.6 The ancient history of China (Imperial era) 
stretches for a few thousand years starting as early as 1200 BC. The recent history of 
China (Republican era) started with the first Opium war in 1840 and lasted through 
the entire life-span of the first Republican (Republic of China) regime in China The 
contemporary history (Communist era) began in 1949 when the Communist Party 
took power and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Each of the three 
eras is marked by a complex and yet distinctive cultural legacy, including the role of 
law. A detailed documentation of the historical roots and contents of these 
philosophical schools is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, the 
discussion in the rest of this section is meant to provide the readers with the kind of 
                                                 
6 As discussed previously, there are many nuances within and between these historical 
periods. This dissertation is not attempting to (re)construct an “authentic” timeline of 
Chinese history but to present an overview that is readily available to the subjects of my 
research.  
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knowledge an ordinary Chinese person is likely to possess so as to understand the 
rationale of the study design.  
Although ancient China is known to have hosted a variety of philosophical 
schools (Schwartz 1985), the Confucian school of thought is commonly considered to 
be the dominant cultural discourse between one of the first dynasties, Han, and the 
last, Qing (Liang 2009, Zhang and Schwartz 1997, Tu 1990). Transitions from one 
emperor to the next were accompanied by variation within the school but the main 
theme remained consistent. It focused on the exploration of the connection between 
one’s self, family, nation, and the world (Zhang 2006). Within this larger cultural 
schema, the society is considered to operate under the same logic as a family, the 
“natural” cell of the social world. Therefore, the government is seen as parental, as 
loving, caring, and protective, albeit authoritative. Law is considered part of the 
“natural order”, in particular, an extension of the rules within families (Liang 1991). 
In the rest of this dissertation, I refer to the Confucian Model to mark this line of 
thinking.  
At the turn from the 19th to the 20th centuries, when China was faced with 
increased tension and conflict from within and invasion from without, elite 
intellectuals started looking outside for answers to save the nation. Combining 
American and French revolutionary philosophies with a sentiment against the ethnic 
minority rule of the Qing Dynasty, groups of revolutionaries organized a series of 
uprisings which eventually led to the abdication of the last emperor and the 
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establishment of the first constitutional democracy in China,7 the Republic of China 
(ROC) (Xue 2011, Zhang 2011). The establishment of the Republic and its failure 
urged intellectuals to further question the “inherent weakness” of the Chinese nation 
and culture. A “New Culture Movement” thus called for even more radical revolts 
against Confucianism and the establishment a new Chinese culture based on global 
principles, particularly such Enlightenment-driven concepts as democracy and science 
(Wu 2008, Hummel 1930). Soon the intellectual movement split up between those 
who sought to stay close to the political models established in Europe after the 
Enlightenment movement and those who demanded different changes inspired by 
Marxist teaching and the Russian Revolution. Mao Zedong is the most well-known 
and influential among the latter (Guo and Wu 2010). The intellectual gulf was 
paralleled by the struggle between the official government of the Republic led by 
Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party) and the communist regime led by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). The latter eventually won a brutal civil war in 1949 and 
overthrew the KMT government. In the rest of this dissertation, I refer to the one 
school of thought developed in the New Culture Movement as the Enlightenment 
Model. Under this model, the power of the state is based on a contractual relationship 
with its citizenry—people give up parts of their freedom in exchange for the 
                                                 
7 There is debate over the extent to which the newly founded republic is indeed democratic 
but formally, it is organized under the intuitional rules of a democracy.  
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protection from the state (Rousseau 1762). Law, in this case, is the specific provisions 
of such social contract.  
While this line of thinking was prominent in the early years of the Republican 
era, the Marxist-Maoist school became dominant as the CCP seized power. Consistent 
with the current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which categorizes 
China as a socialist state, I refer to this officially recognized discourse as the State 
Socialist Model. This model defines the current regime in China as a “people's 
democratic dictatorship” (人民民主专政) whose essence is the dictatorship of the 
proletarian class (Constitution of PRC). Law in this case, is defined as the collective 
will of the people, specifically the proletarian class, and a tool of class struggle. 
Definitions as such entail strong and centralized state power and implicitly sanction 
state violence against enemy classes.  
After Mao’s death, the successive leaders of CCP continued to uphold the 
basic principles of this model. However, with China’s increasing integration into the 
global economy and involvement in international Human Rights discourses,8 the 
concept of rights, which resonates with the Enlightenment Model, has once again 
entered into debates  (though mostly in academia). In addition, in the early 2000s, as 
                                                 
8 China has signed and ratified almost all the major human rights treaties under the UN 
framework except for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also has 
been actively adopting the language of human rights in various official reports and press 
releases, albeit with the unconcealed intent to (re)define the concept. In 2004, the National 
People’s Congress adopted an amendment to the Constitution that included human rights as 
basic civil rights.  
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increasing inequality led to intensified social conflicts, the CCP leadership developed 
the discourse of “Harmonious Society”. While explicitly serving a socialist goal, this 
discourse revitalized and reconceptualized such elements as natural harmony and 
social order under the Confucian Model to legitimize the state’s effort in maintaining 
stability (维稳), sometimes through undemocratic tools such as censorship (Zheng 
and Tok 2007).  Therefore, in today’s China, legal ideas based on different 
complementary as well as conflicting cultural discourses coexist, rendering “Chinese 
legality” an inherently complex concept.  
Meanwhile, the social relations from which law arises and on which law 
exercises constraints further add to the complexity. Previous legal consciousness 
research demonstrates the constructed and constitutive nature of law and legality by 
examining how they intersect with other social structures such as family (Hartog 
1993), race/ethnicity (Goldberg-Ambrose 1994), gender (Witt 2000), and sexuality 
and marriage (Hull 2003). Therefore, in my dissertation, I propose a 
relational/contextualized (de)conceptualization of law. Specifically, instead of treating 
“law” as an overarching and homogenous entity, I propose to systematically 
deconstruct law along the different social relations it regulates. Based on fundamental 
characteristics of contemporary Chinese society and how different laws regulate and 
shape the various aspects of social life, the analysis in the following chapters focuses 
on three kinds of social relations, namely family relationships, state-citizen 
relationships and economy-related relationships.  
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I chose the three spheres of social life based on their significance in 
contemporary Chinese society: family relations; relations with the state; and economic 
relations. Each sphere is closely connected with one of the three most influential 
intellectual traditions discussed above. As a kinship based society, imperial China 
placed paramount importance on the institution of the family and mutual support 
among family members as the basis and core of social and legal orders (Ebrey and 
Watson 1986; see also Fei 2005). Although the political turmoil and economic 
reforms in recent Chinese history have modified the specific structure of 
contemporary Chinese families (Quach and Anderson 2008), the value of family ties 
as the foundation of social life has never been seriously challenged.9 Therefore, 
Confucian legal ideas are most relevant to family laws in today’s China as the 
relationships within the family are still mostly regulated by notions of traditional 
morality.  
Meanwhile, the illiberal and undemocratic nature of the Chinese government 
renders the relationship between its state and citizens a unique context for socio-legal 
studies. In post-Mao China, the socialist state still has a strong grip over political 
                                                 
9 Mao launched a series of attacks against the “feudalist culture” during the Cultural 
Revolution and attempted to trump family ties with class struggles. However, in post-Mao 
China, the Cultural Revolution is considered a grave mistake and one of the reasons cited is 
its destruction of “traditional culture”.  As argued by some China scholars (e.g. Zhao 2000), 
in contemporary China, as the ideological ground of the socialist state decays, moralistic 
legitimacy becomes increasingly important; and one way for the government to build such 
ground is to revive the discourses surrounding familial values. 
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power and limits the development of civil society (Zhao 2000). Studies on the 
Chinese legal system have repeatedly documented the influence of political factors in 
a variety of legal domains (Tanner and Green 2007; Qin 2007; Rooij and Lo 2010). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in the political realm, law is most likely 
subject to the influence of the official discourse of the State-Socialist model.  
Finally, the importance of economic relationships lies in the role of economic 
reform in motivating China’s legal reform. Many have argued that the main objective 
of the legal reform is to ensure healthy and sustainable economic growth ( Potter 
2004, Lubman 1999, Chen 1996). As China models its economy-related legal system 
after Western economies (Vermeer and d’Hooghe 2002), one may conclude that the 
law functions in a similar manner in China’s markets as it does in these other market-
driven economies. Therefore, Enlightenment-driven legal ideas are most relevant to 
laws regulating economic relationships.  
Chengdu 
I focus on one major city, Chengdu, the capital of the Sichuan province. 
Chengdu has some 14 million inhabitants according to the 2010 census. I selected this 
city as the research site because it presents some of the most important characteristics 
of China’s urban and social development (Wang 2008). Its inland location means that 
it is not as heavily influenced by globalization as other mega cities such as Beijing or 
Shanghai, allowing it to maintain more of the traditional characteristics of Chinese 
culture. Yet, its strategic importance in the economic development of western China 
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calls for “modernization.” Thus, on-going reforms produce colliding cultural 
discourses in this city. This social context allows us to observe a variety of coexisting, 
sometimes contradicting, legal ideas and behaviors. Such variation crystallizes how 
legal compliance behaviors may be associated with legal ideas. Chengdu thus is likely 
to have a mixture of cultural materials that is well suited for this project.  
Method and Data 
To gather data for this project, I conducted a social survey with 556 
individuals randomly sampled from all Chengdu urban residents. 10 Survey 
methodology has been critiqued for obstructing the complexity of legality and legal 
consciousness with standardized variables as measures of fluid meanings (Silbey 
2005). I concur with the substance of this argument and address the limit of my 
methodology with regard to the various aspects of my research questions in each 
empirical chapter. However, I also contend that, despite their shortcomings, social 
surveys produce indispensable information on the broad patterns of social phenomena 
and generalizable relationships among social forces. In the context of China, where 
socio-legal research is not abundant, such information is valuable in establishing 
baseline facts for more nuanced research.  
One main caveat when interpreting my survey findings is that the associations 
I identify and describe in the following chapters do not necessarily constitute causal 
                                                 
10 The survey was conducted with the help of the Western China Social Survey team.  
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relations. My theoretical arguments suggest that people’s legal consciousness is likely 
to be a result of their larger cultural identities, as reflected in their memories of the 
past, and that such consciousness further shapes their behaviors toward the law (legal 
compliance and mobilization). However, the operation of individual consciousness 
and of larger cultural structures is much more complex. Chances are that different 
components measured in my survey draw from each other. A cross-sectional survey 
cannot provide sufficient evidence to make definitive casual arguments. Therefore, all 
arguments regarding the direction of associations in the dissertation are based on 
theoretical reasoning for the sake of analytical clarity instead of empirical data.  
To my best knowledge, this survey is the first in China to specifically focus on 
the connection between collective memories and legal consciousness. To avoid bias in 
answers, the instructions for the survey questionnaire did not specify the connection 
between memory/history and law as the major objective. Instead, it described the 
instrument as a general poll of social values among Chengdu residents. The survey 
consists of three major sections. Section I covers the cultural attitudes of the 
respondent, including but not limited to their memories of China’s past. Section II 
surveys their ideas of and potential behaviors toward the law. Section III collects 
demographic information. A complete survey questionnaire in both English and 
Chinese is attached as appendixes. In the following chapters, I describe how I 
measured memories and legal consciousness in detail as they become relevant in the 
analysis. A note on my measurement of collective memories is in order. I utilized 
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open-ended questions to capture a wide range of responses. These did not entirely 
map onto the three eras of Chinese history that I have highlighted in this chapter. As a 
result, my findings reveal a more complex process of (re)construction of the past than 
I had anticipated in my hypotheses, which were based on the three categories. I 
discuss these discrepancies and their implications in the empirical chapters that 
follow.  
To implement the survey, I trained a team of 50 interviewers who then 
conducted in-house surveys. The training covered basic interview skills and the 
intention of the survey questions. Stratified probability sampling strategy was utilized 
to ensure the representativeness of the sample. Specifically, 28 neighborhoods11 were 
randomly selected from the urban area of Chengdu city; 20 households were 
randomly sampled from each chosen neighborhood and finally one individual 
between the age of 18 and 79 was randomly selected from each household. In the 
sampling of neighborhoods, I was assisted by the Chengdu Statistics Bureau. The 
complete list of neighborhoods is considered confidential information to persons 
without special government permission. The survey team sampled within 
neighborhoods. Team leaders visited each of the 28 neighborhood offices to obtain a 
                                                 
11 Neighborhood is called “Jiedao (街道)” in Chinese and is the local administrative unit in 
urban China. According to the “Organizational Law of the Local People’s Congress and 
Local People’s Governments of the PRC”, county-level governments could set up delegated 
offices in smaller areas within their jurisdiction and these areas are called Jiedao 
(Neighborhood). Neighborhood officials are in charges of keeping detailed registration 
information of all households in their neighborhood. 
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list of registered households and their addresses. A list of 20 households was then 
randomly drawn from the each neighborhood. Finally, when an interviewer entered a 
household, he/she chose the person to be interviewed based on a randomization 
schedule.12 The interviewer then read the survey questions to the selected individual 
and filled out the questionnaire with answers provided by the respondent. Four of the 
surveys were discarded due to respondent ineligibility (age beyond 79), resulting in a 
sample size of 556.  
Types of Laws 
As discussed before, I focus on three types of social relations regulated by 
law, namely family relations, state-citizen relations, and economy-related relations. 
For Chapters III and IV, I distinguish between public and private economic relations. 
I chose two specific legal provisions from each category to construct law-related 
measures. These will be discussed in more detail in the remaining chapters, but I 
provide an introduction to their operationalization here.   
Two specific legal provisions were chosen from numerous family laws in 
China. These are laws providing that 1) parents are responsible for raising their 
underage children and 2) adult children are responsible for supporting their aging 
                                                 
12 The random selection of individuals within households was based on their birthdays. The 
interviewer registered the birthdays of all household members, calculated their ages and thus 
eligibility for the survey, and picked the eligible person whose birthday was closest to the 
interview date as a subject. If nobody was at home to answer the door or if the selected 
individual was not on site, the interviewer was instructed to revisit the household three times 
and then move to a different person in the household.  
  
 
31 
 
 
 
parents (Article 21, Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China).  These two 
laws are chosen because filial piety and parental love are the most essential and 
consistent features of discourses surrounding Chinese families (Yue and Ng 1999; 
Knapp 2005).13 
The two specific provisions chosen from laws that regulate state-citizen 
relations  are 1) family planning laws (Population and Family Planning Law of the 
People's Republic of China) and 2) laws that restrict individuals’ ability to participate 
in political groups and demonstrations (Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations). These laws are chosen because they 
characterize the unique relationship between the Chinese government and its 
citizenry. I explain each in turn. 
In China, reproduction is not an issue of individual (women’s) rights but 
instead is regulated to meet the needs of the collective (Lee and Feng 2001). In 
particular, after 1978, the Chinese government implemented controversial family 
planning policies that made the regulation of reproduction formally the business of the 
state (Savage 1988). Since then, the number of children per family is defined first and 
foremost as an issue related to population control (Tribe 1992). This state intervention 
into individuals’ private lives has invited mixed domestic and international reactions 
                                                 
13 Institutions such as marriage, while remaining unique and closely tied to traditional 
Chinese culture, have gone through considerable reconstruction (Quach and Anderson 2008). 
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and is said to illustrate China as an oppressive state (Crane and Finkle 1989). China’s 
family planning laws thus provide a good example of its regulation of the state-citizen 
relationship.  
Similarly, in China, people’s freedom of association and demonstration is 
limited. The state represses demonstrations with force and takes protesters into 
custody, often without fair trials and proper procedure ( Polumbaum 1991; Kaiman 
2013; Tang 2013). Laws that limit the freedom of association and demonstration thus 
constitute another example of how the Chinese state attempts to regulate its citizenry. 
This study focuses thirdly on economic regulations affecting 
interactions among non-intimate parties.14 It further distinguishes between laws 
that protect private economic interests and those that regulate public economic 
relationships. The distinction is meaningful to the extent that, under an 
authoritarian and ideologically socialist state, public economic laws should be 
more legitimate. Meanwhile, infringement upon the public interest is considered a 
violation of the state’s interest which can invite intense and repressivet state 
intervention (Los 1983; Savelsberg 2000). As examples of laws in the private 
economic realm, I selected intellectual property rights laws and theft laws, 
                                                 
14 I am aware 1) that people interact with strangers in ways other than economic transaction 
and 2) that other groups such are friends, colleagues, neighbors, also play important roles in 
people’s social life. Economic relationships are chosen because of their significance as 
driving forces of the legal reforms in China. Meanwhile, other groups are likely located 
between strangers and family members on the spectrum of familiarity and intimacy. This 
study looks at the extremes of the spectrums as examples of more nuanced variation. 
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specifically, laws that regulate downloading unauthorized materials and 
knowingly purchasing stolen property.   
To illustrate obedience to laws in the public economic realm I chose tax laws 
and laws that guard against the private appropriation of public resources. These two 
laws were chosen because they are pertinent to different social groups. The national 
minimum wage for paying personal income tax is 2,000 RMB/month, which is close 
to average personal income levels in urban China in 2012 (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2013). This means that tax laws are more relevant to Chinese people who 
are relatively well-off. In contrast, the appropriation of public resources, such as water 
and electricity, is more prevalent among people with lower income levels who tend to 
live in housing provided by their work units. 
The Sample 
Table 2.1 reports the distribution of the demographic variables. It shows that the 
sample of this study is made up of a diverse group of individuals. The participants of 
the survey ranged from 18 to 79 years in age by study design. On average, they have 
about 12 years of formal education, an equivalent of a high school degree in the 
Chinese context. As an indicator of the extreme economic inequality in China, 
monthly household expenditure varies drastically, ranging from 300 RMB (less than 
50 USD) to 50,000 RMB (more than 7,000 USD) per month. About 58% of the 
respondents are female and more than a fifth are Communist Party members. Aside 
from gender, the distributions of most demographic variables among the sample are 
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comparable to recent census data for similar geographic regions (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2012).15 There is no reason to suspect that respondents included in this study 
vary systematically from the general adult population in Chengdu in terms of their 
ideas about and behaviors toward the law. Therefore, by controlling for a number of 
demographic variables in the statistical analyses, the findings and conclusions based 
on this sample are meaningful indications of patterns among ordinary residents in 
Chengdu, a typical urban setting in contemporary China.  
Table 2.1 Distribution of Demographic Variables  
Variable Statistics N 
Age (mean ± SD, median [range]) 45.7 ± 15.4, 46, [18-79] 555 
Sex (% female) 58.1% 556 
Years of formal education (mean ± SD, median 
[range]) 11.8 ± 3.8, 12, [0-22] 554 
Political affiliation (% party member) 20.5% 556 
Household monthly expense in RMB 
     (mean ± SD, median [range]) 
3693.9 ± 3893.9, 3000, 
[300-50000] 529 
 
                                                 
15 To my best knowledge, there is no detailed census data available for the exact same 
sampling frame as mine. Therefore, I based the comparison on the 2005 1-thousdandth census 
sample data of urban Sichuan, the province where Chengdu is located. The gender 
distribution of my sample does seem to differ slightly from that population (where there are 
52% women for the same age group). However, by controlling for gender in all my analyses, I 
address the possibility of men and women differ systematically in any of the processes in 
which I am interested and thus the connections I found among memories, legal ideas, and 
potential legal behaviors are still meaningful. 
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Chapter III: Linking Memories to Legal Ideas 
The central argument of my dissertation is that both legality and legal 
consciousness are culturally and historically specific. I argue that currently legal 
consciousness studies on China, while informative, still do not adequately address the 
country’s complex history and cultural legacies. Studies in various disciplines have 
shown that retrospective accounts are essential in creating and sustaining continuous 
identities of individuals (Davis 1979), communities (Bellah et. al 1985), and nations 
(Tsutsui 2009). In the context of rapid social change, social memories form the bridge 
between the past and the present and provide strategies to cope with the uncertain 
future (Encarnación 2008,Curry 2007, Brito, Enriquez, and Aguilar 2001). Therefore, 
in this chapter, I introduce the theoretical concept of collective memories and outline 
the cultural terrain of my study setting to contextualize the discussion of legal ideas 
and behaviors of Chinese people described in later chapters.  
I start by demonstrating why a historical notion of culture is necessary in the 
study of contemporary China and Chinese law. I then provide a brief overview of the 
basic concept of collective memory and its connection to law, introducing specific 
hypotheses based on broader theoretical expectations. After explaining the key 
variables for this chapter, I elaborate my findings in thematic orders, revealing the 
patterns of collective memories among Chinese urban residents, how they vary across 
social groups and how memories are associated with people’s perception of current 
laws. I conclude that memories, as a constructed vision of the past, are crucial to 
  
 
36 
 
 
 
understanding the fluid cultural identities, including legal consciousness of ordinary 
citizens in the context of profound reforms.   
Historicizing Legal Consciousness 
The study of legal consciousness in China, although still emerging, has borne 
some fruit. Gallagher (2006), for instance, finds two related but distinct patterns of 
understanding law through experiences with the court among legal aid clients in a 
Shanghai law firm. As they became familiar with the legal system that was once 
distant and seemingly mysterious, these plaintiffs displayed an increasing confidence 
in engaging law more strategically, but a decreasing respect for law as fair and just. 
This divergence in different aspects of legal consciousness, which Gallagher aptly 
names “informed disenchantment”, clearly resembles the ambivalence expressed in 
most legal consciousness studies in the United States where most legal consciousness 
research is based. In an international comparative study that includes China, Jacobs 
(2007) also confirms the multiplicity of legal consciousness, and he refers to the 
difference in cultures as an explanation for the variation. 
These studies are informative as they reveal the necessity of taking culture 
seriously in the study of legal consciousness. Like most legal consciousness studies 
(Merry 1990, Tyler 1990, McCann 1994, Marshall 2005, etc), they are limited by the 
lack of attention to the cultural origins of legality and legal consciousness. “Legal 
culture” as the basis for most analyses is treated as an assumption instead of a 
theoretical concept that also requires being defined, categorized and analyzed. This 
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problem becomes especially pronounced in the case of China, as argued in Chapter II, 
where the basic categories regarding law contradict those of the western “rule of law” 
model and are not internally consistent (Head 2009). In the stories of Gallagher 
(2006) and Jacobs (2007), “rights” and “entitlement” seem to always be at the center 
of the argument, especially when the discussion involves the legitimacy and 
hegemony of law. This suggests an implicit but close bond between awareness of 
rights and respect for law. For countries like the United States, where very basic 
social relations are formulated by borrowing concepts from law, this bond might 
make intuitive sense (Ewick and Silbey 1998). Yet, China fundamentally differs from 
the United States when it comes to legal tradition or state formation. Specifically, 
“private right” was never a presumption or even implication of law in traditional 
Chinese culture (Liang 1996, Diamant et al. 2005, Gu 2009).  
To explore the extent to which various legal cultures simultaneously inform 
the legal ideas and behaviors of Chinese people, I collaborated with Professor 
Savelsberg to conduct an interview project in 2009. I interviewed a dozen Chinese 
people engaged in disputes over relocation issues with their local government. Five of 
these individuals resorted to court while the rest opted for other revenues to address 
their grievances. The interviews focused on the processes of the conflicts and the 
actors’ choice whether to litigate. The interviews showed that subjects indeed refer to 
the three larger cultural discourses discussed in previous chapters, namely the 
Confucian Model, the Enlightenment Model, and the State Socialist Model. 
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Therefore, at least in the case of contemporary China, to arrive at a sufficient 
understanding of legal consciousness is not only to decipher what people think of and 
do with law but also to trace their motivation to different cultural origins, to explain 
the coexistence of these different cultural schemas and to understand how these 
schemas and people’s minds and behaviors penetrate each other. As argued in Chapter 
II, each of these models, while constantly being reinvented by current actors, has deep 
historical roots in various eras of China’s long history. An understanding of China’s 
past as reflected in the minds of Chinese people today thus is critical for the 
understanding of its current legalities.  
As we have seen the complexity of legal culture and legal consciousness in 
China and its possible relation to China’s past, I introduce the concept of collective 
memory to accommodate the need of taking seriously the rich history of China in 
understanding Chinese cultures in general and Chinese legal cultures in particular.  
Collective Memory 
1. The Social Origins of Memories  
I use collective memory the way Halbwachs (1992) has coined it, which is a 
“sociological perspective with a particular emphasis on the impersonal, conventional, 
collective, and normative aspects of the process of remembering.” (Zerubavel 1996: 
283). Challenging empiricist and Kantian apriori conceptions of knowledge 
(Savelsberg and King 2007), this constructionist notion of memory echoes earlier 
voices on individual memory (Bartlett 1932, Davis 1979) but attributes even heavier 
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weight to its social origin. Since “it is in society that people normally acquire their 
memories; it is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories” 
(Halbwachs 1992a:38), remembering is as much social as it is personal and memory 
itself is a “social, inter-subjective phenomenon” (Zerubavel 1996: 297). The logical 
outcome of memory so defined is that there should be systematic patterns of 
memories among members of a society. Therefore, the first set of objectives of this 
chapter is to examine and present the patterns of Chinese people’s memories. Chapter 
II described the three major historical periods of relevance to my dissertation, namely 
the Imperial era, the Republican era and the Communist era. The three historical 
periods are not equally represented in materialized commemoration. For example, as 
indicated in Table 3.1, the majority of China’s seven national holidays (Spring 
Festival, Qiming Festival, Duanwu Festival and Zhongqiu Festival) are adopted from 
long-standing folk traditions, potentially providing rich cultural materials for 
individuals in their imagination of the nation’s history and tradition. Two of the three 
other national holidays (Labor Day and National Day) are linked to the communist 
movements. In contrast, there is no national holidays dedicated to the Republican era. 
16 Similarly, among the 96 first-tier state-owed museum operating in China in 2012 
                                                 
16 Understanding the last of the seven holidays (New Year’s Day) requires a brief review of 
its history in China. Before 1912, New Year’s Day (元旦) had always referred to the first 
day of the lunar calendar. The switching of meaning happened on January 1st 1912, the day 
of the establishment of the Republic of China after the capitalist revolution of 1911. 
Afterwards, it was celebrated also as the founding day of the Republic. In Taiwan, where the 
government considers itself a continuation of the Republic of China, the New Year’s Day is 
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(source: State Administration of Cultural Heritage), only five are dedicated to events 
and figures in the Republican era. Four of them are associated with China’s struggle 
against Japanese colonization and only one is dedicated to the founding father of the 
Republic.17  Therefore, I expect this silence in public and collective commemoration 
to correspond with a lack of memories in individual minds.   
Hypothesis 3.1: Fewer Chinese people remember events and figures from the 
Republican era than from either the Imperial or Communist era. 
Table 3.1: China’s National Holidays 
Name of Holiday Date Content of Celebration Days off  
New Year’s Day January 1st  Beginning of a calendar year 1 
Spring Festival 
(Lunar New Year) 
Varies (first day of the 
lunar calendar) 
Beginning of a lunar year 3 
Qingming Festival  April 5th  Memorial day for ancestors 1 
                                                 
also called the Founding Day of the Republic of China. However, in mainland China, the 
celebration of this holiday is totally deprived of any political or historical implication. (The 
discussion of the debate over the nature of Taiwan’s current regime and its connection to the 
ROC government in and outside Taiwan is beyond the scope of this chapter). The absence of 
mnemonic contents constitutes an unstructured “overt silence” that might contribute to the 
forgetting of the celebration’s origin (Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger 2010) and the historical 
background attached. Actually, a comparison between the lists of official holidays of the two 
countries/regions offers an interesting insight into how collective commemorations reflect 
and reconstruct collective memories. Both countries/regions celebrate the same traditional 
holidays and the New Year’s Day (with different meanings). In addition to that, Taiwan 
celebrates Peace’s Day on Feb. 28th and National Day on October 10th. The first 
commemorates a violent conflict between the islanders and the government Chongqing (the 
Capital of the Republic during WW II) in 1947 and the latter celebrates the victory of the 
bourgeoisie revolution in 1911.   
17 There are seven and sixteen museums respectively dedicated to the Imperial and 
Communist history. The vast majority of these museums are either not for historical content 
or cover the general history of a region. Without reviewing the specific content of each 
museum, which is far beyond the scope of this chapter, I cannot conclude how much 
commemoration is dedicated to each historical period. 
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Labor Day May 1st The 1886 Chicago Strike 1 
Duanwu Festival 
(Double Fifth 
Festival) 
Varies (the fifth day of 
the fifth month on the 
lunar calendar) 
Beginning of summer and the 
famous poet Qu Yuan 
1 
Zhongqiu Festival 
(Mid-autumn Day) 
Varies (the 15th day of 
the 8th month on the 
lunar calendar) 
The full moon and the get-
together of families 
1 
National Day October 1st  The establishment of PRC    3 
2. Multiple Memories 
The understanding of collective memory as constructed and malleable 
naturally leads to the conclusion that the social location of a person dictates his/her 
memories of the past and thus there is a systematic but not unified vision of the past. 
As a student of Durkheim, Halbwachs is both sympathetic to and cautious about his 
teacher’s collectivist overtones.18 Instead of talking about Society as a single 
collectivity and the moral force of “collective conscience” (Durkheim 1964), 
Halbwachs (1992) points to the location of individual carriers of memory in different 
groups and notes that there are as many different collective memories as there are 
carrier groups. Building on this notion of group-specificity of collective memory, later 
works have demonstrated how people and groups fight vigorously for their stories of 
the past.  As a result of these mnemonic battles (Zerubavel 2012), there exist state 
histories and counter histories (Alonso 1988), official and vernacular memories 
(Bodnar 1992), master and competing narratives (Tsutsui 2009). I thus expect to 
                                                 
18 For a review of Durkheim’s (implicit) contribution to collective memory study, see 
Misztal 2003. 
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observe systematic variation in memories among Chinese people based on their 
membership to different social groups. Specifically, I anticipate that: 
Hypothesis 3.2A: People of higher socio-economic status (SES) are more 
likely to consider events and figures from the Republican era as important. 
Hypothesis 3.2A is based on the common understanding of the Republic of 
China as the product of a bourgeoisie-led revolution (Xue 2011, M. Zhang 2011). The 
communist Chinese government after 1949, while never denying the historical 
significance of relevant events and figures from that era, never fully embraced them in 
the form of national commemoration or holiday as it does for other historical periods. 
Meanwhile, such events and figures occupy large sections of history text books. In 
addition, in high-end cultural production, such as literature, a contained nostalgia of 
the Republic era has been a long-standing theme (e.g. Zhang  2004). Therefore, I 
expect the exposure to formal education and elite cultural products as well as 
identification with the bourgeoisie leaders will lead to more appreciation of the 
Republican history. In contrast, I expect the Communist Party members, those who 
are most closely connected to the political core of the state and who have arguably 
benefited the most from a communist regime, to be more appreciative toward the 
history of the communist movements, particularly those during the Maoist era when 
political capital was of greatest value.  
Hypothesis 3.2B: Communist Party members are more likely than non-
members to consider leaders and achievements of Maoist movements as important. 
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3. The Problem of Cohort 
In addition to social standings, memory scholars have been particularly 
interested in how age cohort may be a factor in whether and how people remember 
the past or, in turn, how the memory of important historical events can mark a certain 
age group as a cohort. Mannheim ( 2013[1952]) argues that distinction among 
generations19 is not biologically inevitable but created through major social and 
political events collectively experienced by members of each cohort during their 
formative years. Where unusual events are rare and change is slow, as in traditional 
peasant societies, distinct cohorts may not appear. Only where events occur in such a 
manner as to demarcate a cohort in terms of its "historical-social" consciousness, 
should we speak of a true cohort. Empirical research has attested to this theory by 
demonstrating how the significance (Wohl 1979) and timing (Schuman and Scott 
1989) of events can be consequential to cohort identity formation. The effect of 
significant events in identity formation thus depends on how they are experienced by 
various cohorts. In other words, for events that are not experienced by any living 
cohort or are being experienced by all age groups, cohort should not be a relevant 
concept. Therefore, in this chapter, I test the cohort effect of memory. I expect that 
memories of events during the early Communist era, particularly the Cultural 
                                                 
19 The Mannheimian term “generation” is usually considered equivalent to “cohort” in most 
other scholars’ work on collective memories. I will use the term “cohort” in its place 
hereafter.  
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Revolution, as the iconic event of the Mao era, will distinguish those who were of 
formative age at that time from those who are either too young to remember it or too 
old for it to be influential. I expect so because those events were experienced by 
multiple age groups within my sample at different stages of their life trajectories. In 
contrast, events in the Imperial era and the Republican era were either never 
experienced by any of the respondents or only experienced by the oldest group in their 
early years. Therefore, I do not expect to see any cohort difference for memories of 
these earlier historical periods. 
Hypothesis 3.3: People who experienced significant events during their 
formative age, which is late adolescence or early adulthood, will be most likely to 
mark these events as important. Respondents in their late teens when the Cultural 
Revolution started in 1966 (i.e. people between age 62 and 65 in 2012) are more 
likely than others to recall the Cultural Revolution as an important part of China’s 
history.   
Memory and Law  
Scholars have generally come to agree that collective memories are at least in 
part represented in "rules, laws, procedures, precedents, records, files, books, 
holidays, statues, mementos" (Schudson 1994:51, emphasis added) of specific 
institutions-which conforms to the more abstract proposition that institutions 
remember (Douglas 1987). In other words, law itself constitutes the crystallization of 
a nation’s remembrance of and response to its own past. The relationships between 
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law and collective memory lay at the foundation of many countries’ founding myths. 
Legal documents such as Magna Carta and the Declaration of Independence are 
essential for understanding their respective societies’ beginnings and values. Negative 
memory of the past can also serve as a reminder to society and compel legal changes 
so as to prevent history from taking the same trajectory in the future (Alexander 
2004b, Savelsberg and King 2011) or the suppression of such memory can limit the 
possibility for legal change (Balfour 2003).  
Meanwhile, law exerts both inducement to and constraints on the formation, 
institutionalization and changes in collective memories as well. Authors as early as 
Durkheim (1964) have been attentive to the ritual function of trails in reinforcing 
social solidarity through degrading the person on trial (Garfinkel 1956), clarifying the 
wrongs in the past and preparing ground for future redress (Borneman 1997). Others 
emphasize how law allows discontenting actors to converse with one another (Osiel 
1997). Both criminal prosecution and civil confrontation can been seen as ways in 
which different parties struggle to define the “truth” about the past and thus contribute 
to the formation of collective memories. Sometimes, law even gives direct answer to 
what is “true” when there is no other way to find out, as in the case of death on the 
battle field or missing person (McEvoy and Conway 2004). Law can even be the 
object of memory (Kwiatkowski 2006). Yet, law’s contribution to collective memory 
is neither entirely genuine nor without limitation. The reconstruction of the past is 
bound to be selective due to particular institutional rules of law such as its evidentiary 
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standards, binary logic, and individualization tendency (Giesen 2004) and changes in 
all these aspects. Law also influences how we remember the past by restricting access 
to historical documents (Markovitz 2001) and the distribution of certain types of 
knowledge (For a comprehensive review and empirical elaboration of the dialectical 
relationship between law and collective memory, see Savelsberg and King 2007; 
Savelsberg and King 2011).  
The dialectic relationship between memory and law is of particular importance 
in the understanding of legal reforms in transitional societies where drastic social 
changes have brought the past into direct conflict with the present and the future. The 
final objective of this chapter thus is to explore the connection between what is known 
to be important in the past and people’s ideas about current laws. As outlined in 
Chapter II, originated from different historical eras, the three cultural models are also 
relevant to different types of laws. In designing the survey, I did not constrain the 
respondents’ memories of the past by providing them categories. The connections among the 
cultural models, the historical eras, and different types of laws are based on theoretical 
speculation. The goal of this chapter is to empirically test those connections. Specifically, 
dominant in ancient China, the Confucian model is most relevant to laws that regulate 
family relations; dated back to the Republican era, the Enlightenment model is closely 
tied to the market and economic transactions in contemporary China; and the current 
official Socialist State model is likely to be influential in the domain of state-citizen 
interaction. Therefore, I expect that people with memories of different historical eras 
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will show varying levels of support to laws across social relations. In addition, I 
expect that those who deem the Communist era as the most important are more likely 
to be supportive of the current communist regime and thus are more likely to view the 
laws under the regime as legitimate in general. 
Hypothesis 3.4A: Those who are more appreciative of histories of the ancient 
China are more likely to consider family laws as legitimate. 
Hypothesis 3.4B: Those who are more appreciative of the Republican era and 
the bourgeoisie revolution are more likely to find the laws regulating economic 
relationships as legitimate. 
Hypothesis 3.4C: Those who are more appreciative of the Communist era will 
rank the overall legitimacy of law higher than people who remembers the other two 
eras. In particular, they are more likely to acknowledge the legitimacy of laws that 
strengthen the political power of the state in particular. 
Key Variables and Statistical Models 
The data used to test the above hypotheses come from the survey instrument 
described in Chapter II. For this chapter, I utilize a methodology proposed by 
culturalist scholars to operationalize the concept of collective memory. There has been 
a long-standing debate over what memories are truly “collective”. Some maintain that 
only materialized objects independent of human consciousness such as monuments, 
rituals and written texts can be the vehicle of collective memory (Pierre Nora 1996, 
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see also Terdiman 1993). However, since the late 1990s and early 2000s, there have 
been arguments for bringing individuals back to the study of collective memory 
(Wertsch and Roediger 2008). As noted by Halbwachs, despite his emphasis on the 
social nature of collective memory (or any kind of memory), the carriers of collective 
memories are still individuals in groups. A more comprehensive approach thus sees 
collective memories as “meaning-making” cultural reservoirs (Schwartz 1996) from 
which everyday folk draw resources and to which they contribute (Schwartz and 
Schuman 2005). Therefore, I measured collective memories through aggregating and 
systematically looking for patterns in individual answers to questions regarding the 
past. 
Memories of the Past 
A series of questions in the survey concern people’s memories and evaluations 
of China’s past. The list is as follows. 
1) What do you think is the most important event/change throughout Chinese history?  
2) What do you think is the most important event/change since the People’s Republic of 
China was established? 
3) Who do you think is the greatest thinker in Chinese history? 
4) Who do you think is the greatest political leader in Chinese history? 
To avoid bias by my assumptions of Chinese history, all questions are open-
ended. These four questions are designed to capture the various aspects of national 
identities. I first conducted frequency analyses of the events/changes/figures and 
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created dummy variables for those most frequently mentioned—those mentioned by 
at least five percent of the respondents.  
To examine how memories of the past vary across social groups, I conducted 
logistic regressions to identify socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
associated with the odds of it being mentioned. The demographic variables used in the 
analyses for this chapter are described in Table 2.1.  
Legitimacy of Law 
I measured the respondents’ perception of law’s legitimacy by asking how 
much they thought the violation of law also violated core social values. The question 
was worded as follows, 
How much do you think each of the following behaviors violates our core social values? 
The respondent was given a list of behaviors that violate various Chinese laws 
and was asked to assign a score of 1 to 4, the larger the score, the more the behavior 
violated social norms and thus the more legitimate the legal rule that restricts the 
behavior.20  
The eight behaviors included in the survey constitute violations of the four 
larger categories of laws discussed in Chapter II: 1) laws that govern family relations, 
2) laws that regulate the relationship between the state and citizens,3) laws that 
protect public economic interests, and 4) laws that protect private economic interests. 
                                                 
20 The labels associated with the four numbers are: 1—no violation at all, 2—a little 
violation, 3—some violation, and 4—much violation. 
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Appendix A gives a full list of the eight behaviors in the order in which they appeared 
in the questionnaire. Except for violations of the family-planning policy that only 
constitutes civil violations, all behaviors could result in either civil or criminal 
sanctions. The circumstances and severity of violations were not described in detail 
but left to the respondent’s own judgment. 
For the statistical analyses described below, I aggregated the score of different 
behaviors within four categories of laws as well as across all types of laws. Since 
there are two laws within each category and eight laws in total, the final non-
compliance scores are variables with either seven (2-8) (for each type of law) or 
twenty eight (5-32) (for all laws combined) possible values. 
The wording of the question was designed to emphasize the “social” aspect of 
law’s legitimacy instead of the respondent’s personal value judgment. The survey 
interviewers were trained to clarify “core social values” as meaning “values that you 
think the larger society holds as important, not necessarily your own values”. The 
legitimacy of law is seen as hegemonic not because it resonates with the personal 
philosophies of its subject but rather its link to some “larger” values that transcend 
personal ideas and interests and to which we should defer.  
In line with the Weberian categorization of substantive and formal legal 
rationalities (Weber 1978), contemporary socio-legal scholars in the U.S. attempt to 
explore whether each, the content and the formality of the law independently 
contributes to people’s perception of the law’s legitimacy which in turn shapes their 
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compliance behaviors. However, formal legal procedures are not widely-respected in 
China, even within the judiciary (Fu and Cullen 2011). Lay Chinese people hardly 
make clear distinctions between formal and substantive aspects of the law (Michelson 
and Read 2011).21  Meanwhile, protection of individual rights has not been a central 
piece of legal philosophies throughout Chinese history (Head 2009). As documented 
by previous legal studies of local courts in China, “practical meanings of the legal 
institutions are socially constructed in the judicial practice to reconcile the conflicts 
between global and local sources of legitimacy” (Liu 2006:75). Therefore, the current 
project does not distinguish between formal and substantive legitimacies and leaves it 
for the research subjects (in this case ordinary Chinese people) to decide what social 
values are embedded in the law.22 
                                                 
21 During the study-design phase of the current project, the author also conducted a number 
of trial surveys with colleagues and friends, most of whom are highly educated and more 
exposed to foreign legal cultures than an average Chinese person. All of these survey takers 
were confused and annoyed by questions designed to distinguish the fairness of the 
procedures and the justice of the outcome of a legal process. The local professional 
collaborators also advised against including such questions, citing the possibility of agitating 
and losing potential respondents as justification and indicating that they did not find the 
distinction meaningful.  
22 The social basis of legitimacy is not a set of homogenous or static values. It varies 
spatially and temporally (Weber 1978). Development of formal legal rationality and rights 
discourses is closely associated with the rise of modern capitalism in continental European 
countries and is not necessarily applicable in other social or historical context (Trubek 1972). 
In the context of contemporary China, a land with its own unique historical and cultural 
heritages and far removed from western capitalist civilizations, there is no ground to assume 
either the formality of law or discourse around individual rights as the basis for law’s 
legitimacy.  
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To assess how people’s memories of the past are associated with their 
evaluation of current laws’ legitimacy, I conducted statistical analyses with the 
perceived level of law’s legitimacy as the dependent variable, using Ordinal Logistic 
Regression (OLR) models and controlling for demographic variables. The OLR 
model is suited for analyzing data with ordinal categorical dependent variables 
(Agresti 2002). The model is as follows, 
 
logit[Pr⁡(Legitimacy⁡scorei ≤ j|x)]
= α𝑗 + β1memory⁡of⁡certain⁡event + β2age + β3gender
+ β4enducaiton + β5party⁡membership
+ β6household⁡expenditure,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡j = 1,2, … J − 1 
 
logit[Pr⁡(Legitimacy⁡scorei ≤ j|x) is called the cumulative logit of category j, 
and is defined as the log function of the odds of legal compliance score being less 
than or equal to j against it being larger than j.  
A model for logit [Pr(Y≤j)] alone is an ordinary logit model for a binary 
response in which categories 1 to j form one outcome and categories j+1to J form the 
second. The model described above simultaneously uses all the cumulative logits. 
Each cumulative logit has its own intercept, 𝛼𝑗. The 𝛼𝑗
′𝑠 are increasing in j, since 
Pr(Y≤j|x) increases in j for fixed x, and the logit is an increasing function of this 
probability. The ß’s are the coefficients of the independent variables. eβ is the 
exponential increase in the odds of making response ≤j, with one-unit increase in the 
independent variable and it is constant across all logits. In other words, one need not 
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know the specific values of 𝛼𝑗
′𝑠 in order to interpret the effects of the independent 
variables. 
The following sections elaborate findings from the statistical analysis of the 
survey data and answer questions regarding the patterns of collective memories in 
contemporary Chinese urban setting and connect these memories to the perceptions of 
laws among ordinary Chinese people. 
What/who are remembered? 
 Table 3.2 presents the list of the most frequently mentioned historical events 
throughout Chinese history. More than eighty percent of respondents referred to one 
of the eight events as being the most important one throughout Chinese history. Most 
of these events are from recent or current historical periods. The subsequent section 
briefly describes these events in temporal order. As discussed previously, I am not 
trying to reconstruct an accurate and authentic history of China or objective recount of 
these events. Instead, I rely mostly on sources that are likely available to ordinary 
Chinese people so as to provide possible interpretations from their perspectives.   
Table 3.2: Distribution of Most Frequently Mentioned Historical Events/Changes 
Event/Change Time N  % 
Anti-Japan War 1937-1945 98 20.223 
Opium war 1840-1842 61 12.6 
Xinhai Revolution 1911 58 11.9 
Reform and Opening 1978-? 49 10.1 
                                                 
23 The percentages are based on number of people who gave a valid answer to the survey 
question. 
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Establishment of PRC 1949 38 7.8 
Cultural Revolution 1966-1976 36 7.4 
May 4th Movement 1919 32 6.6 
The War of Liberation 1946-1950 28 5.8 
Total  428 82.4 
 
The Opium War, reported by almost thirteen percent of the respondents as the 
most important historical event in Chinese history, usually denotes the First Opium war 
(1840-1842) fought between the Qing Dynasty and Great Britain. Prior to the war, China 
enjoyed a large trade surplus against Britain due to the high demand of Chinese goods in 
Europe and the Qing government’s tight control over international trade. The war was 
allegedly caused by British traders’ attempt to fix the trading imbalance by exporting 
opium to China which not only reversed the trade imbalance to Britain’s favor but 
caused enough social problems to worry the Qing government. The war was trigged by 
the anti-Opium campaign launched by Lin Zexu, the Commissioner of Canton port, in 
1839 when he forced the British Superintendent of Trade to turn in a large amount of 
Opium and promise not to export opium to China. The war ended in 1842 with the 
signing of the “Treaty of Nanking” which mandated the Qing government to pay an 
indemnity to Britain, open four ports to Britain, and cede Hong Kong to Queen Victoria. 
In a supplementary treaty, Qing gave Britain the most favored nation treatment. A series 
of treaties followed giving other foreign countries similar privileges and access to 
China’s market.  
Many see this war as the starting point of recent Chinese history and China’s fall 
as a powerful empire. For the first time in history, China had to adjust its own legal 
system to accommodate the demands of other nations. It also compromised the judicial 
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power of the Qing government by giving the colonizing powers consular jurisdiction 
over their citizens in China. In the decades following the Opium War, the Qing 
government attempted various modernization reforms, including the famous (and yet 
unsuccessful) “Hundred Days Reform” in 1898 modeled after the Meiji Reform in Japan 
and aimed at transforming China into a constitutional monarchy. In 1908, three years 
before Qing Dynasty was overturned by the Xinhai Revolution, Emperor Guangxu 
announced the first constitutional document in Chinese history.  
 The opium is not celebrated by any national holiday or public ceremony. In 
Chinese history textbooks, a lot of emphasis is put on the heroic charisma of Lin Zexu as 
an anti-opium fighter and the incompetence of the Qing government. 
 The Xinhai Revolution (1911), remember by twelve percent of the respondents, 
was known to be the Bourgeois revolution led by a group of intellectuals (among whom 
Sun Yat-sen was the most famous) that overturned the last imperial dynasty in China 
(Qing) and established the first Republic in Chinese history. It consisted of a series of 
revolts and uprisings throughout China against the Qing government for its corruption 
and ineffectiveness in resisting foreign powers’ intrusion. The revolution climaxed on 
October 10th 1911 with the successful uprising in Wuchang that encouraged and 
facilitated the victories of the revolutionary forces in other parts of China. A number of 
provinces declared independence from Qing and the Republic of China was established 
on January 1st, 1912. Sun Yat-sen was elected the temporary President. The revolutions 
finally achieved a cease-fire agreement between the Qing military leader Yuan Shikai 
and the revolutionary armies and forced the last Qing Emperor, Fuyi, to relinquish his 
power. The organization known to have organized and led the revolution, Tongmenhui 
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(United League), was the predecessor of “Kuomintang (KMT)”. Yuan Shikai succeeded 
Sun as the President of the Republic in 1913 as a compromise by the revolutionary force 
to secure his support. Before transferring the presidency to Yuan, Sun and the parliament 
allegedly passed the “Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China” to set up a 
parliamentary system as a constraint on Yuan’s power. This is considered the first 
bourgeoisie constitution in Chinese history.  
 
Figure 3.1: Railroad Protection Movements Monument in People’s Park, Chengdu 
 
Both the KMT government that later invaded Taiwan and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) claim to have inherited legacy from the Xinhai Revolution. 
Chinese history books place a fair amount of emphasis on this event—the latest version 
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of the official history text book24 by the People’s Educational Press allocates an entire 
chapter on the various aspects of the revolution. However, the revolution is not 
celebrated officially as a national holiday in contrast to Taiwan, where October 10th is 
celebrated as the National Day. 
Chengdu is closely tied to the Xinhai Revolution as the Wuchang Uprising 
resulted from the Qing government’s mishandling of the Railroad Protection 
Movements in the southern and central China provinces. Sichuan witnessed the most 
intensified Railroad Protection Movements and declared independence from the Qing 
government soon after the Wuchang Uprising. In the People’s Park in downtown 
Chengdu, a major gathering spot of Chengdu people, stands a monument of the Railroad 
Protection Movements (Figure 3.1). 
May 4th Movement (1919), mentioned by about seven percent of the 
respondents, was the marking event of a wider cultural and political movement (the New 
Culture Movement) during late 1910s and early 1920s led by radical intellectuals. 
“Democracy” and “Science” were the two slogans motivating the movements. A number 
                                                 
24 China has gone through different models of text book assignment for middle and high 
schools. Right after PRC was established, the Ministries of Education and the 
Administration of Press and Publication jointly established the People’s Educational Press 
and charged it with the sole responsibility and authority to compile text books for public 
schools (which make up the vast majority of schools in China). Since late 1950s, there have 
been several (unsuccessful) attempts to distribute the responsibilities and authorities to local 
governments. The most recent educational reform happen in early 2001 where the Ministry 
of Education decided that certified private organizations can also compile text books and a 
board made up with experts and teachers at the municipal level should decide which version 
of text book to use within the municipality. However, the reform was within the bigger 
context that the Ministry of Education still controlled the contents on the entrance exams to 
college, which dedicate what is taught in schools. Also, since 2011, the central government 
has argued that the 2001 reform caused confusion and instability in the text book market and 
thus initiated another round of reform to re-centralize the production of text books.     
  
 
58 
 
 
 
of foundering figures of CCP were active participants of the movements. The May 
4thevent itself was a march led by college students in Beijing which induced violent 
confrontations and strikes in 1919.The march was a response to the end-of-WWI 
negotiation and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty, instead of having the 
defeated Germany relinquish its privileges in its “leased” territory in Shandong, China, 
stated that Japan should take over those privileges. The students were angered by the 
international community and the Chinese government, believing that they sold out the 
interests of China. Ordinary citizens from other social groups such as workers and small 
merchants also participated in the event. 
The May 4th Event is now celebrated as a national holiday in China and framed 
as part of the neo-democratic revolution led by the CCP. Some sources (Chien 2008) 
indicate that both the ROC government and social movements in Taiwan after 1949 also 
claimed the May 4th movement and the broader New Culture Movement as part of their 
ideological heritage. 
The Anti-Japan War (1937-1945), mentioned by more than twenty percent of 
the respondents and ranked first on the list, is known internationally as the second Sino-
Japan war and the major front of the WWII in East Asia after the Pearl Harbor event in 
1941.  
Many see the war as an intensification of Japan’s decades-long efforts to colonize (parts 
of) China started late in 19th century. Before the 1930s, such efforts were mostly realized 
through treaties and “leases” of Chinese territories (through military attacks or threats). 
The war was fought in the context of a politically and militarily divided Republic of 
China (ROC)—the nominal government led by the Kuomintang (KMT) was in constant 
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conflict and negotiation with relatively independent local military powers and was 
starting to feel the threat of the newly formed Chinese Community Part (CCP). During 
the war, most military powers, including armies led by CCP, swore loyalty to the KMT 
government which was relocated to Chongqing after its Capital city, Nanking, was taken 
over by Japanese armies in December 1937. The war ended with a “victory” for ROC in 
September 1945 when the Emperor of Japan surrendered to the Ally Forces. It had 
claimed at least 35 million Chinese and eight million Japanese casualties (Lary and 
MacKinnon 2001). China won a permanent seat in the UN Security Council for its 
contribution in defeating Japan in WWII. 
In China, narratives of the war describe it as the climax of century-long nationalist 
movements against foreign powers and restored China its full independence. KMT 
armies fought most battles in the war and suffered the majority of the casualties. 
However, the KMT regime was overturned in 1949 after a full-scale civil war with the 
CCP armies and fled to Taiwan. The ROC was replaced by the People’s Republic of 
China (in mainland China in 1949 and in the UN Security Council in 1971).  In most 
Chinese high school text books, the role of CCP is much more salient than that of the 
KMT.  
The War of Liberation (1946-1950) (internationally referred to as the Second 
Chinese Civil War), mentioned by slightly less than six percent of the respondent, was 
the final stage of a decades-long military conflict between the KMT-led Republic forces 
and the CCP armies started in the 1920s. Many believe in addition to the ideological 
split between the leftist-communists and the conservative nationalists, the war also was 
precipitated by the rivalry between the USSR and the U.S. in the post-WWII era (O. A. 
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Westad 1993). The war ended in 1950 when most major battles ceased while in 1949, 
Chiang Kai-Shek and two million nationalist Chinese had retreated to Taiwan. Mao 
Zedong announced the establishment of a CCP-led Chinese government, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) on October 1st, 1949. According to PRC historiography, the 
war claimed more than 1 million causalities for the CCP armies and more than 10 
million nationalist fighters were killed, captivated, or absorbed by the CCP armies.   
Intense debates surround the cause, process and implication of the war. First and 
foremost, the name of the war is a subject of contestation. Referred to as “the War of 
Liberation” in mainland China and Communist historiography, it is depicted by the 
official narratives as the CCP’s heroic struggle to save the nation from a corrupted 
capitalist government. In contrast, the Republic government considered the CCP a 
rebellious force and saw the war as a legitimate state instrument to put down a rebellion. 
Historical accounts indicate that both parties’ strategies have led to significant civilian 
casualties (Westad 2003). In mainland China, both the establishment of the Liberation 
Army and the victory of the war are celebrated publicly. The Army Foundation (August 
1st) was not a national holiday but there is usually a ceremony on the national TV 
station. The war is celebrated along with the establishment of the PRC on October 1st, 
the national day of PRC. In this chapter, I used the term adopted by the respondents—
the War of Liberation instead of the civil war to preserve the political implication of 
their answers. 
The establishment of PRC (October 1st, 1949), mentioned by slightly less than 
eight percent of the respondents, was marked by a speech given by Mao Zedong at the 
Tian’an Men Square, declaring “the people of China have risen again”. The official 
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narratives in mainland China glorify this event as the moment at which China finally 
won its independence from the imperialist powers and started to rise as a great nation, 
despite the very tight connection between the USSR and the PRC at that time. October 
1st is now the National Day of the PRC and is nationally celebrated. A brief economic 
boom ensured the establishment of the PRC as the nation recovered from the loss of 
wars and the government focused on restructuring the economy. After the new nation 
was established, the People’s Congress passed a series of legal statues, including the 
first Constitution of the PRC. Many of these laws were either revoked or ignored during 
the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution. 
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), remembered by more than seven percent 
of the respondents, was a political campaign launched by Mao Zedong. The stated goal 
of the campaign was to “redress the revisionist and bourgeoisie tendencies” in the party, 
while most historians believe that Mao meant to purge political dissents. It evolved into 
violent “class struggles” executed for the most part by Red Guard groups.25 Many, 
mostly intellectuals of all ranks, were persecuted through torture, public humiliation, 
arbitrary imprisonment, and even murder. A lot of properties were seized and/or 
destroyed. The movements also influenced top party leaders including Liu Shaoqi, the 
President of PRC then, and Deng Xiaoping. Starting 1968, when the fractional conflict 
among Red Guard groups became rampant and violence in the urban areas started to get 
out of control, Mao initiated the “Down to the Countryside” movement in which 
millions of “intellectual youths” were shipped into rural China to be “reeducated.” The 
                                                 
25 Red Guard groups are paramilitary youth groups mostly made up of college and high 
school students.  
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specific number of people persecuted and displaced during the upheavals cannot be 
accurately estimated as the Chinese government is not willing to release official 
statistics (many cases were probably never recorded). It is safe to state that millions of 
lives were influenced. The ending point of the movement is an issue of debate. Many 
historians consider it to have ended effectively when Mao died in 1976. A month after 
Mao’s death, “the Gang of Four”, the political faction trusted by Mao and controlled 
political power in the later stage of the Cultural Revolution was arrested. The downfall 
of this group was considered also to be a marker of the ending of the political turmoil. 
Therefore, in this chapter, I categorized responses regarding their fall as memory of the 
Cultural Revolution. The “Gang of Four” was officially blamed for the destruction of 
Cultural Revolution. 
This decade is considered by many China scholars to be the most turbulent and 
traumatic period in Chinese history since the establishment of the PRC. It destroyed the 
productive forces and social institutions built during the two decades after the country’s 
establishment (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shi 2008). The entire legal system was 
also destroyed as the social movements rely almost solely on the orders by political 
leaders. The People’s Congress redrafted a completely new Constitution in 1982, six 
years after the death of Mao and the end of the Revolution.  
The Reform and Opening (1978-?), considered by ten percent of the 
respondents as most important, is a series of reforms installed by reformists within the 
CCP led by Deng Xiaoping and continued by his successors. The slogan is to develop 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”. The core of reform is to shift from a state-
planned economy to socialist market economy and to integrate into the global market. 
  
 
63 
 
 
 
The specific strategies included decollectivizing agricultural production, allowing 
private capital into the market, privatization of non-essential industries, opening up 
coastal cities as trading ports, and actively seeking to participate in international political 
and economic organizations such as the UN, WTO, APEC, etc. Many argue that this is 
actually the neoliberal turn of China’s economy (Harvey 2003). The reforms have 
brought profound changes into China’s social life. China is now the second largest 
economic entity in the world. Average disposable annual income per capita in urban 
China rose from around 60 USD in late 70s to about 4,000 USD in 2012 (All China Data 
Center 2014).26Cities like Beijing and Shanghai (and even Chengdu) are increasingly 
becoming similar to any other global cities with skyscrapers, traffic jams, high-scale 
shopping malls and restaurants, as well as basement rooms full of immigrant workers 
and other young people seeking to realize their lucrative dreams.  Extreme inequality 
and serious environmental degradation are among the deepest concerns brought about by 
the reforms.   
Meanwhile, as the Chinese economy essentially adopted capitalism, in the 
political realm, China still maintained its “democratic authoritarianism by the people” 
which guarantees the absolute authority of the CCP. 
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 present the most frequently mentioned political 
leaders and thinkers throughout Chinese history by the survey respondents. The four 
most frequently mentioned political leaders’ life spans overlap significantly with the 
                                                 
26 These numbers does not take into account the factor of inflation and thus exaggerates the 
economic growth in China. Another more complex measure, the Per Capita Annual 
Disposable Income Index( %), indicates that at year 2012, Chinese urban citizens have 12 
times more disposable income than when they did in 1978.  
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historical periods during which the eight most-mentioned events happened. As a 
matter of fact, all of the four political leaders were the key participants of some of the 
events. Sun Yat-Sen, widely considered as the “father of the Republic”, was one of 
the most well-known leaders of the United League, the organization behind the 
bourgeoisie revolution in the early 20th century. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng 
Xiaoping are all prominent leaders of the communist movements and civil war 
against the KMT armies throughout the 20th century. Mao and Zhou also participated 
in the bourgeoisie movements as young students in their early years. Deng, who was 
slightly younger than Mao and Zhou, is considered the core of the CCP power after 
Mao’s death and the key engineer of the Reform and Opening. In contrast, almost 
forty percent of the respondents consider Confucius, the presumed founder of the 
most popular philosophical school in China, as the greatest thinker in Chinese history 
even though the other three of the four most frequently mentioned great thinkers 
overlap with the most popular political leaders.27  
The above findings indicate that there are noticeable patterns of Chinese 
people’s memories of the past. Among all the historical events and figures scattered 
throughout thousands of years of history, eight historical events and five historical 
figures would capture more than eighty percent of the respondents’ definition of what 
                                                 
27Sun Yat-Sen, the fourth person on the list of greatest political leaders and the icon of the 
bourgeoisie revolution, ranked seventh on the list of great thinkers. The fifth and sixth are 
respectively Lao-Tzu (popularly understood to be the founder of Tao-ism) and Lu Xun (a 
radical non-partisan writer who was a key figure in the New Culture Movement). 
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is important. Such patterns speaks to the social original of memories—individuals do 
not develop idiosyncratic visions of the past but rather remember as groups. 
Table 3.3: Distribution of Most Frequently Mentioned Political Leaders 
Name Time N % 
Mao 1893-1976 314 61.2 
Deng 1904-1997 103 20.1 
Zhou Enlai 1898-1975 28 5.5 
Sun Yat-Sen 1866-1925 24 4.7 
Total   91.5 
 
Table 3.4: Distribution of Most Frequently Mentioned Thinkers 
 
 
 
 
However, these findings also suggest that patterns of individual memories do 
not always coincide with official historical narratives. The distribution of memorable 
events and figures across historical periods varied depending on the issue at question. 
For historical events and political leaders, the respondents tend to focus on the recent 
or contemporary times, including the Republic era. In particular, almost half of the 
respondents identified event/change in the Republic era as being most important 
(Figure 3.2). 28 This pattern contradicts Hypothesis 1 which predicts that, consistent to 
                                                 
28 I further divided the “Communist era” in “Maoist era” (1949-1976) and “contemporary 
era” (post 1976). It should be noted again that such beginning and ending points are 
relatively arbitrary and cannot reflect the continuity and non-linear nature of history. 
Name Time N % 
Confucius 551–479 BC 176 38.1 
Mao 1893-1976 123 26.6 
Zhou Enlai 1898-1976 45 9.7 
Deng 1904-1997 36 7.8 
Total   82.2 
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patterns of national commemoration, there will be lack of memories of the Republican 
era among individual Chinese people. Indeed, it is the memory of the ancient China 
that is missing. This discrepancy between individual and official memories highlights 
the fluidity of mnemonic patterns, the focus of the next section. In addition to 
temporal distance which might leads to unfamiliarity and assumed irrelevance, the 
absence of reference to the Imperial history despite the significant amount of public 
commemoration may be due to the lack of specificity in the public celebration—none 
but one of the four national holidays is associated with a specific event or figure—and 
the low density of historical narrative—with thousands of years lumped together 
under the same category,29 the chances of any specific period standing out becomes 
low. 
Meanwhile, the disproportionate attention received by the Republic era can be 
partially attributed to ambiguity and non-linearity of historical accounts—the timing 
of an event is not a definite mark of the cultural implication and significance of such 
event. Figure 3 lays out the potential cultural meaning contained in the events. I 
constructed these cultural categories based on both the respondents’ expressed reason 
for considering certain event as important and scholarly writings on the historical 
significance of such events. For example, most respondents who mentioned either the 
                                                 
29 The development of these categories was not arbitrary. I based them on popular and 
scholarly understandings of China’s history. This finding indicates that these categories are 
consequential. 
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anti-Japanese war or the Opium war mentioned the importance of those events to the 
identity of the “Chinese nation”, and these events are thus labeled as a sign of 
nationalism.30 However, most respondents did not provide reasons that clearly signal 
cultural meanings. For example, a considerable number of respondents gave reasons 
such as “the event fundamentally changes the trajectory of Chinese history”. 
Therefore, for events where few respondents explicate their cultural meanings, I relied 
on historians’ interpretation of the events. As shown in the two figures, even though 
almost half of the important historical events mentioned by the respondents happened 
during the republic era, only twenty percent of them are primarily associated with the 
Enlightenment-driven values promoted by the bourgeoisie movements. Similarly, 
only eight percent of the events imply some connection to the traditional Chinese 
cultural and political system while around 21% events technically happened during 
the imperial era. There are two main reasons for this mismatch between the timing of 
the events and their historical significance. First, the cutting points of historical eras 
mask the close connections between the neighboring eras. For instance, even though 
the communist party did not establish an official regime until 1949, a lot of the events 
significant to the communist movements and the development of Maoism happened 
before that year, which was technically counted as the republic era. Second, some 
                                                 
30 The categorization is based on events instead of respondents. In other words, even though 
not all respondents mentioning the same event gave the same reason, their responses are still 
coded to be in the same cultural category based on the majority’s reasoning for or the most 
popular scholarly interpretation of the event. 
  
 
68 
 
 
 
events and their cultural message, such as wars with foreign powers and the 
construction of national identity, are not specific to certain era.   
Finally, the status of Confucius as a historical figure also deserves elaboration. 
Far exceeding other candidates and mentioned by almost 40% of the respondents as 
the greatest thinker in Chinese history, Confucius without doubt occupies an 
outstanding place in the consciousness of ordinary Chinese people. The 
overwhelming identification with this figure seems to confirm the observation that 
Confucian tradition “remains the defining characteristics of Chinese mentality”(Tu 
1990: 136). However, the limitation of the reference to Confucius’s significance only 
in the realm of philosophical thinking suggests that Chinese people, at least at the 
conscious level, do not attribute political connotation to Confucian thinking. 
Meanwhile, scholars have constantly documented the significance (Zhao 2004) and 
relative stableness (T. Zhang and Schwartz 1997) of Confucian ideals in China even 
through the most radical and violent political turmoil. Therefore, this finding raises 
further questions regarding the relationship people’s cultural and political identities.  
Who remembers what? 
To examine how memories of the past vary across different social groups, I 
first created dichotomous variables to indicate whether a respondent referred to one of 
the historical events and figures mentioned by at least five percent of all respondents. 
I then conducted logistic regressions with these dummies as dependent variables and 
the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents as the independent variables. 
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Tables 3.5 through 3.7 present the results of these logistic regressions 
predicting the odds of remembrance of each of the most frequently historical 
events/changes and figures.  
20.9% 49.0% 16.9% 12.8%
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
Imprial Era Republic Era Mao Era Contemporary Other
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Figure 3.2: Temporal Distributions of Memories of Historical Events (%) 
 
Figure 3.3: Cultural Distributions of Memories of Historical Events (%) 
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Table 3.5: Results of Logistic Regression on Odds of Remembering Historical Events/Changes 
  Anti-Japan War Opium war 
Xinhai 
Revolution 
Open & 
Reform 
PRC Founding 
Cultural 
Revolution 
May 4th 
Liberation 
War 
Predictor 
β β β β β β β β 
 (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) 
female 0.195  -0.152  -0.288  0.632  -0.567  0.215  -0.027  -0.103  
  (1.215)  (0.859)   (0.749)   (1.881)   (0.567)   (1.240)   (0.973)   (0.902)  
age -0.001  -0.017  -0.004  0.015  0.039 ** 0.033 * 0.008  -0.011  
 (0.999)   (0.983)   (0.996)   (1.015)   (1.040)   (1.033)   (1.008)   (0.989)  
Education (years) -0.014  -0.006  0.123 * 0.047  -0.008  -0.058  0.055  -0.072  
 (0.986)   (0.994)   (1.131)   (1.048)   (0.992)   (0.944)   (1.057)   (0.930)  
Party membership 0.047  -0.038  -0.059  0.26  -0.562  -0.438  -0.203  -0.271  
 (1.049)   (0.962)   (0.942)   (1.297)   (0.570)   (0.645)   (0.816)   (0.763)  
HH expenditure -0.010  -0.043  -0.062  0.025  0.039  0.013  0.011  -0.055  
 (0.990)   (0.957)   (0.940)   (1.026)   (1.039)   (1.013)   (1.001)   (0.947)  
Constant -1.452   -1.032   -3.062 *** -4.159 * -4.189 * -3.723 ** -3.816 ** -1.279   
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.6: Results of Logistic Regression on Odds of Remembering Political leaders 
  Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Zhou Enlai Sun Yat-Sen 
Predictor 
β β β β 
 (𝑒𝛽)  (𝑒𝛽)  (𝑒𝛽)  (𝑒𝛽) 
female 0.084   -0.35   0.494   0.331   
  (1.088)   (0.705)   (1.639)   (1.392)   
age 0.021 ** -0.027 ** -0.03   0.041 * 
  (1.021)   (0.973)   (0.970)   (1.042)   
Years of education -0.121 *** 0.126 ** -0.045   0.15   
  (0.886)   (1.134)   (0.956)   (1.162)   
Party membership 0.323   -0.29   0.331   -0.101   
  (1.381)   (0.748)   (1.392)   (0.904)   
Household expenditure -0.031   -0.009   0.025   0.068 * 
  (0.969)   (0.991)   (1.025)   (1.070)   
Constant 0.745   -1.575   -1.645   -7.337   
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.7: Results of Logistic Regression on Odds of Remembering Great Thinkers 
  Confucius Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Zhou Enlai Sun Yat-Sen 
Predictor 
β β β β β 
 (𝑒𝛽)  (𝑒𝛽)  (𝑒𝛽)  (𝑒𝛽)  (𝑒𝛽) 
female -.094   -.077   -.390   .521   -.063   
 (0.910)  (0.926)  (0.677)  (1.684)  (0.939)  
age .004   .016   -.017   .037 ** .002   
 (1.004)  (1.016)  (0.983)  (0.964)  (1.002)  
Years of education 0.039   .002   -.075   -.011   -.033  
 (1.040)  (1.002)  (0.928)  (0.989)  (0.968)  
Party membership .230   .113   -.121   .045   -17.878   
 (1.259)  (1.120)  (0.886)  (1.046)  (0.000)  
HH expenditure .036   -.053   -.022   -.021   .091 * 
 (1.037)  (0.948)  (0.978)  (0.979)  (0.913)  
Constant -1.566 * -1.816 ** -.674   -4.389 *** -3.425   
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Hypothesis 3.2A, which predicts that people of higher SES are more likely to 
remember events/figures from the Republican era, is mostly supported. Table 3.5 
indicates that while the chances of remembering most of the important historical 
events are evenly distributed across different gender, education, age, income and 
political groups, more educated people are more likely to remember the Xinhai 
Revolution, the event marking the success of the bourgeoisie revolution and the start 
of the Republic era. Table 3.6 shows that both higher levels of education and higher 
family expenditure levels are significantly associated with higher odds of naming Sun 
Yat-Sen, the most well-known leader of the Xinhai Revolution and the icon of the 
Republic era, as the greatest political leader throughout Chinese history. In addition, 
people with higher family expenditure are also more likely to consider Sun as the 
greatest thinker of all times (Table 3.7).31 The aforementioned evidence lends strong 
support to the hypothesis that people with higher SES are more likely to identify with 
bourgeoisie ideas and values, including the events and figures in Chinese history that 
symbolize such ideals and values.32 However, the picture gets more complicated when 
                                                 
31 I included Sun Yat-Sen in the analyses for both great political leaders and thinkers as 
tests for the hypothesis even though only 14 respondents mentioned him for the latter. The 
results of the latter analysis should thus be treated with caution due to the small case 
number. Some of the coefficients in that model do have large standard errors, suggesting the 
instability of the model. 
32 In addition, with China’s reintegration into the world economic system after Mao’s death, 
more opportunities have opened up for Chinese citizens to get in contact with Western 
cultures that promote the ideal of middle class (in contrast to the communist ideology that 
had dominated during the Cultural Revolution). People with more education and economic 
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we look at the memories of the May 4th Event. As the marking event of a highly 
intellectual cultural movement, the May 4th Event highly mobilized such 
Enlightenment-derived ideals as democracy and scientific rationality. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that people with higher SES to also be more likely to mention 
this event as important and yet neither level of education or family expenditure is 
significantly related to the memory of this event. One possible explanation could be 
found in how this event is constructed through educational system and public 
commemoration in mainland China. In the official high school history text book, the 
May 4th is described as “part of the global proletarian revolution” and the moment 
“when the working class in China entered the stage of history,…facilitating the 
dissemination of Marxist ideas in China and laying foundation for the Chinese 
Communist Party” (Recent and Contemporary Chinese History: 115). The celebration 
of the movement was institutionalized in 1939 by the Communist Party leadership in 
communist-occupied regions and became a national event only after the CCP armies 
won the civil war. It should not be surprising that the narrative of the national 
commemoration of this event resonate a lot with the history text book and contribute 
most of its significance to the development of communism and proletarian struggle in 
China. Therefore, it appears that not only does people’s social status matters for their 
                                                 
resources are more likely to interact closely with such relatively new ideas either through 
studying overseas or business collaboration with foreign partners. 
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memories of the past, such memories also interact with how the past is 
institutionalized.   
Hypothesis 3.2B finds no support. The members of the communist parties are 
not more likely to remember either events or figures associated with the Maoist era or 
communist movements. This could suggest that the party membership, while 
remaining important political capital, does not carry the same ideological significance 
as it used to.  
Finally, Hypothesis 3.3 regarding the importance of personal experience in 
forming memories of the past bears out partially. Five of the eight most frequently 
mentioned historical events happened before the oldest of the respondents was born; 
one of them (Reform and Opening) is still ongoing and is thus experienced by all 
respondents; and two events (the establishment of the PRC and the Cultural 
Revolution) were experienced by a sub-sample of the respondents. Age seems not to 
matter for the memories of the first two categories of events—past events that were 
not experienced by any age group or on-gong event that are being experienced by all 
age groups. In contrast, for memories of the third kind of events—events that were 
experienced by some but not all age groups—it plays a significant role. Older people 
appear to be more likely to remember both the establishment of the PRC and the 
Cultural Revolution. This is consistent with Mannheim’s (1952) generational theory 
which suggests that personal experience plays an important part in the formation of 
collective memories and age, as an indicator of cohort, marks such shared 
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experiences. I also tested if people of formative age during the Cultural Revolution 
indeed tend to have deeper impression of the event and found no such pattern with 
various age cutting points.33 Such finding seems to somewhat diverge from, if not 
contradict, Mannheim and some empirical research in collective memories on cohorts 
(Schuman and Scott 1989). One possible explanation for such patterns is that the 
Cultural Revolution was targeted at party cadres who had already cumulated certain 
amount of political capital and were mostly middle-aged men and women. Even 
though the youths of that age were also deeply impacted by the disruption of the 
educational system and the “down to the countryside” movement, it is the lives of 
these adults that were turned upside-down. In other words, the generation that was 
most impacted by the Cultural Revolution would have been fairly old by the time 
when my survey was conducted and they were more likely to remember that period. 
This explanation suggests that even personal experiences matters for memories not 
only at the level of when one experiences certain [dramatic] changes but also how 
they experience these changes.  
Memories and Legal Ideas: From Past to Present  
Finally, this chapter links the respondents reported memories of the past to 
their attitudes toward the current laws, examining the implication of the particular 
                                                 
33 I was not able to test the theory using the establishment of PRC because it happened 
when the oldest respondent in my sample was still fairly young. 
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cultural and historical conditions of contemporary China to the formation of legal 
consciousness today.  
Figure 3.4 reports the distribution of the dependent variables, namely the 
perceived legitimacy of different types of laws. Family laws are by far the most 
legitimate legal rules—more than 90% of respondent consider disobeying either of the 
chosen legal provisions a violation to core social values (Figure 3.4a&b). Least 
legitimate appear to be laws that prohibit downloading pirated materials (Figure 3.4f). 
Only slightly more than half of the respondents think that breaking such laws 
somewhat violates core social values. Meanwhile, theft laws, albeit in the same 
category, are perceived by more respondents to be legitimate than state-citizen 
relationship laws, particularly family planning laws. Public economic laws are again 
in the middle of the spectrum, with slightly more than 80% of respondents perceiving 
either kind of laws within this category to be legitimate (Figure 3.4g&2h).These 
results suggest that there is considerable variation in the perceived legitimacy cross 
different types of laws regarding, opening the question of what factors might 
contribute to such variation. 
Tables 3.8 through 3.10 present the results of ordered logistic regressions with 
the legitimacy of law as dependent variable. In each model, only one memory dummy 
was included as independent variable along with other controlling variables (i.e. the 
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tables summarize the results of 80 models).34 Starting with the models with the overall 
legitimacy score as dependent variables, it appears that people who rank the Anti-
Japanese War, the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong as of great historical 
importance tend to view current laws as more legitimate. Such findings are consistent 
with Hypothesis 3.4C. As all of the three events/figures are closely associated with 
the Maoist communist party,35 it is reasonable to argue that people who consider them 
important are more likely to identify with the communist ideology and thus support 
the legal system based on such ideology. However, a closer look at the models 
regressing to the legitimacy of specific types of laws reveals a different picture.
                                                 
34 For the purpose of brevity and clarity, Tables 8 through 10 only present effects of the 
memory dummy variables, meaning one effect from each model. The specifications and 
estimated effects of full models are available upon request.  
35 As indicated previously, there exists heated debate over the trajectory of the Anti-
Japanese war, particularly the respective contribution of the KMT and Communist Parties. 
Most non-Mainland-China-based scholars agree on the major role played by KMT armies in 
resisting the Japanese invasion. However, in the official narratives in Mainland China, the 
CCP is still framed as the leader of the resistance.  
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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
h. taking public water and electricity for
private use
g. tax evasion
f. downloading pirated movies and songs
e. knowingly purchasing a stolen bike
d. having more children than allowed by the
law
c. illegal aggregation
b.adult children not supporting their aging
parents
a. parents not rasing their underage children
Much violation
Some violaiton
A little violation
No violation at all
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Legitimacy of Law by Social Relations Regulated 
        (How much does violation of the law also violate core social values?) 
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Table 3.8: Results of Ordered Logistic Regression on the Perceived Legitimacy of Law, effects of memories (events) a 
 Model 3.8 
Overall 
 Model 3.8A 
State-Citizen 
 Model 3.8B 
Family 
 Model 3.8C 
Private  
Economic 
 Model 3.8D 
Public  
Economic 
Events          
Anti JP war .416 * 0.606 ** 0.251  0.066  0.233 
opium war -0.208  -0.343  -0.294  -0.191  -0.033 
Xinhai Rev -0.306  -0.406  -0.182  -0.008  -0.152 
Opening and Reforming -0.231  0.299  0.194  -0.046  0.062 
establishment of PRC -0.164  0.598  -0.383  -0.595  -0.226 
cultural revolution 0.848 ** 0.488  0.576  0.748 * 0.652 
May 4th movement 0.126  0.089  0.059  0.025  0.175 
Liberation war 0.025  0.088  0.355  0.007  0.286 
a. All models controlled for sex, age, years of education, party membership and household expense 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.9: Results of Ordered Logistic Regression on the Perceived Legitimacy of Law, effects of memories (political leaders) a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.10: Results of Ordered Logistic Regression on the Perceived Legitimacy of Law, effects of memories (thinkers) a 
 
 
 Model 3.10 
Overall 
 Model 3.10A 
State-Citizen 
 Model 3.10B 
Family 
 Model 3.10C 
Private  
Economic 
 Model 3.10D 
Public  
Economic 
Figures          
Confucius 0.142  0.054  0.036  0.085  0.212 
Mao Zedong 0.150  0.263  0.029  0.044  0.106 
Deng Xiaoping 0.768 * 0.739 * 0.379  0.806  0.197 
Zhou Enlai -0.040  0.063  -0.622  -0.076  -0.004 
Sun Ya-Set -0.159  0.106  -0.034  -0.567  -0.835 
a. All models controlled for sex, age, years of education, party membership and household expense 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 Model 3.9 
Overall 
 Model 3.9A 
State-Citizen 
 Model 3.9B 
Family 
 Model 3.9C 
Private  
Economic 
 Model 3.9D 
Public  
Economic 
Figures          
Mao Zedong 0.296 ** 0.586 *** 0.295  0.146  0.479 
Deng Xiaoping 0.234  -0.325  -0.002  0.262  0.006 
Zhou Enlai -0.227  -0.202  -0.252  -0.297  -0.416 
Sun Ya-Set -0.068  -0.172  -0.53  0.329  0.12 
a. All models controlled for sex, age, years of education, party membership and household expense 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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It appears that people who consider both the Anti-Japanese War and Mao 
Zedong as of historical significance tend to also positively perceive the laws that 
strengthen the control of the government over private and civic issues (Table 3.8 
Model 3.8A and Table 3.9 Model 3.9A). This finding is still consistent with 
Hypothesis 3.4C. However, the positive association between people’s memories of 
the Cultural Revolution and their perceived legitimacy of law is mostly driven by 
their appreciation of the private economic laws, seemingly contradicting Hypothesis 
3.4C. 
To explore the unexpected correlation between the memories of the Cultural 
Revolution with the appreciation of private economic laws, I coded the reasons the 
respondents gave for thinking certain events as important into three categories: 
neutral, positive and negative. Example answers that are coded as positive include 
“good for people’s life”, “stimulated economic growth”, “makes China a great 
nation”, etc. Examples of negative answers include “it was a disaster”, “it was a 
mistake”, “many people suffered”, etc. Finally, examples of neutral answers include 
“it is very influential”, “it changed the trajectory of Chinese history”, “I heard a lot 
about it”, etc. When I was not sure whether the respondent gave a negative or positive 
answer, I coded it as neutral. 
Table 3.11: Reasons for Remembering Historical Event/Change   
Event Neutral (%) Positive (%) Negative (%) Total 
Anti-Japan War 6 (7.2%) 76(91.6%) 1 (1.2%) 83 
Opium War 20 (40.8%) 16 (32.7%) 13 (26.5%) 49 
Xinhai Revolution 11 (22.9%) 37 (77.1%) 0 (0.0%) 48 
Reform and Opening 6 (14.3%) 36 (85.7%) 0 (0.0%) 42 
Establishment of PRC 2 (5.4%) 35 (94.6%) 0 (0.0%) 37 
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Cultural Revolution 7 (21.9%) 3 (9.4%) 22 (68.8%) 32 
May 4th Movement 3 (10.7%) 25 (89.3%) 0 28 
Liberation War 1 (4.0%) 24 (96.0%) 0 25 
Table 3.11 presents the recoded reason for why people remember the top eight 
events, meaning whether they remember them for positive or negative reasons (the 
total numbers don’t match because some people did not give a reason why they think 
a certain event/change was important). At least two patterns emerged out of this table. 
1) Chinese people tend to (say that) they remember the past for positive reasons. Even 
for the Opium War, an event that many historians consider as marking the downturn 
of China’s trajectory as a powerful nation(Mao 2005), more people found positive 
reasons to celebrate it than to remember it as a negative event. 2) The Cultural 
Revolution stands out as the only event that was remembered for negative reasons. 
Most respondent associated it with words such as “disaster” or “suffering”. This 
finding suggests that experiential memory is different from cognitive memory. As 
discussed before, the Cultural Revolution is one of the only three frequently 
mentioned events that were experienced by some or all of the respondents. In contrast 
to the other two such events, the Establishment of the PRC and the Opening and 
Reform, which are less ambivalently considered victories or positive achievements of 
the CCP regime, the Cultural Revolution invokes much more controversy and debate. 
Therefore, the aforementioned patterns suggest how the perception of events that are 
learned from textbooks or other less personal sources might be different from 
perceptions of events experienced personally or learned through intimate stories told 
by close family members. It also suggests that the working mechanism of memories 
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can be both positive and negative. While positive memories may lead to appreciation 
of present institutions that reinforce the image of the past, negative memories can lead 
people to either reject present institutions closely tied to the past or embrace other 
ones that neutralize such a past. Therefore, people who remember the Cultural 
Revolution, which rejected any kind of market logic, now are more supportive of 
rules that reinforce the market logic. 
Hypotheses 3.4A and 3.4B do not find any support. People’s memories of the 
Republic era and Confucius do not seem to have any implication for whether and 
what types of laws they find legitimate. However, higher SES, which is positively 
associated with people’s memories of the Republic era, has a relatively consistent 
negative effect on people’s perception of the laws that strengthen state power. This 
finding suggest even though at times, there might not be a clear connection between 
collective memories and current legal ideas, these different components of individual 
consciousness and cultural identities can simultaneously be conditioned by the social 
contexts in which the consciousness resides.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the patterns of memories of the past among 
ordinary Chinese people. In so doing, I contributed to studies of collective memory 
and legal consciousness theoretically and empirically in various ways.  
In addition to extending the theories of collective memory to China, an 
important society under-studies, the first significant and systematic contribution of 
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this chapter lies in the insights it provides on the connection/disconnection between 
collective memories as material forms and as individual consciousness. The small 
number of events and figures that capture the vast majority of the spontaneous 
recollections of the past by people from various social groups speaks to the 
foundational notion that “remembering” is not a random process but a systematic 
enterprise. More importantly, the patterns of individual consciousness is largely 
constrained by the available martial mnemonic resources—the vast majority of events 
and figures mentioned by the respondents are either celebrated through publicly 
rituals and objects or figure prominently in mainstream historical accounts. 
Meanwhile, the patterns of individual memories deviate considerably from official 
commutations, indicating that the translation between memories as a collective 
endeavor and as individual processes are imperfect. This disconnection suggests that 
there can be competing visions of the past and the visions are likely distributed 
unevenly across different social groups. 
Specifically, people with higher social-economic status are more likely to 
mention the Bourgeoisie Revolution, which could be an indicator of how people’s 
present experience and interests shape their perception of the past. Meanwhile, I 
revise theoretical ideas on generation and collective memory by showing that the 
timing of the dramatic events in one’s life trajectory is not the only factor that 
determines how deeply the memory of the events is engraved in one’s mind. The way 
in which a person experiences the events also matters. The Cultural Revolution has 
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the most profound effect on the people who experienced it as adults, as it changed 
their lives in fundamental ways. 
Secondly, the curious placement of Confucius in the minds of Chinese people 
is worth noting. Despite the popular understanding that Confucian philosophy 
permeates all aspects of Chinese people’s social life, including the political struggle 
of historical construction (T. Zhang and Schwartz 1997), few Chinese respondent 
referred to him when asked about the political aspect of history while an 
overwhelming majority consider him the most important philosopher. Such finding 
suggest that the impact of the past could be implicit—one might not even think of it 
when it becomes an integral part of the present. Future research should examine how 
Confucian thoughts impact people’s ideas and behaviors in various social domain, 
regardless of whether the thinker himself is identified as important by the subjects.  
Finally, there is evidence indicating that people’s ideas of current laws are 
associated with their memories of the past. For instance, those who consider the 
achievement of the communist movements as important think more highly of the laws 
that strengthen the power of the state. However, the link is not one that is neat and 
clear-cut. Instead of supporting the laws that are theoretically tied to the each 
historical era they deemed important, the respondents’ reaction toward the various 
laws is also influenced by how they evaluate the past. Therefore, we see that those 
who consider the Cultural Revolution as the most important, and yet disastrous, event 
in Chinese history are not more likely to rank the laws that centralizing state power 
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high in legitimacy. Instead, they are more likely to support laws that strengthen the 
logics of the free market, which contradicts the extreme communist values hailed 
during the Cultural Revolution. Such findings suggest that not only people’s cultural 
identities matter for their legal consciousness, but the specific ways they are 
associated with the larger cultural discourses also matter.   
The analyses in this chapter are limited in a few ways which can and should be 
addressed in future research. Most noticeably, the connection between public 
commemorations/historical narratives and patterns of individual consciousness are 
only observed indirectly. There still needs to be research that directly examines the 
mechanisms through which individuals absorb information that forms their views of 
the past and strategies they adopt to reconcile conflicting information. In particular, in 
recent years, TV series have become an increasingly popular venue for cultural 
consumption in mainland China. One major theme of these dramas is China’s struggle 
against the Japanese invasion in the 1930s and 1940s. The coincidence between this 
phenomenon and the overwhelmingly high percentage of respondents referring to the 
anti-Japanese war opens up space to envision future research on the connection 
between cultural consumption and collective memories.  
In addition, as the study design asked open-ended questions about history, it 
prompted a wide range of answers. While providing a full view of how China’s public 
perceives the nation’s past, this limits the number of responses assigned to each 
event/person and thus decreases the power to test differences across respondents. 
 88 
 
 
 
Future research can use a design that limits the respondents’ number of choices based 
on the current survey responses and thus increases the power of the statistical test. In 
particular, the mismatch between the timing and the cultural significance of historical 
events suggests the latter might be more meaningful in categorizing events and 
building hypotheses. The design could also include significant figures that are less 
mentioned but are likely to pick up variation along certain dimensions, such as Wu 
Zetian, the one and only empress in ancient China. A few women mentioned Wu 
Zetian, but the number was too small for a meaningful comparison between the 
gender groups. Finally, as previously discussed, the cross-sectional nature of the 
survey limits my ability to make causal claims. The language here suggesting any 
direction in the association between different variables should be read as a 
theoretically-informed interpretation instead of empirically-verified causality.
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Chapter IV: Legal Compliance in Contemporary China 
China consistently ranks low among nations on measures of democracy and 
the rule of law (Polity IV 2010, World Bank 2012). Surprisingly, given this context, 
Chinese people highly trust and embrace their courts and legal system (Landry 2008). 
This paradox and its implication on Chinese people’s legal compliance behaviors are 
the central foci of this chapter. 
It is well established that in stable democracies, legitimacy is central for 
people’s respect for and compliance with the law.36 As a transitional authoritarian 
society, China provides an intriguing case for understanding the lawful cooperation of 
the masses. In countries whose governments are neither produced through popular 
elections nor committed to the notion of individual freedom, it becomes a particularly 
curious question why people obey the law. After all, they have little control over its 
creation and the content of the law often appears more constraining than liberating. If 
it is only out of fear of the authoritarian regimes, why do regimes such as the Chinese 
even bother to set up an elaborate legal system? 
My research sheds light on these issues by examining the connection between 
people’s perceived legitimacy of law and their expected likelihood of compliance in 
                                                 
36 This chapter focuses on individual compliance to domestic laws. There are large bodies 
of literature that survey compliance to domestic laws by other kind of actors (e.g. Gould 
2001, Dobbin and Kelly 2007, Kelly 2010, Parker and Nielsen 2011) or compliance to 
international laws (see Simmons 2010 for a review). While such research is unquestionably 
relevant to the current project, a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of the current 
chapter. 
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urban China. It enriches the sociological research tradition in legal compliance by 
expanding its scope to a non-Western37 context and complicating presumptions about 
legal culture(s). 
I start with a review of sociological literature on legal compliance, proposing a 
more nuanced theoretical frame that takes account of culture and the complex social 
relationships regulated by the law. I then provide a more detailed description of the 
historical, social and cultural environment of contemporary China that leads to a set of 
hypotheses. A methods and data section is followed by an analysis of the patterns and 
relationships emerging from the data. I conclude with a discussion of implications of 
the current project for the theoretical development of legal compliance study and 
future research. 
Contextualizing Legal Compliance 
Sociology has long engaged with the concept of legitimacy and its role in 
securing obedience. In his analysis of power and political domination, Weber 
emphasizes the importance of legitimacy in sustaining stable power relations 
(Weber1978).38  Studies of legal compliance, mostly conducted in the United States, 
confirm that individuals are more willing to obey the law when they perceive it is 
                                                 
37 I am aware that the “Western vs. non-Western” dichotomy is potentially problematic. 
Here, “Western” is not used to denote a geographic region but to refer to countries/regions 
with legal traditions that are highly influenced by the Enlightenment-inspired notions of 
individuality and social contract and corresponding rights discourses. 
38 Such legitimacy is important due to its usefulness in justifying institutions that disregard 
the personal interests and values of the dominated (Spence 1970; Weber 1978). 
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imbued with important social values. 
Early survey studies in the United States have documented a generally active 
and assertive citizenry and a widespread, although somewhat unevenly distributed, 
willingness to comply with and utilize the law (e.g. Priest and Klein 1984, Tyler 
2006). Some argue that the willingness of U.S. citizens to follow and use the law 
derive from “a myth of rights [that] exercises a compelling influence...and provides 
shared ideals for the great majority…Even otherwise alienated minorities are 
receptive to values associated with legal ordering” (Scheingold 1974: 78–79). U.S. 
citizens also obey the law when they perceive that it is procedurally fair (Tyler 1997, 
Tyler and Huo 2002, Tyler 2006). U.S. citizens thus participate in a shared legal 
discourse, collectively reinforcing and contributing to the construction of law’s 
supremacy in regulating social relations. Studies confirm similar patterns for citizens 
in other industrialized nations (e.g. Torgler and Schneider 2007). 
Recent research on legal compliance examines the effect of legitimacy in 
different realms (e.g. law enforcement, see Tyler, Callahan and Frost 2007a, drunk 
drivers, see Tyler et al. 2007b, gun offenders, see Papachristos, Meares and Fagan 
2009), at particular historical moments (e.g. Chinese Exclusion Era, see Ryo 2006), in 
specific contexts (e.g. multicultural community, see Tyler 2000), and for various types 
of laws (e.g. tax laws, see Torgler and Schneider 2007, immigration laws, see Ryo 
2006). These works indicate that the symbolic power of law is mediated and 
conditioned by other institutional structures (e.g. organizational culture, see Tyler et 
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al. 2007a), personal factors (e.g. emotion, see Murphy and Tyler 2008) and 
interpersonal networks (Papachristos et al. 2009). 
A theme that runs through this literature, but has not been sufficiently 
theorized, is how the role of the perceived legitimacy of law in legal compliance 
varies in a systematic way. This is critically important because it gives enhanced 
leverage to determine when (and therefore why) the law is legitimate. Continuing my 
arguments in previous chapters, I propose that we start such systematic analyses from 
the various social relations regulated by legal provisions. Legal rules are 
sociologically meaningful only in ways in which they are relevant to people’s social 
life. This connection between the legal the social happens through the definition, 
construction and regulation of social relations by legal rules and the interpretation of 
legal provisions in social relations (Conley and O’Barr 1990).  
Meanwhile, both legitimacy and the organization of social life are closely 
connected the cultural contexts from which law-related values originate.39  Thus, legal 
compliance research must look beyond the context of societies with similar legal 
cultures. To develop theories that are more widely applicable, the study of legal 
compliance must take into account the situations of non-Western societies. Due to its 
substantial differences from the usual background of legal compliance research, China 
                                                 
39 A large body literature examines the importance of culture in understanding law-related 
ideas and behaviors, including numerous studies on China’s legal culture and heritage (e.g. 
Macauley 1998; Lubman 1999; Potter 2001; Potter 2004). However, few socio-legal studies 
on China have explicated the importance of local culture in compliance behaviors of 
individuals, which is one of the major objectives of this research. 
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provides an ideal context for formulating and testing such theories. 
Legal Compliance in Transitional China 
Contemporary China provides an ideal setting for research on the relationship 
between legitimacy of law and legal compliance. It is also a relevant setting. With a 
quarter of the world population and the world’s second largest economy (World Bank 
2013), China is one of the most influential players in the international community. 
The country’s long-standing emphasis on “education (jiaohua)” over penalty in 
maintaining legal orders suggests that values should play a central role in guiding 
law-related behaviors (Liang 1991).  Previous studies on legal compliance of 
marginalized social groups in China indicate that their non-compliance with certain 
legal rules resulted from their disbelief in the laws’ legitimacy (Xin 2005). This study 
tests if such mechanism is also observable among the general urban population. 
Despite China’s authoritarian state and its legal system rife with arbitrariness (e.g. 
Johnson 2011, Kahn 2005), survey studies in China have consistently documented 
exceptionally high levels of trust in courts and other legal institutions among the 
general public (Landry 2008, Michelson and Read 2011). Such findings imply that 
Chinese people view law as legitimate. However, with complex, sometimes 
contradictory, legal cultures coexisting in today’s China, it remains unclear whether 
all laws enjoy the same level of legitimacy according to Chinese people or whether all 
laws are obeyed to the same extent. 
 Transitioning from a planned economy to a market economy under an 
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authoritarian regime, China shares challenges faced by other transitional societies 
(e.g. Nee, Stark, and Selden 1989, Sachs et al. 1994, Hendley 1996, Czarnota, Krygier 
and Sadurski 2005). Recent transformations in economic, social and legal arenas in 
China bring conflicting intellectual traditions into contact (Nathan 1997, Logan 2008). 
In the realm of law, such clashes have created space for different understandings of 
and attitudes toward both legal sanctions and the legitimacy of law.  
As detailed in Chapter II, China’s recent legal reform challenge forms of legal 
philosophy that once dominated China. For example, the legal formality promoted by 
newly professionalized lawyers and judges places a greater burden on plaintiffs and 
defendants to participate in and contribute to the litigation process. This 
“modernization” contrasts with the litigants’ faith in a caring and responsive state, 
which was strongly supported by both Confucian and socialist legal philosophies. 
This legal reform thus led to popular resentment and eventually political intervention 
from the central government (Fu and Cullen 2011). Such instances reflect a contested 
process of institutional changes and highlight the complexity of Chinese legal cultures 
that stem from and lead to varying attitudes and behaviors toward the law 
(Peerenboom 2002). During and after legal reform, the vestiges of previous legal 
cultures continue to influence the operation and people’s perception of the new 
system. 
Hypotheses 
As argued in Chapter II, the coexistent legal ideas in China assume different 
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fundamental values, prioritize different social institutions, and are likely pertinent to 
different laws. I expect such variation in legal ideas to be accompanied by variation in 
legitimacy of and compliance with different laws, creating an optimal context for 
testing their relationship. Therefore, as argued in the previous section, I propose to 
systematically examine how the relationship between perceived legitimacy of law and 
legal compliance varies based on the social relations regulated by the law.   
Given the authoritarian context of China, I also consider the alternative 
explanation for legal compliance, among which the most important is the deterrence 
effect of law. There has been a long-standing tradition in criminology that examines 
how potential punishment deters people from engaging with illegal activities. 
Influenced by the law and economics tradition (e.g., Becker 1968, Stigler 1970, 
Brown 2004), this rationalist school argues that the effectiveness of law is based 
primarily on its ability to inflict loss and suffering on the person who defies its 
authority. An individual's decision to be law-abiding thus results from an instrumental 
cost-benefit analysis (Bridges and Stone 1986, Brown 2004). Compliance is likely 
when the rational actor’s estimate of the expected cost of committing an illegal act 
outweighs the estimate of the expected benefit: the more certain and severe the 
punishment, the less likely legal noncompliance (Gibbs 1986). Recent empirical 
research in this area finds perceived certainty to be the most consistent factor for 
law’s deterrence effect (Waldo and Chiricos 1972, Grasmick and Bryjack 1980, 
Hirschi and Gottfredson 1990, Maxwell and Gray 2000). My subsequent analysis thus 
 96 
 
 
 
controls for the extent to which ordinary Chinese people believe that certain law-
breaking behaviors will result in formal punishment. 
As proposed in Chapter II, the analysis here focuses on three kinds of social 
relations, namely family relationships, state-citizen relationships and economy-related 
relationships.  
1. Family Relationships 
As a kinship based society, imperial China placed paramount importance on 
the institution of the family and mutual support among family members as the basis 
and core of social and legal orders (Ebrey and Watson 1986, see also Fei 2005). Even 
though the political turmoil and economic reforms in recent Chinese history have 
modified the specific structure of contemporary Chinese families (Quach and 
Anderson 2008), the value of family ties as the foundation of social life has never 
been seriously challenged.40 I therefore expect:  
Hypothesis 4.1a. In China, people will view family laws to be more 
legitimate that other types of laws. 
Hypothesis 4.1b. In China, expectations of compliance with family 
laws will be associated with perceptions of these laws’ legitimacy rather than 
                                                 
40 Mao launched a series of attacks against the “feudalist culture” during the Cultural 
Revolution and attempted to trump family ties with class struggles. However, in post-Mao 
China, the Cultural Revolution is considered a grave mistake and one of the reasons cited is 
its destruction of “traditional culture”.  As argued by some China scholars (e.g. Zhao 2000), 
in contemporary China, as the ideological ground of the socialist state decays, moralistic 
legitimacy becomes increasingly important; and one way for the government to build such 
ground is to revive the discourses surrounding familial values. 
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with perceived likelihood of punishment for violating them. 
Two specific legal provisions were chosen from numerous family laws in 
China. These are laws providing that 1) parents are responsible for raising their 
underage children and 2) adult children are responsible for supporting their aging 
parents (Article 21, Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China).  These two 
laws are chosen because filial piety and parental love are the most essential and 
consistent features of discourses surrounding Chinese families (Yue and Ng 1999, 
Knapp 2005).41 
2. State-Citizen Relationships 
Distinct from family ties are state-citizen relationship. As discussed above, 
China is considered neither democratic nor liberal. It is thus in this area where one 
might expect to find the most drastic differences from earlier legal compliance 
research, which has been conducted almost exclusively in liberal democracies 
(Lubman 1999). In post-Mao China, the socialist state still has a strong grip over 
political power and limits the development of civil society (Zhao 2000). Studies on 
the Chinese legal system have repeatedly documented the influence of political 
factors in a variety of legal domains (Tanner and Green 2007, Qin 2007, Rooij and Lo 
2010). With such strong domination of the executive over the judicial branch of 
government, individuals face serious consequences for disobeying laws aimed at 
                                                 
41 Institutions such as marriage, while remaining unique and closely tied to traditional 
Chinese culture, have gone through considerable reconstruction (Quach and Anderson 2008). 
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maintaining the political power of the state. Meanwhile, after the Cultural Revolution, 
the Chinese Communist Party has lost its ideological appeal among some of the 
younger generations (Zhao 2000). Consequently, the legitimacy of laws that mostly 
serve state interest is less likely to influence individual behaviors. I thus propose:   
Hypothesis 4.2. In China, expectations of compliance with 
administrative laws,42 will be associated less with these laws’ perceived 
legitimacy than with perceived likelihood of punishment for violating them. 
The two specific laws chosen for this category are 1) family planning laws 
(Population and Family Planning Law of the People's Republic of China) and 2) laws 
that restrict individuals’ ability to participate in political groups and demonstrations 
(Law of the People's Republic of China on Assemblies, Processions and 
Demonstrations). These laws are chosen because they characterize the unique 
relationship between the Chinese government and its citizenry as discussed in Chapter 
II.  
3. Economy-Related Relationships: Private vs. Public 
This study focuses thirdly on economic regulation affecting interactions 
among non-intimate parties.43 Many have argued that legal reform of China is mostly 
                                                 
42 In China, laws that define the functions of the state and its organs as well as their 
relationship to civil society and citizenry are called administrative laws.  
43 I am aware 1) that people interact with strangers in ways other than economic transaction 
and 2) that other groups such are friends, colleagues, neighbors, also play important roles in 
people’s social life. Economic relationships are chosen because of their significance as 
driving forces of the legal reforms in China. Meanwhile, other groups are likely located 
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driven by economic reform with the main objective of regulating the market to ensure 
healthy and sustainable economic growth ( Chen 1996, Lubman 1999, Potter 2004). 
As China models its economy-related legal system after Western economies (Vermeer 
and d’Hooghe 2002), one may conclude that the law encourages conformity in a 
similar manner in China’s markets as it does in these other market-driven economies. 
The emphasis on rationality in the realm of economics makes it likely that individuals 
will base their judgment for law-breaking on a cost-benefit calculation and thus 
refrain from violation when the risk of punishment is high (Simpson and Koper 1992). 
On the other hand, economic growth contributes to people’s commitment to norms 
and concepts that are essential to the stability and expansion of free markets and 
encourages their compliance with laws that reflect such norms (Posner 2000, Tyler 
2009).  
As argued in Chapter II, This research more specifically distinguishes between 
laws that protect private economic interests and those that regulate public economic 
relationships. The distinction is meaningful to the extent that, under an authoritarian 
and ideologically socialist state, public economic laws should be more legitimate and 
more influential in evoking compliance than private property laws. Meanwhile, 
infringement upon the public interest is considered a violation of the state’s interest, 
                                                 
between strangers and family members on the spectrum of familiarity and intimacy. This 
study looks at the extremes of the spectrums as examples of more nuanced variation. 
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triggering a more serious threat of punishment (Los 1983, Savelsberg 2000). 
Therefore, I propose: 
Hypothesis 4.3a. In China, expectations of compliance with economy-
related laws will be associated with both perceived legitimacy of the law and 
the perceived likelihood of punishment. 
Hypothesis 4.3b. In China, law’s perceived legitimacy has a larger 
impact on people’s expectation of compliance with public economic laws than 
on such expectation for laws regulating private economic relationships. 
Hypothesis 4.3c. In China, the likelihood of punishment under the law 
has a larger impact on people’s expectation of compliance with public 
economic laws than on such expectation for laws regulating private economic 
relationships. 
As examples of laws in the private economic realm, I selected intellectual 
property rights laws and theft laws, specifically, laws that regulate downloading 
unauthorized materials and knowingly purchasing stolen property.   
To illustrate obedience to laws in the public economic realm I chose tax laws 
and laws that guard against the private appropriation of public resources.  
For each of the eight laws discussed above, I measured individuals’ perception 
of the legitimacy of law, likelihood of punishment for violating the law and their 
expected likelihood of breaking the law. The next section discusses in detail how each 
variable was measured.  
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Key Variables and Statistical Models 
I again utilize the survey data described in Chapter II. 
Likelihood of (non)compliance with the law 
The question regarding legal compliance was worded as follows: 
Imagine a person just like you. Given the conditions and opportunities, how likely 
do you think (s)he will do the following things? 
The respondent was then given the list of behaviors that violate various 
Chinese laws as described in Chapter II (Appendix A) and was asked to give a score 
of 1 to 5 to indicate the expected likelihood that a person like her/himself would 
engage in each behavior. The larger the number, the higher the likelihood.44 
Asking people whether they have violated certain rules directly is the 
conventional measurement of legal (non)compliance (e.g. Tyler 2006), but it is not 
optimal for the purpose of this project. If individuals fear the repercussion of violating 
the law, they are unlikely to report their own illegal behaviors or potential for such 
behaviors truthfully out of fear of discovery. Indeed, there are reasons for this fear in 
the current project as the survey was conducted in communities where no researchers 
can access the residential registration without permission from the local government.  
At times, researchers had to be accompanied by local residential committee 
                                                 
44 In the survey questionnaire, each number is given a verbal label as existing research 
demonstrates that fully labeled scales facilitate the respondents’ comprehension of the 
questions and are more reliable (Christian, Parsons, and Dillman 2009). The labels are: 1—
inconceivable, 2—unlikely, 3—50/50, 4—likely, and 5—definitely. 
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members45 so that security guards would allow interviewers access to residential 
buildings. Although the interviewers were thoroughly trained to maintain 
confidentiality of the survey data and respondent information, the respondents 
nonetheless might suspect the possibility of their responses being leaked to the 
authorities. Such fear would likely discourage the respondents from being truthful in 
reporting their own illegal behaviors. Therefore, I adopted a hypothetical approach to 
protect the respondents and to capture a wider range of possible variation in 
(non)compliance behaviors.  
The eight behaviors included in the survey constitute violations of the four 
larger categories of laws discussed in previous sections, namely 1) laws that govern 
family relations, 2) laws that regulate the relationship between the state and citizens, 
3) laws that protect public economic interests, and 4) laws that protect private 
economic interests. Appendix A gives a full list of the eight behaviors in the order in 
which they appeared in the questionnaire. Except for violations of the family-planning 
policy that only constitute civil violations, all behaviors could result in either civil or 
criminal sanctions. The circumstances and severity of violations were not described in 
                                                 
45 Residential committees are the self-governing organs of local residents in urban China. 
According to the “Organizational Law of Residential Committees of PRC”, these committees 
should be elected by the local residents in the same neighborhoods. The assumed 
responsibility of such committees are “self-management, self-education and self-service” 
among the residents. They function under the “supervision, support and help” of the local 
governments and their delegated offices and “assist the work of local governments and their 
delegated offices”. 
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detail but left to the respondent’s own judgment. 
For the statistical analyses described below, I aggregated the score of different 
behaviors within four categories of laws as well as across all types of laws to form the 
dependent variables. Since there are two laws within each category and eight laws in 
total, the final non-compliance scores are variables with either nine (2-10) (for each 
type of law) or thirty-six (5-40) (for all laws combined) possible values. 
Perceived Legitimacy of Law  
The major independent variable of interests is the respondents’ perceptions of 
the law’s legitimacy. Corresponding to the likelihood of people’s compliance with 
different types of laws, questions about this variable were also categorized based on 
the nature of the legal rules. Chapter III provides detailed description of the variable. 
Likelihood of Punishment 
In consistence with the dependent variable and the main independent variable, 
the respondents were asked for each deviant behavior, how likely they think a person 
like him/herself would be punished under the law for engaging in such a behavior. 
The question was phrased as follows: 
Imagine a person just like you. Had (s)he done the following things, how likely do 
you think (s)he would be punished under the law?46 
The survey interviewers were trained to emphasize that the negative 
                                                 
46 As discussed previously, the certainty of punishment has shown by empirical studies to be 
most influential and consistent in actors’ decisions regarding legal (non-)compliance and thus 
I only asked about the perceived likelihood of punishment in the current study. 
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consequences of interest were only those imposed by formal legal institutions, 
excluding “punishments” from other social groups such as families or neighborhood 
groups. Similar to the non-compliance question, the respondents were asked to assign 
a score of 1 to 5 to the likelihood of punishment as the result of each violation, the 
larger the score, the higher the likelihood.47 
For both perceived legitimacy and likelihood of punishment, the answers are 
aggregated in a similar manner as for the likelihood of noncompliance such that each 
category of laws and all laws correspond with is a legitimacy score and a punishment 
score. 
In addition, different social and demographic groups have different needs and 
opportunities for deviance and are thus likely to follow different patterns of legal 
compliance. I included in each statistical model a number of socioeconomic and 
demographic variables for controlling purposes. Age and sex have traditionally been 
included in the study of deviance and criminal behavior(Hagan, Simpson and Gillis 
1979, Grove 1985, Friedman and Rosenbaum 1988, Akers and Lee 1999, Tittle, Ward, 
and Grasmick 2003). Educational level and monthly family expenditure are used as 
indicators of respondents’ social economic statuses. I used family expenditure instead 
of individual income for a number of reasons. First, the age range of the sample 
covers some high school and all college full-time students who did not work but 
                                                 
47The text labels corresponding to the numbers are: 1—impossible, 2—unlikely, 3—50/50, 
4—likely, and 5—definitely. 
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belonged to relatively advantaged social groups. Second, there is a large number of 
missing values of the income variable due to both its inapplicability to some groups 
and respondents’ reluctance to answer the question. Third, according to a number of 
experienced survey scholars in China, self-reported expenditure level is more reliable 
than self-reported income level as Chinese people tend to be reluctant in sharing their 
real incomes with strangers. Finally, under a single-party regime, it is reasonable to 
assume that members of the ruling pa who are more closely tied with the regime, are 
more likely to abide by the state-sanctioned legal rules. I thus also included 
Communist Party membership as a control variable. Table 2.1 in Chapter II describes 
the basic demographic features of the sample. 
I used Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) models as described in Chapter III 
for my statistical analyses in this chapter.48 The specific model here is as follows, 
logit[Pr⁡(Legal⁡compliance⁡scorei ≤ j|x)]
= α𝑗 + β1legitimacy⁡of⁡the⁡law + β2coerciveness⁡of⁡the⁡law + β3age
+ β4gender + β5enducaiton + β6party⁡membership
+ β7household⁡expenditure,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡j = 1,2, … J − 1 
 
logit[Pr⁡(Legal⁡compliance⁡scorei ≤ j|x) is called the cumulative logit of 
category j, and is defined as the log function of the odds of legal compliance score 
being less than or equal to j against it being larger than j.  
Findings 
                                                 
48 I also checked the findings using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models and both 
method provide very similar results in terms of the significances and magnitudes of 
coefficients. 
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Distribution of Key Variables 
Unsurprisingly, as indicated in Figure 4.1, most respondents report people like 
themselves to be rather law-abiding. For seven of the eight deviant behaviors, more 
than 70% of the respondents report that it is inconceivable or unlikely that people like 
them would display such behaviors. The distributions of nearly all non-compliance 
variables are left-skewed, meaning that respondents are more likely to report their 
equivalents as law-abiding rather than law-defying. The exception is the variable 
representing downloading pirated movies and songs, which is more evenly distributed 
across the possible responses. Even for this relatively minor offense, however, more 
than half (55%) of the respondents thought that people like them were unlikely to 
break the law. 
 The categories of laws generated different reactions. Most noticeably, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 4.1a, the absolute majority (>90%) of respondents report it to 
be inconceivable or unlikely that people like them would ever consider abandoning 
their responsibilities toward their family (Figure 1a & b). In contrast, people are much 
more likely to expect infringement upon the economic rights of another private party. 
Respectively 45% and 26 % of respondents think that people like them would have at 
least a 50/50chance of either downloading unauthorized materials or purchasing a 
stolen bike (Figure 1e & f). In between are people’s expectations of their equivalents 
defying the state’s authority (Figure 1c & d) and taking advantage of public resources 
(Figure 1g & h)—15 to 20% of the respondents expected people like them to have at 
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least a 50/50 chance of disobeying any of the four laws within these two categories. 
Figure 4.2, which replicates Figure 3.4, reports the distribution of the key 
independent variable, namely the perceived legitimacy of different types of laws. 
Family laws are by far the most legitimate legal rules—more than 90% of respondent 
consider disobeying either of the chosen legal provisions a violation to core social 
values (Figure 4.2a&b). Least legitimate appear to be laws that prohibit downloading 
pirated materials (Figure 4.2f). Only slightly more than half of the respondents think 
that breaking such laws somewhat violates core social values. Meanwhile, theft laws, 
albeit in the same category, are perceived by more respondents to be legitimate than 
state-citizen relationship laws, particularly family planning laws. Public economic 
laws are again in the middle of the spectrum, with slightly more than 80% of 
respondents perceiving either kind of laws within this category to be legitimate 
(Figure 4.2g&2h). 
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taking public water and electricity for private use
tax evasion
downloading pirated movies and songs
knowingly purchasing a stolen bike
having more children than allowed by the law
Illegal aggregation
adult children not supporting their aging parents
parents not raising their underage children
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Reported Expectation of Legal Non-Compliance by Social Relations Regulated
Inconceivable
Unlikely
50/50
Likely
Definitely
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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
h. taking public water and electricity for private
use
g. tax evasion
f. downloading pirated movies and songs
e. knowingly purchasing a stolen bike
d. having more children than allowed by the
law
c. illegal aggregation
b.adult children not supporting their aging
parents
a. parents not rasing their underage children
Much violation
Some violaiton
A little violation
No violation at all
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Legitimacy of Law by Social Relations Regulated 
         (How much does violation of the law also violate core social values?) 
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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
h. taking public water and electricity for private use
g. tax evasion
f. downloading pirated movies and songs
e. knowling purchasing a stolen bike
d. having more children than allowed by the law
c. illegal assembly
b. adult children not supporting their aging parents
a. parents not rasing their underage children
Definitely
Likely
50/50
Unlikely
Impossible
Figure 4.3: Distribution of Perceived Likelihood of Legal Punishment for Non-Compliance by Social Relations Regulated 
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Figure 4.3 presents the distribution of the main controlling variable, the 
perceived likelihood of punishment under different laws. Private economic laws seem 
be at the opposite end of the spectrum from the other laws. Respondents state that 
people like them are not likely to be punished for violating private economic laws, 
particularly the piracy law. Almost 60% of respondents believe it is unlikely or 
impossible for people like them to be punished under the anti-piracy laws (Figure 
4.3f) and about 40% think the same for theft laws. In contrast, most respondents think 
that violating other laws is much more likely to evoke punishment. At least around 
80% think there is at least a 50% chance for people like them to be punished under all 
the other laws for violation, with the highest percent (95%) of them thinking the laws 
that restrict freedom of assembly were likely to evoke punishment. 
There appears to be consistency between the respondents’ perception of the 
legitimacy of a law (Figure 4.2) and their perception of the likelihood that infractions 
of the same law will lead to punishment (Figure 4.3). Chi-square tests with Gamma 
statistics (results upon request) indicated that for each specific law, there exists a weak 
to moderate but consistently significant correlation between the level of perceived 
legitimacy and the estimated likelihood of punishment. Thus, in China, the more 
people think a law is legitimate, the more people believe its violation will be 
punished.  
Naturally, the aggregated ranks of perceived legitimacy and expected 
likelihood of punishment do not match exactly, however. Eighty percent of the 
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respondents think that theft laws are legitimate (Figure 4.2e) but only about 60% 
believe that people like them were likely to be punished under the law for breaking 
these laws (Figure 4.3e).49 In comparison, fewer people perceive the family planning 
laws (70%, Figure 4.2d) to be legitimate while more respondents (80%, Figure 4.3d) 
think people like them were likely to be punished for disobeying these laws. 
Results of Ordinal Logistic Regressions 
The results of the multivariate statistical analyses are presented in Tables 4.1 
and 4.2. Table 4.1 describes the category-specific relationships between expectations 
of non-compliance and either the perceived legitimacy or perceived likelihood of 
punishment,50 without controlling for the other. Table 4.2, in contrast, contains full 
models with the key independent variable, legitimacy, and the main control variable. 
Models 4.1A/4.2A through 4.1D/4.2D each involves one of the four sub-sets of laws 
discussed above. The dependent variables in these models are aggregated non-
compliance scores of the two deviant behaviors within each category. Model 4.2E in 
                                                 
49 In this analysis, if a person rated the infraction of a law as “much” or “some” violation to 
core social values, then (s)he is described as attributing legitimacy to this law. If a person 
rated the likelihood that someone like her/him would be punished for disobeying a law is 
50/50 or higher, (s)he is described as thinking punishment under such law is likely.  
50 The key independent variable and the main control variable are treated as continuous 
variables for a number of reasons. First, the coding of independent variables is mostly 
consequential to the interpretation of estimated coefficients and is not as important as the 
proper specification of the distribution of the dependent variable. Second, the numbers of 
categories for each independent variables are rather large, and thus the interpretation of the 
models will be unnecessarily complicated should they be fitted as categorical variables. 
Finally, in existing literature, relationship between legal compliance to both the legitimacy of 
law and possibility of punishment tends to be described as monotonic.   
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Table 4.2 combines all kinds of laws in the survey questionnaire and measures the 
general relationships between the tendency of legal compliance and the legitimacy.  
 
Results in Table 4.1 suggest that for all types of laws, the perceived legitimacy 
and likelihood of punishment both exhibit significant association with the 
expectations of non-compliance. However, as indicated by the comparison between 
models in Table 4.1 and those in Table 3, the relationship between perceived 
likelihood of punishment and the dependent variable are attenuated when the effect of 
perceived legitimacy is taken into account. Diagnostics of multicollinearity shows that 
the tolerance of either main independent variables is above than 0.7 (i.e. variance 
inflation factor is smaller than 1.43) across all types of laws.51 These indices 
demonstrate that there is no reason to suspect that the change in significance level of 
an independent variable’s effect is the result of collinearity or unstable standard error 
                                                 
51 These diagnostics were produced in Ordinary Least Square Regression models with the 
same dependent and independent variables. SPSS regression procedures for categorical 
dependent variables do not have collinearity diagnostics. However, one can use the linear 
Regression procedure for this purpose. Collinearity statistics in regression concern the 
relationships among the predictors, ignoring the dependent variable (IBM 2011; Kutner, 
Nachtsheim and Neter 2004). 
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Table 4.1: Results of Ordinal Logistic Regressions Modeling the Likelihood of Non-Compliance with Different Types of Law 
 
Model 4.1A: 
Family 
Model 4.1B: 
State-Citizen 
Model 4.1C: 
Private Economic 
Model 4.1D: 
Public Economic 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Predictor (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) 
Legitimacy of the law -0.444***  -0.474***  -0.412***  -0.513***  
 (0.641)  (0.623)  (0.662)   (0.599)  
Likelihood of legal punishment  -0.125**  -0.198***  -0.278***  -0.172*** 
  (0.882)  (0.820)  (0.757)  (0.842) 
Age in years -0.011 -0.013 -0.028*** -0.035*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.033*** -0.035*** 
 (0.989) (0.987) (0.972) (0.966) (0.960) (0.958) (0.968) (0.965) 
Female -0.102 -0.108 -0.018 -0.198 -0.521*** -0.556** -0.369* -0.465** 
 (0.903) (0.898) (0.982) (0.820) (0.594) (0.573) (0.691) (0.628) 
Years of formal education -0.008 -0.018  0.009  0.027  0.058*  0.039  0.016  0.009 
 (0.992) (0.982) (1.009) (1.027) (1.060) (1.040) (1.016) (1.009) 
Party Membership  0.102  0.071 -0.078 -0.144 -0.249 -0.211  0.036 -0.013 
 (1.107) (1.074) (0.925)  (0.866) (0.780) (0.810) (1.037) (0.987) 
Household monthly expense -0.022 -0.022 -0.015  0.004  0.012  0.006 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.978) (0.978) (0.985)  (0.961) (1.012) (1.006) (0.987) (0.989) 
         
N 526 526 526 527 525 526 525 525 
Note: * p<0.05;** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.    
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Table 4.2: Results of Ordinal Logistic Regressions Modeling the Likelihood of Non-Compliance with Different Types of Laws  
 
Model 4.2A:  
Family  
Model 4.2B:  
State-Citizen 
Model 4.2C:   
Private 
Economic 
Model 4.2D:  
Public 
Economic 
Model 4.2E: 
General 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Predictor (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) 
Legitimacy of the law -0.405 *** -0.428 *** -0.296 *** -0.471 *** -0.146 *** 
 (0.667)  (0.652)  (0.744)  (0.624)  (0.864)  
Likelihood of legal punishment -0.059  -0.093  -0.206 *** -0.063  -0.012  
 (0.943)  (0.911)  (0.814)  (0.939)  (0.988)  
Age in years -0.011  -0.028 *** -0.040 *** -0.033 *** -0.037 *** 
 (0.989)  (0.972)  (0.961)  (0.967)  (0.963)  
Female -0.065  -0.073  -0.560 ** -0.393 * -0.342 * 
 (0.937)  (0.930)  (0.571)  (0.675)  (0.710)  
Years of formal education -0.010  0.013  0.042  0.012  0.024  
 (0.990)  (1.013)  (1.042)  (1.012)  (1.024)  
Party Membership 0.092  -0.074  -0.234  0.041  -0.026  
 (1.097)  (0.928)  (0.791)  (1.041)  (0.975)  
Household monthly expense -0.023  -0.012  0.005  -0.015  -0.004  
 (0.977)  (0.988)  (1.006)  (0.986)  (0.996)  
           
N 525 524 525                    525 524 
Note: * p<0.05;** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.     
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estimation. Therefore, the seemingly significant effect of perceived punishment for some 
laws is spurious as it disappears in presence of perceived legitimacy.  The following 
analyses thus focus on models in Table 4.2, where both effects are included. 
Starting with aggregation of expectations concerning compliance with all types of 
laws (Model 4.2E), I found legitimacy but not the deterrence effect of the law to be 
significantly associated with people’s expectation of legal compliance by others like 
them. These patterns resemble findings in other social contexts (e.g. Tyler 2006).  They 
are nonetheless slightly surprising in the Chinese context given the authoritarian nature of 
the Chinese government. But does this pattern hold up for all kinds of laws or does it vary 
with the types of social relationships regulated by the laws?  
Turning to different categories of laws, expectations concerning legal compliance 
varied based on the type of regulation. Specifically, as predicted by Hypothesis 4.1b, 
respondents’ expectation of how likely people like them will comply with family 
laws(Model 4.2A) corresponds to their evaluations of the laws’ legitimacy—the more 
they think a law is legitimate, the less likely they think people like them would disobey it 
(coefficient = -0.405, p<0.001). In contrast, the expectation of legal compliance in this 
area does not correspond with people’s estimation that a violation will be punished, 
although respondents tended to believe that the law would be responsive to behaviors that 
upset family ties. 
Hypotheses 4.3a and 4.3b are partially confirmed. In the case of economic laws, 
the perceived legitimacy of law is associated with expectations of compliance in both 
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private and public realms while the likelihood of punishment is only associated with 
expectations of legal compliance in the private realm (Model 4.2C and Model 4.2D, p-
values for all significant coefficients smaller than 0.001). The perceived legitimacy of the 
law matters more for public economic laws than for private economic laws (the 
coefficients of the legitimacy of law are -0.471 and -0.296 respectively for public and 
private economic laws52).   
These findings highlight the importance of a relational understanding of the law. 
In other words, the legitimacy and potential deterrence effect of laws, and how they 
induce compliance, can be better assessed when the analysis considers two aspects: first 
the actor and secondly the entity in relation to which the actor’s interest is defined. In the 
case of economic laws, although violations of both private and public laws involve the 
behavior of gaining economic interest by taking property that does not lawfully belong to 
the actor, the identity of the rightful owner also matters. Chinese people find laws that 
protect public economic interests both more legitimate (Figure 4.2 g&h vs. Figure 4.2 
e&f) and more likely to trigger punishment (Figure 4.3 g&h vs. Figure 4.3 e&f)53than 
laws that protect private economic interests. When the “victim” is the general public, they 
                                                 
52 As mentioned above, since the statistical models are non-linear, the numerical values of the 
coefficients do not have intrinsic meanings. However, as the dependent and independent variables 
through Model 3A and Model 3D are measured on the same scale, it is meaningful to compare the 
magnitude of the coefficients of the same variable across different models.  
53 The author conducted paired t-tests that indicate the legitimacy and punishment scores of 
public economic laws are both significantly higher than those of private economic laws. Aware of 
the categorical nature of the measurement in a more accurate sense, I also performed binomial 
tests to insure that larger proportion of people gave relatively high scores on those measures for 
public economic laws than for private economic laws. 
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seem to be more concerned with how socially (un)acceptable the potential violation is. In 
their assessment of the likelihood of violation for people like them, the potential 
punishment is only relevant when respondents position the violator against other private 
actors. 
Finally, the results concerning laws that regulate state-citizen relationships 
deserve particular attention. Disproving Hypothesis 4.2, likelihood of punishment and 
expectations of legal compliance with these laws are not related. Also, the link between 
the perceived legitimacy of the law and expectation of legal compliance is as strong as 
those for other kinds of laws (Model 4.2B). This finding is curious given popular 
assumptions about authoritarian regimes securing the political interests by deploying 
aggressive measures against their citizens (Svolik 2012). Both legal rules within this 
category have attracted intensive media attention and invoked heated discussion on the 
oppressive nature of the Chinese state (e.g.Wong 2012, Tang 2013, Kaiman 2013). 
However, it appears that, in the minds of ordinary Chinese citizens, fear of oppression is 
not the major deterrent keeping individuals from defying the state. Instead, it is their 
belief in the righteousness of government restrictions on civil liberty.  
Intrigued by this finding, I replicated the OLR model for each of the two specific 
kinds of legal provisions under this category. Table 4.3 presents the results of the 
additional statistical analyses. As it appears in Models 4.3A and 4.3B, Chinese citizens 
have approached the two kinds of laws differently. Specifically, the relationship between 
the perceive legitimacy of the law and expectations concerning legal compliance is much 
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stronger for family planning laws than for laws restricting public assembly (the two 
coefficients are –0.761and -0.507 respectively and both with p-values< 0.001). 
Meanwhile, the likelihood of punishment is significantly associated with expected legal 
compliance only for the latter.  
Such findings complicate the relational understanding of legal compliance 
discussed in the previous paragraph. In the case of family planning laws, the intended 
objective of the law (to regulate population growth) intersects with social relations in a 
much more private and intimate space, the family.54 As such, the law invokes different 
categories of social values that conflict and compete with one another.  A noticeable and 
distinctive feature of family planning laws in China is that, in addition to its constraint on 
individual reproductive rights, it puts two important social institutions, the state and the 
family, at odds with one another. Given the significance of family in Chinese society 
indicated by the findings in this and previous studies (Ebrey and Watson 1986), this 
finding may indicate that violations of family planning laws in China are motivated and 
justified more by the commitment to the family than by defiance against the state. Such 
finding thus reveals the multi-faceted nature of legal regulations and hints at the 
complexity of legal ideas and behaviors.  
                                                 
54 Despite its relevance to family life, I decided against the strategy of analyzing the family 
planning law under the category of family law for two reasons beyond the argument made in 
previous sections. First, the distributions of key variables for this law more closely resembles 
those of the public aggregation law instead of the two family laws. Second, in the case of family 
planning law, the relevance of the law to family relations lies in that it intrudes the family domain 
and competes with traditional family values. In contrast, the two family laws are consistent with 
traditional family values.  
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Meanwhile, both the legitimacy of law and expected punishment play an 
important role in expectations of compliance with laws that restrict public assembly. This 
finding partially confirms Hypothesis 4.2 that Chinese citizens, living under an 
authoritarian regime, are sensitive to the cost of challenging the state. However, the 
significant role that the legitimacy of this law plays beyond punishment suggests that 
perceived coercion is not the primary mechanism through which the Chinese government 
seeks obedience from the masses, even in the political realm.  
Finally, this research reveals a stable, significant and negative association between 
age and legal non-compliance. This could be a simple age effect consistent with most 
studies on deviant behaviors but it may also reflect the impact of different life trajectories 
of different age cohorts. Future research could expand this finding by looking into the 
relationships between people’s experience in or memories of the past and their 
understanding of and behaviors toward the law today. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Above all, this analysis reveals that in China, all things considered, it is the social 
values imbedded in laws instead of the laws’ ability to invoke punishment that closely 
connects to expectations for legal compliance. The importance of the law’s legitimacy 
under an authoritarian regime challenges the common assumption of an essential 
connection among democracy, liberalism and the rule of law (Hutchinson and Monahan 
1987, Murphy 1993). 
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Furthermore, the drastically different levels of perceived legitimacy among 
categories of laws warrant a rethinking of the theoretical concept of “legitimacy” in the 
context of socio-legal studies. Conventionally, studies on legal compliance tend to either 
treat “law” as a homogenous entity or focus on a single category of law without situating 
it in the larger legal system and social context. Such studies tend to assume a legal system 
legitimated through complementary values associated with individual rights (as in the 
case of rights discourse) and dignity (as in the case of procedural justice). Legal 
consciousness studies have raised questions regarding the complexity of legality and the 
potential tension between the legitimacy of law and its repressive nature (e.g. Ewick and 
Silbey 1998). The research here further reveals an internal tension within the concept 
“legitimacy of the law” and a close connection to the local context. All laws considered 
in this analysis are parts of the same legal system and yet are perceived by Chinese 
people to possess varying degrees of legitimacy.  
For example, the one kind of law perceived to be most legitimate in China are 
laws that strengthen family ties, reflecting the longstanding Chinese culture that arranges 
social life through kinship networks (Fei 2005). Meanwhile, the laws that protect private 
(property) rights are relatively less legitimate, indicating the absence of the rights-based 
legal discourse prevalent under capitalist systems. Such findings not only complicate the 
definition of “legitimacy” for socio-legal scholars but also highlight the value of 
conducting socio-legal research in diverse cultural contexts.  
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The key innovation here, allowing for a more nuanced theoretical treatment of 
“legitimacy,” is a relational and culturally sensitive conceptualization of the law. By 
differentiating four major categories of legal provisions and explicating their particular 
significance in Chinese society, this research demonstrates that the connection between 
legal compliance and legitimacy is conditioned by cultural and social locations of the 
law. Both the social relationships regulated by the law and the cultural values supporting 
the law play a role in people’s expectations concerning obedience to or defiance of the 
law. 
In addition, this research suggests an interaction between the overall level of 
legitimacy of law and individual expectations concerning legal compliance. Since, in the 
realm of family relations, respondents overwhelmingly assert the legitimacy of the law, I 
find that the legitimacy of these laws clearly trumps potential punishment in encouraging 
compliance behaviors. In contrast, in the realm of private economic relations, the lack of 
acknowledgement of the laws’ legitimacy coincides with the connection between 
potential punishment and expected legal compliance. These findings indicate that 
punishment is sometimes merely a secondary regulating mechanism in some social 
domains, but this is not true in areas where law coincides with strong normative 
regulation. Although the limited number of legal rules included in the current study does 
not allow for a strict statistical test of this hypothesis, more theoretical and empirical 
discussion on this front will be fruitful in the future. 
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Finally, the analysis here demonstrates a moderate correlation between Chinese 
individuals’ perceived legitimacy of the law and their perceived likelihood of punishment 
under the law, regardless of the actual likelihood of such punishment. This finding echoes 
some previous research in Western societies (Sherman 1993) and raises interesting 
question about the connection between people’s normative judgments and their 
instrumental decision-making.  
Future research should expand discussion on the complexity of legal ideas and 
behaviors raised here. Conditioned by the survey method, the current project limited the 
respondents’ options to questions that might have otherwise generated more extensive 
and nuanced responses. The survey questionnaire was designed to reveal the complexity 
of China’s legal culture at the macro level by demonstrating how diverse legal ideas 
coexist. Nevertheless, it likely masks the multifaceted and self-contradictory nature of 
both ideas and behaviors at the individual level. Future research will analyze interview 
and ethnographic data collected in conjunction with the administration of the survey 
reported here. Such data will shed light on the micro meaning-making processes and 
power-relationships that interact with macro patterns of legal ideas, behaviors and 
cultures. 
Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, I cannot make any definite causal 
inference between people’s perceived legitimacy of law and their expectations 
concerning compliance with the law. It is possible that some of the respondents are using 
their perception of law’s legitimacy (of lack thereof) to justify their expectations 
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concerning compliance. This does not undermine my fundamental argument that the 
legitimacy of law and its relationship to legal compliance are both contingent upon the 
nature of the social relations regulated. Future research can work to deepen and 
complicate this argument by collecting longitudinal data that will help to tease out the 
causal direction. 
Table 4.3: Results of Ordinal Logistic Regressions Modeling the Likelihood of  
                  Non-Compliance with State-Citizen Laws 
 
Model 4.3A:  
Public Assembly 
Model 4.3B:  
Family Planning 
Model 4.2B:^  
State-Citizen 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Predictor (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) (𝑒𝛽) 
Legitimacy of the law -0.507 *** -.761 *** -0.428 *** 
 (0.602)  (0.467)  (0.652)  
Likelihood of legal punishment -0.186 * -0.056  -0.093  
 (0.831)  (0.946)  (0.911)  
Age in years -0.026 *** -0.030 *** -0.028 *** 
 (0.975)  (0.971)  (0.972)  
Female -0.122  0.042  -0.073  
 (0.885)  (1.043)  (0.930)  
Years of formal education 0.040  -0.016  0.013  
 (1.041)  (0.984)  (1.013)  
Party Membership -0.177  0.049  -0.074  
 (0.837)  (1.050)  (0.928)  
Household monthly expense -0.019  -0.003  -0.012  
 (0.981)  (0.997)  (0.988)  
       
N 524 524 524 
Note: * p<0.05;** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
^ Model taken from Table 4.2.   
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Chapter V: Legal Mobilization in Contemporary China 
As detailed in Chapter II, on-going economic and legal reforms have elevated law 
to an unprecedented level of importance in today’s China (Diamant, Lubman, and 
O’Brien 2005). At a time of intensified social conflicts and unrest due to increasing 
inequality (Erie 2012,Taylor 2012, The Economist 2012, Tong and Lei 2010, Wedeman 
2009), one major effort by the Chinese state in “making law matter” is to promote “rule 
of law” and courts as primary outlets for grievances and tools for “sustaining stability” 
(Weiwen, 维稳) (Erie 2012).  Whether and how ordinary Chinese people have responded 
to state propaganda concerning law is the core question of this chapter, which moves 
from legal compliance to legal mobilization. Continuing the themes from previous 
chapters, I argue that the complex legal cultures built upon China’s rich historical 
legacies shape Chinese people’s understandings of how law is applicable to the various 
social relations they face in everyday life. Their tendency to mobilize the law thus hinges 
upon how they are connected to the larger cultural discourses surrounding the law.  
In this chapter, I add to the existing literature on legal mobilization by considering 
what law means in different spheres of social relations: family, state, and economic (see 
Chapter II). I further contribute to this field of research by linking ideas toward law and 
government to people’s potential decisions regarding legal mobilization. I start with a 
brief review of classic legal mobilization research, focusing on the potential contribution 
of my work to this field. I then expand the theoretical discussion into specific hypotheses. 
After testing my hypotheses with data collected from my social survey describe in 
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Chapter II, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my findings to the studies 
of both legal consciousness and China. 
Legal Mobilization 
Legal mobilization, as its name suggests, refers to how people mobilize and make 
use of legal resources toward certain ends, be such ends personal (e.g. Merry 1990, 
Yngvesson 1993, Sarat and Felstiner 1995) or collective (e.g. McCann 1994, Diamant 
2005). One useful device developed and deployed by legal consciousness scholars to 
study people’s daily interaction with the law, including legal mobilization, is to examine 
the process of dispute transformation (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980). Building on this, 
in this chapter, I explore what Chinese people do when they are faced with different types 
of inter-personal conflicts. In particular, I focus on their choice between informal and 
formal mechanisms of dispute resolution, paying special attention to their tendency to use 
courts.   
My research builds on a long-standing tradition of civil litigation studies in the 
field of law and society, which in the recent decade have been extended to China ( Jiang 
and Wu 2015, Cai 2008, Michelson 2007a, Clark 1990, Hensler 1987, Felstiner, Abel, 
and Sarat 1980, Miller and Sarat 1980). Although previous studies point to the 
importance of the nature of disputes in predicting likelihood of legal mobilization, few 
have systematically examined how the effects of other factors, such as social and 
demographic characteristics of the individuals, vary across categories of legal provisions. 
I expand this line of research by deconstructing the concept of law. As described in 
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Chapter II, I focus on the different social relations regulated by law. I utilize the 
theoretical frame of legal consciousness, which emphasizes how law constructs and is 
constructed through social relations (Marshall 2003, 2005, Nielsen 2004, Engel and 
Munger 2003, Hull 2003, Dellinger and Williams 2002, Witt 2000, Ewick and Silbey 
1998, Goldberg-Ambrose 1994, Engel 1993, Burniller 1988, Hull 2003). I find that 
Chinese urban residents make drastically different choices for dispute resolution 
strategies when faced with conflicts rising from different social relations. 
I also contribute to previous research by reconstituting the “tool kits” (Swidler 
1986) of law in the context of transitional China. Most U.S.-based legal studies (Merry 
1990 McCann 1994, Morrill et al. 2010), as well as those conducted in China (Gallagher 
2006), assume “rights” and “entitlement” as prerequisites for legal mobilization. This 
assumption suggests an implicit but close bond between awareness of rights and respect 
for law. For countries like the United States, where very basic social relations are 
formulated borrowing concepts from law, this bond might make intuitive sense.  Yet in 
China “private rights” were never a presumption or even an implication of traditional law 
and culture (Diamant et al. 2005, Gu 2009). The law in China does not protect private 
rights against public power. For example, according to the Administrative Litigation 
Law, a statute specifically designed to confine the misconduct of government officials 
and to endow the citizens with the right to sue the government, a lawsuit or 
administrative review process can only be initiated against “concrete conduct” of 
administrative bodies or personnel, but the legal process cannot challenge the underlying 
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law or regulation. In other words, it is not governmental power but only the way 
government power is exercised by officials that is monitored and open to challenge. In 
this chapter, I explicate ideas regarding the role of law and government based on different 
cultural traditions and connects them to patterns of legal mobilization tendencies. 
Hypotheses 
The Dispute Pagoda 
I examine the general  patterns of dispute resolution strategies among Chinese 
urban residents utilizing and expanding the dispute pagoda analogy developed by 
Michelson (2007). As a revision to the classic “dispute pyramid” (Felstiner, Abel, and 
Sarat 1980, Miller and Sarat 1980), the pagoda model treats different paths of dispute 
resolution as alternatives rather than requisite stages. A classical dispute pyramid depicts 
a fixed, linear sequence beginning with a perceived inequity and culminating in court 
litigation, with many individuals dropping out at each stage of the process. Because many 
individuals perceive injurious experiences, but few ever reach litigation, litigation sits at 
the top of a pyramid.  In contrast, a dispute pagoda treats responses to grievances as 
alternative options (summing to 100%) rather than one step in a sequence, meaning the 
number of cases at higher levels could possibly surpass those in lower levels, thus the 
shape of a pagoda. For example, more people could choose to appeal to a local 
government office than to look for a third party as the mediator, while in class dispute 
studies, the assumption is that people will only resort to the government after exhausting 
all informal resources, including mediation. This model is of particular value in the 
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context of China where, traditionally, the administrative official also assumed judicial 
responsibilities. Recent campaigns by Chinese government to expand extra-judicial 
administrative channels of redress so as to contain and manage popular contention 
(Minzner 2006, Cai 2004, Luehrmann 2003) also contribute to the lingering popularity of 
appealing to administrative agencies for intervention in disputes (Michelson 2007b, 
O’Brrien and Li 2006). Therefore, in China, the administrative dispute redressing 
mechanisms are more likely to exist as alternatives rather than precursor to litigation, 
rendering the dispute pagoda rather than pyramid model a more proper tool.55 
Following the argument made in previous chapters, I deconstruct the concept of 
law so as to reflect the complexity of the reality from which it originates and over which 
it exercises constraints. Therefore, I predict the shape of the dispute pagoda will vary 
across different types of conflicts. Previous research has demonstrated the type of 
grievances to be a consistent indicator of strategies chosen by the aggrieved individuals 
(Jiang and Wu 2015, Michelson 2007a, Genn and Beinart 1999, Kritzer, Bogart, and 
Vidmar 1991, Curran 1978). However, existing studies tend not to explicitly address the 
confounding issue between types of grievances and characteristics of the parties 
                                                 
55 It should be noted that both models are ideal types, i.e. they are theoretical expectations that 
are never fully realized empirically. Instead, reality is likely to be a combination of both 
models—some disputes will go through the informal to formal process step by step while others 
will start at the middle or top of the different levels. However, different societies vary in the 
degree to which they resemble one model or the other. The task of researchers is to decide for 
the society under study, which model fits best. 
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involved.56 In my Chengdu survey,57 I examine the preferred dispute resolution strategy 
for different types of conflicts among the same group of respondents. Similar to the 
previous chapters, I focus on three different areas of social life, namely state-citizen 
relationship, private economic transactions and family life.58 As previously argued, law 
matters to varying degrees across these social relations. Specifically, in the realm of 
family, traditional morality takes precedence and thus there is little to no room for 
intervention from formal legal institutions. In contrast, as China models its market 
economy after a number of “rule of law” societies, judicial power may be most relevant 
in this domain. Finally, scholars have documented the persistent significance of the 
bureaucratic solutions outside the legal system (Michelson 2007a, Minzner 2006, Cai 
2004, Luehrmann 2003) which are likely to be utilized when the conflict is between the 
state and an individual. 
Hypothesis 5.1: Different shapes of the dispute pagoda.  
a. When faced by conflicts within the family, Chinese urban residents are more 
likely to opt for informal dispute-resolving mechanisms than either petitions 
to the government or appeals to court.  
                                                 
56 I discuss this issue in more details in the Variables and Statistical Models section of this 
chapter. 
57 See the section on “Variables and Statistical Models” for details on the study design. 
58 In this chapter I dropped the category of “public economic relation” as it is rare that an 
individual would be a complainant in that case. 
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b. When mistreated by state officials, Chinese urban residents are more likely to 
appeal to administrative offices than using either informal channels or going 
through the judiciary.  
c. When dealing with economic disputes with other private (non-intimate) 
parties, Chinese urban residents are more likely to appeal to a court than to 
take other options. 
Based on this set of hypotheses, the shape of the dispute pagoda should vary 
across social relations: the one for the family relation is likely to have the widest base and 
the one for the economic transactions is likely to be relatively heavier on the top. 
Social Stratification and Dispute Resolution 
Beyond the social relations from which conflicts arise, the economic, social, and 
political standing of individuals is also likely to shape the processes of dispute resolution. 
The long-standing law and society tradition has established that legal institutions tend to 
benefit the “haves” more than the “have nots” (Kritzer and Silbey 2003, Galanter 1974). 
In addition to the material resources that enable people with higher socio-economic status 
to access legal services with more ease, the social and cultural capital possessed by more 
powerful individuals also enables them to navigate the official systems and utilize them 
with more confidence (Genn and Beinart 1999, Miller and Sarat 1980, Curran 1978). In 
the context of China, a higher level of education can lead to familiarity with formal legal 
codes and the “rule of law” discourse, and thus a higher likelihood of turning to courts. 
Meanwhile, better economic means can lead to stronger social networks with government 
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officials, which can be transformed into advantages in accessing the administrative 
system. Finally, with both the state and legal system perceived as public sphere stages 
where women do not belong (Head 2009), men are more likely to take up both spaces.   
Hypothesis 5.2: Individuals with higher social socio-economic statuses are more 
likely to utilize formal institutions for dispute resolution.  
a. People with high levels of education are more likely to utilize courts for 
dispute resolution. 
b. People with more economic means are more likely to appeal to formal 
institutions other than court for dispute resolution. 
c. Men are more likely than women to use all kinds of formal mechanisms for 
dispute solution.  
Political Embeddedness and Dispute Resolution  
  In the case of China, where the judicial system has traditionally been fused with 
the administrative branch of government (Liu & Yang 1984) and is now embedded in and 
subsumed under the rest of the state bureaucracy (Cho 2003, Potter 1999, Woo 1999, 
Cohen 1997), individuals' privileged positions in the political system should encourage 
and facilitate their access to the legal system. One major marker of a privileged political 
standing is membership in the ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 
addition, although on-going reforms have dismantled much of the state-owned and –
planned economy, employment within the state bureaucratic system or state-owned 
enterprises still offers easier access to political resources.   
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 Hypothesis 5.3 Political embeddedness facilitates access to formal justice.  
a. State employees are more likely to choose formal dispute-resolution 
mechanisms over informal ones.   
b. Communist Party members are more likely to choose formal dispute-
resolution mechanisms over informal ones. 
Legal Ideas and Decision to Litigate 
 Qualitative research has examined how people frame their grievance experiences 
through normative systems based on the legal and social norms they acquire from their 
social surroundings and personal experiences (Macia-Vergara 2012). However, little 
quantitative research has been conducted to systematically examine what kind of legal 
ideas are associated with what kind of behaviors. The current study fills in this gap. 
Specifically, I look at how individuals’ understanding of the roles government and law 
play in social life are linked to their tendency to make use of the formal institutions. I 
expect that their understanding of the role of law will mostly be associated with their 
tendency to resort to court and their understanding of the role of government will mainly 
be associated with their tendency to appeal to government officials for dispute resolution.  
Continuing focusing on the implications of China’s long and complex history for 
individuals’ understanding of current political and legal institutions, I focus on three sets 
of ideas respectively associated with the three major historical eras discussed in Chapter 
III, namely the Imperial Era, the Republican Era and the Maoist Era. Under a 
traditional/Confucian model that is considered the dominant philosophy of ancient China, 
 134 
 
 
 
the relationship and ethics within the family extends to regulate the public sphere.  The 
government is thus seen as parental—loving, care, and protective, albeit authoritative. 
The law is then an extension of the moral regulation within the family.  Under such logic, 
social harmony is of paramount importance (family members should get along) and 
individuals are encouraged to make compromises in order to avoid conflicts and 
instability. I predict that people who identify with the state as a parent are reluctant to 
bring their disputes to public fora, including both judicial and administrative.  
In contrast, under the State Socialist model proposed by the Chinese state since 
the Maoist Era, the government is claimed to be a ruling machine by and for the 
proletarian class, usually referred as “the People” (人民), and the law is considered a 
weapon of class warfare which serve to fulfill the will of the People.59 Therefore, people 
who believe in the socialist nature of the government and the law should not hesitate to 
utilize public institutions. However, a significant portion of the Maoist Era, particularly 
the Cultural Revolution, was marked by political movements that emphasized the 
importance of political struggles and degraded legal orders to the point of non-existence. 
Therefore, I predict that people explicitly identifying with socialist ideas are more likely 
                                                 
59 When translated into English, the expression of the People lost its (revised) Marxian 
connotation of class struggle and thus “the collective will of the People” may appear similar to 
the legislation process of elective democracies where the parliament members supposedly 
represent their constituency. However, this expression is a standard phrase used consistently in 
conjunction with other concepts such as “the rule of law with Chinese characteristics” to 
emphasize the socialist nature of the legal system.  
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to appeal to the administrative branch but will less willing to utilize judicial resources due 
to either their distrust or diffidence in courts’ ability to address their needs.   
Finally, under the Enlightenment model, which could find resonance in the 
Bourgeoisie revolution during the Republic Era, the law is prescribed as a social contract 
and the government the executioner of the contract. This mode of thinking is most similar 
to the hegemonic discourse around legality familiar to the Western audience. In the 
context of China, this Enlightenment discourse is often employed to promote a “modern 
rule of law” over the “traditional rule of person” and thus might be understood as 
encouraging the development of a stronger and more independent judiciary. Therefore, I 
expect people who express such ideas will choose courts over other channels for dispute 
resolution as a sign of their support for rule of law.60 
Hypothesis 5.4: Understanding of law’s role is associated with the potential use 
of court. 
a. People who believe law is a contract between the state and its citizen are more 
likely to use courts for dispute resolution than those who see it as the 
representation of people’s collective will. 
                                                 
60 The following hypotheses do not engage with the possibility that the three cultural schemas 
are relevant to different degrees in different social relations and thus might not influence legal 
mobilization behaviors for different types of conflicts in the same way. In the results section of 
this chapter, I do discuss how the effect of these ideas vary across social fields.   
 136 
 
 
 
b. People who believe law is an extension of family rules are less likely to use 
courts for dispute resolution than those who see it as the representation of 
people’s collective will. 
Hypothesis 5.5: Understanding of government’s role is associated with the 
potential use of administrative petitioning. 
a. People who believe the government is like the manager of a company are less 
likely to appeal to government for dispute resolution than those who see it as 
the servant of people. 
b. People who believe government is like the head of the family are less likely to 
appeal to government for dispute resolution than those who see it as the 
servant of the people. 
In addition, I also examine how perceived legitimacy of law connects to people’s 
tendency to turn to court. In the last Chapter, I confirmed that under most circumstances, 
Chinese people’s tendency to comply with the law is closely associated with how much 
they identify the law as reflective of the core social values (i.e. the legitimacy of the law). 
I argued that this finding indicates that the normative power of law prevails in the context 
of contemporary China. In this chapter, I further test this argument by examining whether 
the acknowledged relationship between law and social values encourages people to 
utilize the law. One would expect the perception of law legitimacy to be associated with 
one's expected use of legal fora; to some extent this relationship seems tautological. 
Nevertheless, it will be useful to bring empirical evidence to bear to verify such 
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connection. Particularly when previous research has established that legal consciousness 
is multifaceted and can sometimes be ambivalent and inconsistent (Gallagher 2006, 
Patricia Ewick and Silbey 1998), we should not take any presumed relationships between 
different elements of legal ideas and behaviors for granted. 
Hypothesis 6: Higher level of perceived legitimacy of law encourages the use of 
courts in dispute solution. 
Variables and Statistical Models 
 Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics of the individuals who were surveyed. For 
this analysis, I draw on several different survey questions, which are elaborated below. 
Dependent Variables 
The following series of questions provided the basis for measuring the nature of 
individuals' likely responses to conflict situations: 
We all experience conflicts in our daily life and we deal with them in different manners. 
Following is a set of questions on how you might resolve conflicts of different natures. 
For each of the following situations, assuming you have confronted the other party with 
the problem without a resolution, would you say you are most likely to a) compromise to 
accommodate the needs of the other party; b) ask a third person known to both parties to 
be the arbiter; c) ask the police for help; d) refer the problem to relevant government 
officials; or e) bring the case to the court? 
 
The respondent was then provided three hypothetical conflicts in the form of a table and 
was instructed to only choose ONLY ONE mostly like resolution to each of the conflicts: 
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Table 5.1:  Hypotheticals for Legal Mobilization Measure, as presented to Respondents in 
Questionnaire (translated from Chinese)   
 Compromise Third 
Party 
Police Government 
Official 
Court 
A government official 
gives you a 5000 RMB 
unjustified fine and refuses 
to redress the mistake. 
a b c d e 
A business partner owns you 
5000 RMB from your last 
transaction and has refuses to 
pay you back. 
a b c d e 
Your brother-in-law borrowed 
5000 RMB from you and 
refuses to pay you back. 
a b c d e 
 
The three scenarios represent the three different spheres of social relations 
introduced in Chapter II. They respectively correspond to relationships in the public 
arena (state-citizen relationship), in private economic transaction, and in the domain of 
family, enabling me to test how the respondents (intend to) use the law differently for 
different aspects of their social reality. This approach differs from the conventional 
measurements of mobilization tendency. More typical are questions regarding people’s 
reactions to actual grievances they have experienced (e.g. Jiang and Wu 2015, (Y. Cai 
2008) Michelson 2007, Hensler 1987)61. I chose a different strategy for a number of 
reasons. First, existing research indicates that a very small number of Chinese people 
report grievances in their responses to social surveys (Jiang and Wu 2015, (Y. Cai 2008). 
                                                 
61 The body of relevant literature is too expansive to exhaust. Therefore, I list but the few 
studies conducted in contemporary China and the foundational project on civil litigation which 
started the line of research in the U.S. and elsewhere. 
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A limited sample size would not have included enough reported conflict experiences to 
conduct statistical analyses. In addition, this approach minimizes the sense of privacy 
invasion and is likely to encourage honest responses. In addition, those who are willing to 
report their grievances in a social survey may not necessarily be representative of the 
general public. Therefore, the generalizability of conclusions based on such samples is 
questionable. Finally and most importantly, as discussed previously, types of conflicts 
have proven to be reliable predictors of chosen courses of action. Yet previous studies 
rarely consider the possibility that individuals assign different meanings to “conflict”62 
(for example, what some may perceive as a friendly gesture from coworkers, others 
define as sexual harassment, see Blackstone, Uggen, and McLaughlin 2009) and thus 
differ in their likelihood of reporting various types of conflicts. Also, different conflicts 
are likely to entail different levels of loss to the parties involved. Meanwhile, the 
demographic and social factors that influence who reports what kind of conflict 
(independent variable), as well as the potential interests involved with different types of 
conflicts, could also be associated with what actions one chooses to take when one 
encounters a conflict (dependent variable) and thus introduces the possibility of 
confounding. 63 Therefore, providing ALL respondents with scenarios involving the 
                                                 
62 As a notable exception, Michelson (2007) systematically examines how the likelihood of 
encounter varies amount rural residents in China. However, he still did not account for the 
potential variance in the grievance “naming” process. 
63 In other words, it could be not that the types of conflict matters for what people do but 1) that 
certain groups who are likely to report particular kinds of conflicts also tend to prefer certain 
resolution mechanisms or 2) certain types of conflict induce a level of loss that people see as 
proper for particular form of remedies.  
 140 
 
 
 
SAME level of economic cost, the hypothetical measurement eliminates possible 
confounding factors and enable me to focus on the foundational dimension that 
distinguishes these conflicts—the social relations involved. It also captures how the same 
group of people reacts to different types of conflicts, avoiding the issue that different 
social groups are likely to encounter different types of problems.  
For the purpose of statistical analysis, I constructed two dependent variables. 
First, I collapsed the first two options in the questionnaire (i.e. “compromise” and 
“informal mediation”) into the same category to indicate that the respondent chose an 
informal mechanism to resolve the conflict. For each scenario, I then conducted 
multinomial regression analyses, comparing the odds of the respondents choosing any of 
the formal institutions (i.e. court, government agency, or police) over the informal 
strategies (Tables 5.4-5.6). Next, I then constructed three dichotomous variables, 
respectively indicating whether, for any of the three scenarios, the respondent chose 
courts, formal institutions other than courts (i.e. government agency or police), and any 
formal mechanism including courts, as conflict-resolving strategy. I conduced binomial 
logistic regression on these three dichotomous variables to assess the respondent’s 
general tendency for using court and/or other formal mechanisms (Table 5.3). 
Independent variables  
 A detailed description of the sample and demographic variables can be found in 
Chapter II. For the current analysis, I also included the respondent’s work-unit sector as 
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an additional measurement for his/her embeddedness in the political structure.64 As 
indicated in table 5.2, more than 30% of the 299 respondent who reported their work unit 
type are employed by either the government or state-owned enterprises/institutions. I 
collapsed these two categories and created a dichotomous variable that indicates whether 
the respondent works for the state, which suggests that (s)he is more embedded in the 
political system.65 
Table 5.2 Distribution of Respondents’ Work Unit Type 
 N % 
Party, government or government agency or offices 24 8.03 
State owned enterprise or institution 73 24.41 
Collective owned enterprise or institution 17 5.69 
Individual business 35 11.71 
Private enterprise 112 37.46 
Foreign investment enterprise 22 7.36 
Other 16 5.35 
Total 299 100 
 I used the same measurements for legitimacy of law as described in Chapter III.  
In the analyses of each conflict, I used the legitimacy of law relevant to the corresponding 
social relation, namely state-citizen relation, private economic relation, and family 
relation.66 For example, when analyzing the preferred strategy to solve a dispute with a 
                                                 
64 I included this variable in the preliminary analyses for previous chapters but its associations 
did not reach statistical significance.  
65 To preserve degrees of freedom, I coded respondents who did not report their work unit types 
as not being state employees. This decision is based on my knowledge that most of these people 
are either full-time students or unemployed. I also conducted statistical analyses without them. 
The directions of all effects remain the same while the statistical significance level decreases, 
which is an expected outcome of the decreased sample size.  
66 See chapter III for a detailed description of the legitimacy measures. It should be noted that 
the specific legal provisions used to construct the legitimacy of law are different from those 
governing the cases in this chapter. In other words, the list of disputes I provided to measure 
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government official, I included in the sample, the legitimacy score of the state-citizen 
laws, namingly family planning laws and regulation on public assembly. When analyzing 
the general tendency of court use, I used the aggregated legitimacy measure of for all 
three types of laws. 
 Finally, to measure the respondents’ general understanding of law, they were 
asked the following questions based on the three cultural models discussed in the 
previous section:  
Which of following statements comes closest to your own view? 
A) The law is like the rules within a family. 
B) The law is the collective will of the people. 
C) The law is a contract between the state and the citizens. 
D) Other. Please specify 
A similar question regarding the role of government was also included:   
Which of following statements comes closest to your own view? 
A) Government is like the head of a family. 
B) Government is the servant of the people. 
C) Government is like the manager of a company. 
D) Other. Please specify_____________________ 
                                                 
respondents’ preferred resolution strategy does not match the list of illegal behaviors used to 
measure the legitimacy of law. I did so to make the hypotheticals realistic as well as to control 
the level of economic loss involved in the disputes. However, that should only decrease the 
potential expected association between the court use and the legitimacy of law. Therefore, with 
such potentially attenuating condition, the consistent and strong association demonstrated later 
should be more instead of less convincing. 
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As shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the largest group of respondents chose answers 
consistent with Chinese government’s socialist ideological line. In other words, they 
believe 1) that the law is the collective will of the people (44%) or 2) that the government 
is the servant of the people (45%). 67 Many more people think the law is a social contract 
(35%) rather than an extension of family rules (18%). Meanwhile, about the same 
number of people think the government is like either the head of a family (25%) or the 
manager of a company (25%). 
 
                                                 
67 These two groups do not completely overlap.  
18%
44%
34%
4%
Figure 5.1 Percived Role of Law by Chinese urban residents
Law is like the rules in a family
Law is the reflection of collective will
of the people
Law is the contract between the
government and the citizens
Other
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Both of the previous variables were included as categorical predictors without 
recoding. People who believe “The law is like the rules within a family” and 
“Government is like the head of a family” are used as statistical reference groups for 
reasons elaborated in the previous section. 
Findings 
Dispute Pagoda, Dispute Hourglass, or (Reversed) Dispute Pyramid? 
  I start with the general distribution of dispute resolution strategies among the 
respondents. Consistent with the baseline prediction of Hypothesis 5.1, variation across 
different types of conflict (i.e. different social relations) is evident (Figure 5.3a-5.3b). 
However, rather surprisingly, when faced with hypothetical dilemmas, urban Chinese 
residents expressed much higher levels of willingness to utilize formal resources, 
particularly courts, than previous research would suggest. Combining responses under all 
scenarios (Figure 5.1d), around 30% of the time respondents expressed that they would 
25%
45%
26%
4%
Figure 5.2 Percived Role of Government by Chinese urban 
residents
Government is like the head of a
family
Government is like the servant of
the people
Government is like the manager of
a company
Other
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have chosen courts as the best resolution. Meanwhile, around 17% and 15% of the time, 
respondents chose either police or a government agency. In other words, over 60% of the 
time, respondents are reporting that the disputes would have been routed to a formal 
institution.  
This tendency to resolve disputes formally is most manifest in the realm of state-
citizen interactions and economic transactions (Figure 5.3a & b). When asked to handle 
conflicts with either a government official or a business partner, respectively 85% and 
80% respondents chose one of the three formal options—in stark contrast to conflicts 
with a family member, where 80% of respondents chose to either compromise or invite 
an informal mediator, which verifies Hypothesis 5.1c. Yet, the types of formal 
institutions preferred under either of the first two scenarios still differ drastically. As 
predicted by Hypothesis 5.1a, when dealing with conflict with a government official 
(Figure 5.3a), respondents demonstrated a preference for administrative petition to a 
government agency (34%) over using either courts (29%) or the police (22%). This 
finding is consistent with Hypothesis 5.1a and previous research that establishes the 
importance of bureaucratic channels in the context of contemporary China. In contrast, 
when managing business relationships (Figure 5.3b), courts (47%) appears to be by far 
the most preferred mechanism among urban Chinese residents while only less than 8% of 
them opted for a government agency under the same circumstance. This supports 
Hypothesis 5.1b. Meanwhile, when the respondents do decide to formally handle their 
family conflict (Figure 5.3d), they are more likely to use courts (13%) than either the 
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police (5%) or a government agency (3%). Therefore, when looking at the shape of what 
is expected to be a “dispute pagoda”, we see, as the type of social relation involved in the 
dispute changes, either a “hourglass” with very wide base for conflicts with family 
members, a nearly “reversed pyramid” for economic transactions, or a “reversed pagoda” 
for tension with the government.  
Who goes where for what?  
 Having demonstrated that distributions of dispute resolution strategies vary 
considerably across different types of social relations, I now turn to how these 
distributions vary across different social groups. I also examine how the effects of the 
social and political standings of individuals and their past experience with the judicial 
system differ by conflict type.  
Socio-Economic Status   
Education has no significant effect on the respondent’s choice of dispute solutions 
(Tables 5.3 to 5.6), rendering Hypothesis 5.2a unsupported. In addition, contrary to 
Hypothesis 5.2b, increases in household expenditures is associated with a slight decrease 
in the respondent’s likelihood of choosing police over informal mechanisms (the odds 
ratio decreases less than 10% for every 1000 RMB increase in monthly household 
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Figure 5.3 Choice of dispute resolution strategies by Chinese urban residents (proportion)  
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expenditure, p<0.1) under the circumstances of disputes with business partner or family 
member (Table 5.5 & 5.6). Richer people are also less likely to petition a government 
agency to resolve a clash with a family member (odds ratio decreases by over 40% for 
every 1000 RMB increase in monthly household income, p<0.1, Table 5.4). These 
findings, while challenging hypotheses originated from U.S.-based research, confirm 
previous studies on dispute resolution in China (Michelson 2007a, Jiang and Wu 2015). 
Social and economic capital is not of consistent importance in the context of 
contemporary China. These outcomes highlight the necessity of expanding legal 
mobilization research to non-conventional settings.  
In contrast, gender has a relatively robust effect on respondents’ tendency to use 
the formal institutions. The general picture (Table 5.3) appears to confirm Hypothesis 
5.2c that men are more likely to mobilize formal resources in dispute resolution. The 
effect of gender on the odds of mobilizing formal resource is mostly driven by men’s 
higher likelihood in choosing courts over informal mechanisms across different types of 
disputes (Tables 5.4 to 5.6). Particularly for conflict with a family member (Table 5.6), 
the odds of men opting for litigation is over two-times as high as those of women. In 
contrast, there is no evidence to indicate that men are more likely than women to either 
petition the government or report to the police for dispute resolution. This finding 
suggests that 1) while formally claiming a socialist gender paradigm, China remains a 
deeply patriarchal society with entrenched gender inequality (Croll 2011) and 2) Chinese 
citizens do recognize courts as distinguishable from other formal institutions. 
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Table 5.3: Determinants of Choosing Formal Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution, Selected Odds Ratios Converted from Logistic Regression, any type of 
dispute  a 
 
Model 5.3A: 
Number of Times Opted for 
Court ≥ 1 
Model 5.3B: 
Number of Times Opted for  
Other Formal Channels ≥ 1 
Model 5.3C: 
Number of Times Opted for  
Any Formal Channels ≥ 1 
Perceived role of government b              
Government as family head 0.792  0.763  1.072  1.095  0.490  0.505  
Government as manager 0.612 * 0.571 * 1.084  1.130  0.274 ** 0.287  
Other 0.665  0.618  0.583  0.604  0.169 * 0.173  
Perceived role of law c              
Law as family rule 0.577 * 0.574 * 1.244  1.243  0.364 * 0.364  
Law as social contract 0.822  0.812  0.823  0.828  0.526  0.526  
Other 0.867  0.869  1.087  1.091  0.505  0.515  
Legitimacy of the law 1.101 ** 1.098 ** 1.022  1.024  1.200 *** 1.200 *** 
Contact with court 1.042  0.976  0.871  0.906  0.560  0.586  
Socio-economic status             
Household monthly expense 0.998  0.999  0.987  0.986  1.001  1.000  
Years of formal education 1.009  1.004  0.990  0.993  0.966  0.968  
Male (reference=female) 1.789 ** 1.766 ** 0.852  0.861  1.894 ^ 1.894 ^ 
Political embeddedness             
Party membership 0.807  0.615 ^ 0.719  0.845  0.543  1.559  
Employment in the state sector 1.315  0.903  1.627 ^ 2.163 * 5.603 * N/A  d 
Party membership *    4.137 *   0.442    N/A 
d 
         State sector employment             
N 524 524 524 
Note: ^ p<0.1, * p<0.05;** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
a. age is included in all models as a controlling variable and omitted in the table for the sake of brevity 
b. reference=government as servant of the people 
c. reference=law as collective will of the people 
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d. There are relatively few “non-cases” (n=40) in this model and thus the standard error of the coefficient estimates for some variables 
are unusually large, rending their interpretation questionable. I therefore omitted them from the table. To make sure that the model 
is robust, I double-checked the results using Negative Binomial and Poisson regressions with the number of times the respondents 
opted for formal mechanisms as the dependent variable. Both alternative models produced similar results as the logistic regression 
model and indicate that there is no interaction effect. 
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Political Standings 
The effects of individuals’ political standings on their choice of dispute resolution 
strategies are more complex. Party membership does not increase one’s inclination 
toward formal dispute resolution mechanisms. However, state employment increases the 
odds of making use of formal institutions by more than five times (Table 5.3, Model 
5.3C, p<0.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 5.3a is supported while Hypothesis 5.3b is not. 
This finding suggests that, while pure political connections to the Communist Party might 
not always be beneficial under a market economy, political embeddedness through 
economic arrangements can be of significance.  
Zooming into the finer picture, the gap between state and non-state employees 
appears to be sustained mostly by state employees’ preference for formal channels other 
than courts, that is  either police or government agency (Table 5.3, Model 5.3B, p<0.05). 
State employees display a particularly strong preference for petitioning to a government 
agency when they are dealing with a conflict involving the government as the other party 
(Table 5.4). Under such circumstances, state employment increases the odds of appealing 
to the government by a factor of more than 2.5. In contrast, when considering business 
transactions and family relations, state employees are not significantly more likely to 
resort to any formal platform. These findings again underline the variable understanding 
of law—individuals' perceptions of and behaviors toward law hinge on the social 
relationship regulated by the law.  
Meanwhile, when comparing the likelihood of appealing to court with any other 
strategy, although party membership or state employment alone does not make a 
significant difference in the respondents’ decisions, party membership within the state 
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sector is associated with 1.3 times higher odds in choosing courts over other approaches 
(Table 5.3, Model 5.3A, 0.615 × 0.903 × 4.137 = 2.3, p<0.05).  This finding suggests, 
with the on-going economic reforms, a close connection to the party might still be 
valuable capital. This is mostly true in an environment where the state still exercise 
effective control over resource distribution.  
How do ideas matter? 
 I now move on to examining how individuals' ideas toward the law and state are 
associated with the choices they make when dealing with concrete problems. I also 
investigate how these connections vary across social relations.  
1. Understanding of Government 
 There is no evidence that individuals who liken the government to the head of a 
family behave differently from those who see it as the servant of the people. In line with 
Hypothesis 5.5b, people who see the government as a company manager tend to use 
administrative petitioning less than those who see it as the servant of the people. This is 
particularly true for state-citizen relationships and business transactions. In comparison to 
the reference group, their odds of appealing to the government is less than 50% for an 
unfair fine (Table 5.4, p<0.05) and less than 20% for an unpaid debt by a business partner 
(Table 5.5, p<0.05).     
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Table 5.4: Determinants of Choosing Formal Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution, Selected Odds Ratios Converted from Multinomial Logistic Regression, 
incorrect fine by government official  a 
 
 
 
Model 5.4A Model 5.4 B 
Court  
vs. Informal  
Government  
vs. Informal 
Police  
vs. Informal 
Court  
vs. Informal  
Government  
vs. Informal 
Police  
vs. Informal 
Perceived role of government b              
Government as family head 0.746  0.576  0.811  0.733  0.580  0.815  
Government as manager 0.464 * 0.484 * 0.824  0.447 * 0.491 * 0.830  
Other 0.182 * 0.041 ** 0.622  0.177 * 0.042 ** 0.631  
Perceived role of law c              
Law as family rule 0.421 * 0.572  0.692  0.422 * 0.573  0.693  
Law as social contract 0.765  0.748  0.717  0.762  0.751  0.719  
Other 1.085  1.342  1.371  1.079  1.350  1.359  
Legitimacy of the law 1.291 ** 1.226 ** 1.135  1.285 ** 1.228 ** 1.135  
Contact with court 0.765  1.182  0.546  0.741  1.195  0.550  
Socio-economic status             
Household monthly expense 0.942  0.961  0.982  0.944  0.961  0.982  
Years of formal education 1.030  1.051  0.966  1.027  1.052  0.966  
Male (reference=female) 1.835 * 1.745 ^ 0.813  1.815 * 1.751 ^ 0.814  
Political embeddedness             
Party membership 0.613  0.632  0.487 ^ 0.535  0.668  0.512  
Employment in the state sector 1.758  2.389 * 1.764  1.426  2.521 ^ 1.837 
 
Party membership *        1.936  0.840  0.772 
 
         State sector employment             
N 525 525 525 
Note: ^ p<0.1, * p<0.05;** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
a. age is included in all models as a controlling variable and omitted in the table for the sake of brevity 
b. reference=government as servant of the people 
c. reference=law as collective will of the people 
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Table 5.5: Determinants of Choosing Formal Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution, Selected Odds Ratios Converted from Multinomial Logistic Regression, 
unpaid debt by business partner  a 
 
 
 
Model 5.4A Model 5.4 B 
Court  
vs. Informal  
Government  
vs. Informal 
Police  
vs. Informal 
Court  
vs. Informal  
Government  
vs. Informal 
Police  
vs. Informal 
Perceived role of government b              
Government as family head 0.677  0.739  0.946  0.654  0.711  0.965  
Government as manager 0.429 ** 0.191 * 0.629  0.401 ** 0.179 * 0.656  
Other 0.576  1.688  0.572  0.544  1.531  0.592  
Perceived role of law c              
Law as family rule 0.627  1.179  0.724  0.627  1.162  0.794  
Law as social contract 0.699  0.606  0.818  0.691  0.597  0.821  
Other 1.170  0.000 d 1.441  1.162  0.000 d 1.417  
Legitimacy of the law 1.445 *** 1.334 * 1.258 * 1.442 *** 1.333 ^ 1.259 * 
Contact with court 0.686  1.012  0.474  0.650  0.999  0.503  
Socio-economic status             
Household monthly expense 0.998  0.861  0.986  1.001  0.861  0.984  
Years of formal education 0.981  0.958  0.917 ^ 0.977  0.954  0.920 ^ 
Male (reference=female) 1.555 ^ 0.749  1.359  1.534 ^ 0.741  1.368  
Political embeddedness             
Party membership 0.794  0.630  0.733  0.619  0.486  0.872  
Employment in the state sector 1.112  0.387  0.945  0.803  0.207  1.126  
Party membership *        2.794  7.479  0.170  
         State sector employment             
N 524 524 524 
Note: ^ p<0.1, * p<0.05;** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
a. age is included in all models as a controlling variable and omitted in the table for the sake of brevity 
b. reference=government as servant of the people 
c. reference=law as collective will of the people 
d. There are too few cases in this cell to make meaningful inference 
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Table 5.6: Determinants of Choosing Formal Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution, Selected Odds Ratios Converted from Multinomial Logistic Regression, 
unpaid debt by brother in law  a 
 
Model 5.4A Model 5.4 B 
Court  
vs. Informal  
Government  
vs. Informal 
Police  
vs. Informal 
Court  
vs. Informal  
Government  
vs. Informal 
Police  
vs. Informal 
Perceived role of government b              
Government as family head 0.864  1.791  1.394  0.845  1.991  1.346  
Government as manager 0.489 ^ 1.954  1.832  0.463 ^ 2.070  1.719  
Other 1.333  0.000 d 2.015  1.279  0.000 d 1.804  
Perceived role of law c              
Law as family rule 0.574  1.194  1.560  0.577  1.174  1.577  
Law as social contract 0.687  0.432  0.855  0.684  0.445  0.865  
Other 0.272  3.480  0.000 d 0.264  3.800  0.000 d 
Legitimacy of the law 1.018  1.655  0.744 ^ 1.018  1.610  0.741 ^ 
Contact with court 1.140  7.143 * 0.709  1.117  7.369 * 0.692  
Socio-economic status             
Household monthly expense 0.921  0.579 ^ 0.910 ^ 0.925  0.583 ^ 0.914  
Years of formal education 1.010  0.975  1.039  1.006  0.978  1.034  
Male (reference=female) 2.433 ** 0.412  0.758  2.421 ** 0.448  0.752  
Political embeddedness             
Party membership 1.079  0.362  0.412  0.920  0.538  0.206  
Employment in the state sector 0.937  1.555  1.754  0.739  1.887  1.331 
 
Party membership *        2.026  0.000 d 4.981 
 
         State sector employment             
N 525 525 525 
Note: ^ p<0.1, * p<0.05;** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
a. age is included in all models as a controlling variable and omitted in the table for the sake of brevity 
b. reference=government as servant of the people 
c. reference=law as collective will of the people 
d. There are too few cases in this cell to make meaningful inference 
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Beyond Hypothesis 5.3b, the idea of government being a company manager is 
also associated with lower likelihood of litigation and the effect appears consistent across 
different social relations. Specifically, this perception is associated with odds about 55% 
lower (i.e. odds ratio≈0.45) than the reference group for disagreement with the 
government, (p<0.05, Table 5.4), almost 60% lower for disputes with a business partner 
(p<0.01, Table 5.5), and around 50% lower for conflicts within the family (p<0.1, Table 
5.6). Such findings are unexpected, if not surprising, given that a view of government as 
business partner is likely to be associated with a social contract model understanding of 
governmentality. I had expected those with this perspective to privilege courts over 
administrative agencies, encouraging judicial checks on administrative powers. 
Combined with their lower likelihood of petitioning a government agency, people who 
believe that the government assumes a managerial role is associated with odds for 
utilizing formal resources less than 30% than that of people who hold a socialist 
understanding of the government as the servant of the people (Table 5.3, Model 5.3C, 
p<0.01).   
Another group who also demonstrates aversion toward formal mechanisms is 
those who did not choose from any of the given answers regarding the role of the 
government. For this small group, the odds of using any formal institution for dispute 
resolution is only about 17% that of the reference group (Table5.3, Model 5.3C, p<0.05). 
This gap is mostly driven by their extremely low likelihood of litigation or administrative 
petition in case of disagreement with a government official. There is a less than 20% odds 
that they would litigate and a less than 5% odds that they would appeal to the government 
under such circumstance in comparison to the reference group (Table 5.4, p<0.01). A 
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closer look at the specific answers provided by this group sheds light on this finding. A 
number of them mentioned very negative images of the government such as “the 
government is a group of robbers” or “the government is a machine of oppression.” 
These sentiments reveal a deep distrust toward the state, which likely leads to avoidance 
of formal tools in dealing with conflict with the government. Such sentiments may 
contribute to the increasing number of protests and dissents in China, documented by 
both mass media and scholars (e.g. “China Protests” 2015,Taylor 2012, The Economist 
2012, Tong and Lei 2010, Wedeman 2009). 
2. Understanding of Law  
 Consistent with Hypothesis 5.5a, people who believe that law is the extension of 
family rules are less likely to use courts for conflict resolution. In general, their odds of 
utilizing court is about 40% lower than the reference group, those who see law as the 
collective will of the people (Table 5.3, Model 5.3A, p<0.05). This trend is mostly driven 
by their unwillingness to litigate in case of state-citizen conflict. When faced with 
disagreement with a government official, their odds of resorting to court are only about 
40% of the odds for the reference group (Table 5.4, p<0.05). However, when dealing 
with problems between business partners and family members, these people show no 
significant difference from the reference group. Meanwhile, there is no evidence to 
support Hypothesis 5.5b that those who perceive law as social contracts are more likely 
to use courts.  
The above findings suggest that among the three commonly seen cultural 
discourses coexisting in contemporary China, the most “Westernized” one, namely the 
Enlighten discourse, inspires the least amount of confidence in formal institutions. 
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Meanwhile, a traditional understanding of the state and law seems to lead to 
differentiated levels of reliance on different types of institution. People who buy into 
these ideas are as likely to turn to the government as those believing in the socialist 
models of state and law, but are much more reluctant to use courts. 
3. Legitimacy of Law 
 The most consistent and significant predictor of people’s propensity toward using 
court and/or other formal institutions is the perceived legitimacy of the law. Increased 
level of perceived legitimacy of law is associated with not only higher odds of choosing 
courts as a dispute resolution strategy but also preference to other formal arenas. Average 
across all types of conflicts, one-point increase in the legitimacy score (ranging from 6 to 
24) corresponds to about 10% increase in the odds of utilizing courts (Table 5.3, Model 
5.3A, p<0.01) and 20% increase in the odds of appealing to any formal authority (Table 
5.3, Model 5.3B, p<0.01). For the dispute that involves a government official as the 
opposing party, higher levels of perceived legitimacy of law increase the use of both 
court and government agency. One-point increase in perceived legitimacy of the 
administrative laws (ranging from 2 to 8) is accompanied by nearly 30% increase in the 
odds of using courts and almost 23% increase in the odds of appealing to the government 
(Table 5.4, p<0.01). The effect of the legitimacy of law appears even more pronounced 
for economic transactions as it positively influence the odds of turning to any formal 
institution. Specifically, with one-point increase in the legitimacy score of private 
economic laws (ranging from 2 to 8), the odds of the respondents choosing court over 
informal channels increase by 44% on average (Table 5.5, p<0.001), the odds of them 
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opting for administrative petition go up by 33% (Table 5.5, p<0.05), and the odds of them 
turning to the police climb by 26% (Table 5.5 p<0.05).  
However, in the realm of family, legitimacy of law has no positive effect on the 
likelihood of using formal resources (Table 5.6, p<0.1). This finding resonates with the 
finding in Chapter IV that legitimacy of family law does not influence people’s tendency 
to comply with these laws, suggesting that the domain of family is dominated by private 
moral codes that renders public regulation irrelevant. These findings again highlight the 
importance of de-constructing “law” as an overarching concept and examining its 
working mechanisms in specific social contexts. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter 1) outlines general patterns in the types of dispute resolution 
strategies proffered by Chinese urban residents, 2) examines how such patterns vary 
across different types of disputes and social groups, and 3) studies the connection among 
individuals' preferences for formal and informal dispute-resolving institutions and 
individuals' ideas about law and government. The findings detailed in the last section not 
only shed light on the preference of ordinary Chinese people in dispute resolution but 
also pose new empirical and theoretical questions to socio-legal scholars as well as 
students of China.  
The first noteworthy pattern is revealed in Figure 5.1 & 5.2. Nearly half of the 
respondents identify with ideas about either law or the government based on state-
sponsored ideologies, meaning ideas that describe the state as an apparatus serving the 
class interests of the proletarians and the law as the collective will of the proletarian class. 
Such ideas are not only different from the dominant discourses familiar to a Western 
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audience, but also inconsistent with traditional Chinese culture. These results demonstrate 
again the effective ideological control of the Chinese government. Meanwhile, a small 
but significant number of respondents chose to provide their own unique opinions on 
Chinese government; the vast majority of these people expressed deep distrust and 
disgust. This suggests cracks in the powerful web of control cast by the government. 
These coexisting and colliding perspectives highlight the urgent need for social scientists 
to take a closer look at the mechanisms through which contradicting ideas take roots in 
the minds of individuals. 
Another major finding is how drastically the distributions of preferred dispute 
resolution strategies vary across different types of social relations.  Ordinary urban 
Chinese are much more reluctant to resort to any formal institution when dealing with 
tension within the family. In contrast, they appear much more comfortable presenting 
their problems on public stages when faced with disagreement with government officials 
or business partners. Yet the weapon of choice differs in these situations as well. For 
administrative errors made by government officials, Chinese urban residents prefer 
resolving the problem within the administrative system and appealing to the government. 
For business transactions, court is their top choice. These findings are consistent with 
scholars’ efforts to debunk the essentialist stereotypes of a Chinese aversion to litigation 
(Diamant 2000a, Diamant 2000b, Marsh 2000, Alford 1997, Huang 1996). The very low 
rate of court use in reality is probably the result of a combination of the dominant type of 
social interactions and institutional obstacles to access rather than Chinese’s people or 
culture’s intrinsic tendency to avoid lawsuits. The variation also suggests that ordinary 
Chinese people are acutely (if not accurately) aware of the potential distinctions among 
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the various formal institutions and are strategic in making their choices. Finally, these 
findings again demonstrate the usefulness of systematically decomposing the concept of 
law by situating it within social relations.   
Findings on the impact of socio-economic standing on the choice of dispute 
resolution strategies confirm and expand previous research done in China and elsewhere. 
Existing studies (Jiang and Wu 2015,  Cai 2008, Michelson 2007a) have found little or no 
consistence evidence that Chinese people of higher educational level or better economic 
resource differ significantly in their approach to inter-personal conflicts from those of 
lesser education and economic means. This is also true of this research.  
However, as is the same for legal compliance, gender appears to be a significant 
factor in Chinese people’s legal mobilization. Men are much more likely to express desire 
for litigation, particularly for conflicts within the family. Feminist socio-legal scholars 
have theorized the implication of gender on law in profound manners, suggesting that the 
masculine nature of the state and judicial systems devalue the views and experiences of 
women (e.g. Haney 2000, MacKinnon 1983). Empirical research in China has confirmed 
that, despite the claimed progressive socialist gender ideology, women are constantly 
marginalized in legal institutions and by legal practitioners (Li forthcoming, Ruskola 
1994). However, little empirical effort has been devoted to systematically assess the 
effect of gender on legal ideas and behaviors in the context of China. While it is not 
surprising that women are less willing to use courts, given the male bias of the legal (and 
other public) institutions (Baer 1991), the varied degree to which gender matters for 
different types of conflicts reveals the complex nature of gendered social relations and 
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their connection to law. These findings also raise question for policy makers and activists 
with regard to how to utilize law to promote gender equality. 
Findings in this chapter further attest to the sustained importance of political 
connections in China’s legal realm, despite the installation of a market economy and 
increasing interaction with the global community (Michelson 2007a, Michelson 2007b). 
In contrast to the minimal impact of social and economic capital, political resources 
appear to matter in more than one way. To begin, employment in the state sector clearly 
boosts the preference in choosing formal institutions over informal ones, particularly 
when the opposite party of the conflict is the state. With the economic reform in China, 
some has argued for the decreasing privileges of state employees as they lost their “iron 
rice bowls” (Razavi 2009, Cai, Du, and Wang 2015). While this may be true for concrete 
economic returns, 68 the persistent political power of the communist state still renders a 
position in the state sector with better access to valuable resources such as health care 
(Zhang 2011) and in this case, confidence to utilize the formal justice system. In addition, 
the combination of party membership and state employment contributes to higher 
likelihood of litigation. This pattern is a perfect example of the intersectionality of social 
stratification—even though political elites (in this case, i.e. party members) in China 
might not enjoy advantages in all social realms nowadays, when situated in a space still 
under tight state control, their privileges surface. These findings invite scholars to further 
examine the peculiar political structures of China and its interaction with other social 
institutions.      
                                                 
68 This is a debated point by itself. Others have argued that even within the context of a market 
economy “with Chinese characteristics”, the sustained power of the state still provides its 
employees better financial benefits even though (e.g. Bian and Logan 1996). 
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Finally, another major contribution of this chapter lies in the establishment of an 
explicit connection between individuals’ understandings of law (and the state) and their 
tendency to utilize legal resources for concrete problems. Existing literature has argued 
that individuals belonging to different social groups, through their unique social 
networks, form distinctive ideas about how law functions and understandings of their 
own position in the legal system, which then translate to varied patterns of legal 
mobilization behaviors. Yet little empirical research has been conducted to test whether 
the claimed connection between ideas and behaviors indeed exist. The current work 
clearly establishes that when individuals think of the roles of government and law 
differently, they choose their dispute resolution strategies accordingly. Further, the 
perceived legitimacy of law is proven again to be a main driving force of Chinese 
people’s law-related behaviors. This piece therefore fills in part of the “black box” and 
demonstrate that ideas indeed matter. It thus again raises the question of how ideology is 
disseminated and sustained.    
In short, this study contributes to the understandings of legal consciousness and 
China through 1) decomposing the concept law by the social relations it regulates and 2) 
connecting abstract ideas about law to concrete strategies toward law. There are a few 
limitations that need to be noted. The quantitative nature of its analyses dictates that it 
cannot assess the full complexity of either people’s legal ideas or their legal mobilization 
strategies. There are always options in real life not available on a survey questionnaire. 
While this is inevitable for any research project of a similar nature, further efforts should 
be made to incorporate the more nuanced ways in which individuals understand and use 
laws through such data as in-depth interviews or ethnographic observation. Moreover, 
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even though the hypothetical study design provides me with the leverage of getting the 
most information from the widest range of individuals, legal mobilization inclinations are 
not always an accurately predictor of actual behaviors (Jiang and Wu 2015). Therefore, 
the results of this chapter should be cautiously read as an evaluation of the preferences of 
Chinese urban dwellers in dispute resolution. In reality, there are numerous factors that 
can and will change the courses of actions of these individuals, which should be carefully 
examined by future research. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
Using a social survey of 556 individuals, my dissertation examines how Chinese 
urban residents remember the past and how they think of and act toward current laws. 
The findings of my dissertation reveal the complex and ever-changing nature of legal 
consciousness as part of broader Chinese cultural identities.  
Based on previous research on the pivotal role of retrospective narratives in 
individual and collective identities (Tsutsui 2009, Bellah et. al 1985, Davis 1979), my 
dissertation treats collective memories of the past as the core of culture. This approach is 
particularly meaningful in the context of transitional China, where multiple cultural 
discourses coexist, each resonating with the popular imagination of parts of China’s past. 
My research suggests the mnemonic patterns among individual memory carriers do not 
represent each part of China’s past evenly or proportionally to its duration. Further, as 
memories of the past among urban Chinese reflect their social positions, their experience 
with major historical changes, and the mnemonic materials available to them through 
public commemoration and historical texts, the meanings of the past for individuals do 
not necessarily line up with dominant cultural discourses.  
The most salient aspect of a Chinese identity consists of a nationalistic sentiment 
informed by memories of struggles with foreign powers. The Opium war and the Anti-
Japanese War are constant themes across imaginations of all historical periods. My 
research also reveals the fluid boundary of a nation; while a large number of respondents 
identify colonizing powers in recent history as the oppositional force of national 
struggles, some also mention ancient wars with ethnic minority groups. This finding 
speaks to the core collective memory theories that define memory as socially constructed 
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and key to collective identity building. However, inconsistent with my expectations, the 
nationalistic theme permeates the three major historical periods based on the official 
narratives that are available to Chinese masses through high school text books. This 
discrepancy raises questions regarding the mechanism through which the public 
manifestations of memories of the past become deposited in individual minds. Cultural 
consumption (e.g. TV watching or reading patterns), among other things, can be a fruitful 
entry way to further this line of research. 
Similar to the complex and sometimes inconsistent patterns of memories, the 
perception of law among urban Chinese is also diverse and uneven. The strongest 
ideological power in contemporary China appears to be the moral obligation one bears 
toward one’s family. Family laws are perceived by far as the most legitimate, that is, they 
closely represent what survey respondents consider as core Chinese social values. Very 
few urban Chinese can ever imagine abandoning their legal and moral obligations toward 
their families. In contrast, property rights laws, intellectual property rights laws in 
particular, are viewed as having little legitimacy, attesting to my argument that the 
concept of private property should not be taken for granted as the foundation of any legal 
system. Compliance with these laws is driven not only by their perceived weak 
legitimacy but also by the possibility of legal sanctions. My analyses further indicate that 
China’s socialist state still has a relatively strong ideological grip over the public. Among 
the different cultural models, most urban Chinese understand the roles of the law and the 
government in ways that are consistent with the official narratives. Also, laws that limit 
personal freedom in favor of public power and order are still considered somewhat or 
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very legitimate by the vast majority of urban Chinese and this perception motivates them 
to comply with such laws. 
The way urban Chinese use the law also varies across different types of social 
relations. Interestingly, despite the high level of perceived legitimacy of family laws, 
urban Chinese are far less likely to mobilize formal legal resources for conflicts within 
the family. Among different kinds of formal mechanisms, they prefer courts for disputes 
involving economic transaction and administrative bureaucracy for disputes with 
government officials. Their tendency to mobilize the law also hinges on their general 
understanding of law and state. In general, those who buy into the official state socialist 
narratives of law and state are more likely to utilize formal resources than those who 
identify with alternative models (i.e. the Confucian Model and the Enlightenment 
Model). With the exception of family matters, where legal mobilization is rare, the more 
legitimate they think the law is, the more likely they will appeal through a formal channel 
for dispute resolution. 
In addition to their similarly complex nature, memories among urban Chinese and 
their ideas toward current laws are also directly connected.  Above all, the nationalistic 
theme runs through people’s memories of all periods of China’s past, reinforces the 
image of China as a nation in crisis, and consolidates the perceived need for strong 
leadership. As a result, memories of national struggles, particularly those led by the CCP, 
according to official history, such as the Anti-Japanese War,69 contribute to people’s 
                                                 
69 As discussed in Chapter III, there is much debate surrounding the contribution by the KMT 
and CCP in this war. Historians from outside China ten to agree that the KMT government led 
the major efforts and the Nationalist armies bare most of the casualty (Fairbank 1983). 
However, in popular Culture as well as school text book in Mainland China, CCP is still 
described as the heroic leader of the war. 
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support for laws that strengthen the power of the state. Moreover, how one experiences 
the past also influences the way one reconstructs it in retrospection and associates it with 
the present. The Cultural Revolution is the only major historical event that is remembered 
for negative reasons. The memory of this event is positively associated with perceived 
legitimacy of laws that strengthen a free market logic, challenging core values promoted 
during the Cultural Revolution.  This finding suggests that strong memories of the past 
could contribute to identification of the values symbolized by the past both positively and 
negatively, depending on the way the past is (re)constructed. I also find that, diverging 
from conventional cohort theories, older people, i.e. people who were past their formative 
ages during the Cultural Revolution, are more likely to remember this historical period 
than other age cohorts. I argue that, this is because these people are likely to have 
experience traumatic life changes at the time which left deep impression on their minds.  
Standing back from the specific empirical findings, my dissertation makes several 
major contributions to the study of law and society. First, it integrates the construction of 
the past into the discussion of the present by introducing collective memory as a key 
underlying factor of people’s culture identity. In so doing, it provides the legal 
consciousness scholarship with a tool to explicitly articulate the complex cultural 
environments in which people experience, think about, and act toward law. The 
unboundedness of culture shapes the fluidity and complexity of legality. Although socio-
legal scholars have long recognized these aspects of social reality, to date, the field has 
not sufficiently decentered Western hegemonic understandings of law and culture, 
particularly such concepts as individual rights, which are not necessarily applicable to 
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other societies including China. The research in this dissertation is among the first to take 
other cultural assumptions seriously. 
In addition, my research shows the promise of decomposing the concept of law 
into parts based on the social relations law seeks to regulate. This approach is based on 
the notion that law, particularly law as reflected in the ideas and behaviors of lay people, 
arises from these social relations with varying significance and meanings. In this 
dissertation, I specifically tackle three types of social relations: family relations, state-
citizen relations, and economy-based relations. Findings suggest that the sources and 
implications of law’s legitimacy vary across these types of social relations. Within the 
domain of family, it appears that the law derives its legitimacy from strong moral codes. 
Such codes are likely to produce conformity but to some extent render legal intervention 
irrelevant in the case of a dispute. In contrast, in relations between the state and its 
citizens, the legitimacy of law seems to be derived from the state’s control over 
ideological high grounds. As the communist government stands strong, people still 
believe in and follow the laws that maintain its order. Yet, as the legitimacy lies in the 
government more than in the law, when it comes to dispute resolution, people are more 
likely to rely on administrative bureaucracy rather than the judiciary. Finally, economy-
based laws are the least legitimate as the basis of the economy, the logic of free markets, 
does not find as strong a moral or political resonance as the relations regulated by two 
other types of law. However, it appears that -- due to the lack of other moral authorities to 
appeal -- when people have trouble with economic tractions, they are more likely to use 
court than for any other problems. Although research on both legal compliance and 
mobilization has indicated that people behave differently when dealing with different 
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types of laws, my research is among the first to systematically trace and theorize such 
differences. Therefore, the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation is 
applicable far beyond the Chinese borders.  
My dissertation also expands the literature on collective memories. First, it revises 
theories on the formation of a cohort through shared experience at a certain age. It reveals 
that not only the timing of a significant social event matters, how the individual 
experiences it also plays a role. Thus, instead of those who are of a formative age during 
the Cultural Revolution, those who are already adults when it unfolds are more likely to 
remember it as their lives were more deeply and irreversibly impacted. Second, by 
connecting the memories of the past to people’s perceptions of present institutions, it also 
contributes to the emerging literature that endeavors to explore the implications of 
memories for other aspects of individual identity and attitudes.  
Methodologically, my dissertation challenges the convention within the field of 
legal consciousness research that prioritizes qualitative methods for engaging the nuanced 
and multi-faceted meanings subjects consume and produce in their interaction with the 
law. While concurring with the argument that standardized survey methodology is not 
best suited to reveal the complexity, inconsistency, contradiction, and fluidity of 
individual consciousness, I argue that it is useful in assessing the complexity, 
inconsistency, contradiction, and fluidity of culture at the macro-level. Borrowing from 
the culturalist tradition in collective memories study and bearing in mind the pitfalls of 
oversimplification, I have designed my survey to cover a wide range of cultural 
discourses. With this approach, my dissertation has produced useful insights into the 
larger context of contemporary China that has been either unduly neglected or 
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misunderstood in previous research. Nonetheless, I am not arguing for abandoning 
qualitative research in this context. To the contrary, I believe this project pave the way 
for future researchers who are interested in studying the legal consciousness in China in 
more intimate ways.  
Beyond the theoretical contributions discussed above, my dissertation research 
provides future China scholars with ample empirical data to assess the context of their 
research. Despite its significance in the international community and the richness of its 
history, China, particularly ordinary urban Chinese, remains understudied in the realm of 
social sciences. Aware of the general cultural environment in which their research 
unfolds, researchers are more likely to design projects that are meaningful and respectful 
to the local population.   Focusing on one country, the research here reveals the 
limitations of socio-legal work based on Western assumptions about law. Future work 
will expand the analysis to how legal consciousness and collective memories vary across 
other Asian countries with a shared cultural legacy, such as Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, 
and Korea. Comparisons among these societies will provide further insights into how 
culture interacts with other social institutions, such as political structures and economic 
arrangements. Comparisons can also be made between China and other societies with 
distinctive cultural traditions such as the United States. Such comparisons can answer 
questions regarding the cultural specificity of social relations and law, for example. 
My research also has implications for activists who aspire to bring change to 
China’s social, legal, and political systems. It reveals strong nationalistic sentiments and 
strong family ties among Chinese urban residents, which can be seen as both obstacles 
and resources for bringing about social changes. On the one hand, reformers could 
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repurpose these existing discourses to promote their causes. For example, research on the 
Ti’an Men Square event indicates that a key strategy for the student movement to garner 
public support was to appeal to moral languages in traditional Confucian narratives (Zhao 
2000). On the other hand, the authoritarian state of China very shrewdly co-opted these 
discursive resources as well. In addition to the recent reintroduction of the concept of 
“social harmony,” the Chinese government has invested considerable resources in 
establishing its image as a rising super power and thus taps into the increasing national 
pride among Chinese citizens for legitimacy. To counter such nationalistic narratives 
could thus be the mission of activists and social reformers.  
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Appendix A: A List of Violations included in the Survey Questionnaire 
1) Downloading pirated copies of movies and songs 
2) Knowingly purchasing a stolen bike 
3) Taking public resources for private use 
4) Tax evasion 
5) Having more children than allowed by the law 
6) Public assembly without official permission 
7) Parents not raising their underage children 
8) Adult children not supporting their aging parents 
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Appendix B: Survey Questionnaire (English) 
Section I: Social Relations, Culture and History 
Our life is made up of various aspects and groups of people. Different people see 
different aspects as important. Please tell me how important the following aspects are to 
you (1—not important at all, 2—somewhat unimportant, 3—somewhat important, 4—
very important). 
 NIA SW 
UI 
SW I V I 
1) You career 1 2 3 4 
2) Your family 1 2 3 4 
3) Your friends 1 2 3 4 
4) Your neighbors 1 2 3 4 
5) Your nation 1 2 3 4 
 
6) Which of the following is the most important to today’s China? 
A) Rapid economic growth 
B) Shrinking the gap between the rich and the poor 
C) Respect and caring among people 
D) Other. Please specify_______________ 
 
7) Which of following statements comes closest to your own view? 
E) Government is like the head of a family. 
F) Government is the servant of the people. 
G) Government is like the manager of a company. 
H) Other. Please specify_____________________ 
 
Please tell me your opinion about the following statements. For each statement, how 
much do you agree (1—strongly disagree, 2—somewhat disagree, 3—neutral, 4—
somewhat agree, 5—strongly agree)? 
 SD SW 
D 
N SW 
A 
SA 
8) Even if parents’ demands are 
unreasonable, children still should do 
what they ask. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9) When hiring, only competence should be 
considered as qualification for the job. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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10) When the interest of the collective is in 
conflict with one’s personal interest, one 
should compromise his/her personal 
interest. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11) It is OK to confront the elderly in the 
family. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12) The gap between the rich and the poor is 
inevitable and the two groups should 
shoulder the same responsibilities toward 
society. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13) A man will lose face if he works under a 
female. 
     
14) It is OK to confront a more senior colleague in 
the work place. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15) It is OK to compromise public interest for one’s  
personal gain. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16) Men and women should enjoy equal 
opportunity in professional development. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17) Rich people should be taxed more heavily and 
contribute more to society than poor people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
We all come across difficult situations in our daily life, following is a set of choices that 
one might have to make under conflicting circumstances. For each situation, how much 
do you approve of the choice of the actor (1—strongly disagree, 2—somewhat 
disagree,3—neutral, 4—somewhat agree, 5—strongly agree)?  
 SD SW 
D 
N SW 
A 
SA 
18) Xiaoli broke up with his girl because 
a. his parents disapprove their relationship. 
b. she impedes his career. 
c. she opposes him engaging in anti-poverty 
activism.  
 
1 
1 
1 
 
2 
2 
2 
 
3 
3 
3 
 
4 
4 
4 
 
5 
5 
5 
19) Xiaochen, who works for the human resource 
department of a large company, helped a job 
candidate secure a position in the company even 
though there was another candidate who was 
slightly more qualified because, 
a. it’s his mother’s request- the first 
candidate is his cousin. 
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b. to promote the sales of the company-the 
first candidate is related to an important 
client. 
c. the first cadidate’s family is facing 
financial difficulty. 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
 
People always use holidays, works of art (such as writings, paintings, movies, etc), and 
places (such as museum, memorial buildings, etc) to exhibit and commemorate our 
history. The following is a list of historical periods and events in Chinese history. For 
each, how much do you think it is worth commemorating? (1—not worthy at all, 2—
somewhat unworthy, 3—somewhat worthy, 4—very worthy, 5—don’t know much about 
the event) 
 NWAA SW U SW W V W DK 
20) Pre-dynasty History 1 2 3 4 5 
21) Slavery Dynasties 1 2 3 4 5 
22) Feudal Dynasties 1 2 3 4 5 
23) The Opium War 1 2 3 4 5 
24) The Xinhai Revolution 1 2 3 4 5 
25) The Republic Period 1 2 3 4 5 
26) The “5.4” Movement 1 2 3 4 5 
27) The anti-Japanese War 1 2 3 4 5 
28) The War of Liberation 1 2 3 4 5 
29) The Beginning of PRC 
History (1949-1979) 
1 2 3 4 5 
30) The Opening and Reform  
Era 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
People have different assessment of historical events and figures. We want to know how 
you think of some aspects of the Chinese history and what you do to celebrate that 
history. 
31)  What do you think are the two most important historical events or changes throughout the 
Chinese history? 
a.__________________________________   
b. _______________________________ 
Could you briefly explain why you chose the two events/changes? 
a.___________________________________________________________________ 
b.___________________________________________________________________ 
32) What do you think are the two most important historical events or changes in China in the past 50 
years? 
a.__________________________________  b. 
_______________________________ 
Could you briefly explain why you chose the two events/changes? 
a.___________________________________________________________________ 
b.___________________________________________________________________________ 
33) Please name a political leader that you think is the greatest throughout Chinese history. 
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_____________________________________________________________________________ 
34) Please name a philosopher/thinker leader that you think is the greatest throughout Chinese history 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Section II: Law 
 
 
 
35) Which of following statements comes closest to your own view? 
E) The law is like the rules within a family. 
F) The law is the collective will of the people. 
G) The law is a contract between the state and the citizens. 
H) Other. Please specify_________________________ 
 
Please tell me your opinion about the following statements. For each statement, how 
much do you agree (1—strongly disagree, 2—somewhat disagree, 3—neutral, 4—
somewhat agree, 5—strongly agree)? 
 SD SW D N SW A SA 
36) Good law should always produce just 
outcomes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
37) Good law should be logic and without 
loopholes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
38) Good Law should rigorously regulate rules 
and behaviors in the market. 
     
39) Good law should be consistent with Chinese 
traditional culture. 
1 2 3 4 5 
40) Good law enforcement should prioritize the 
interest of the disadvantaged groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 
41) Good law enforcement should be consistent 
with human nature and people’s feelings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
42) Regardless of the outcome, good law 
enforcement should always follow proper 
procedures. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
People have different ideas of how the court should do in its job. For each of the 
following situations, how much do you approve of the choice of the court (1—strongly 
disagree, 2—somewhat disagree,3—neutral, 4—somewhat agree, 5—strongly agree)? 
 SD SW D N SW A SA 
43) The court acquitted a defendant on the 
ground that the evidence provided by the 
prosecutor was not acquired legally even 
though it is clear that the defendant was guilty 
of the crime charged. 
1 2 3 4 5 
44) In a murder trial, the court surveyed the 
audience at the trial before making the final 
ruling. 
1 2 3 4 5 
45) In the trial of a gang leader, the PRC Supreme 
Court bypassed the local court and sentenced 
1 2 3 4 5 
People have different ideas of the function of the law in a country. Following is a 
series of questions with regard to this issue. 
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the defendant to death based on the account 
that the local court was too lenient. 
 
We all experience conflicts in our daily life and we deal with them in different manners. 
Following is a set of questions on how you might resolve conflicts of different nature. For 
each of the following situations, assuming you have confronted the other party with the 
problem without a resolution, would you say you are most likely to a) compromise to 
accommodate the needs of the other party; b) ask a third person known to both parties be 
the arbiter; c) ask the police for help; d) refer the problem to relevant government 
officials; or e) bring the case to the court? 
 Compromise Third 
Party 
Police Government 
Official 
Court 
46) A government official gives 
you a 5000 RMB fine which 
you do not deserve and 
he/she refuses to redress the 
mistake. 
 
a b c d e 
47) A business partner owns 
you 5000 RMB from your 
last transaction and has 
delayed the payment for 
more than a year. 
 
a b c d e 
48) Your brother-in-law 
borrowed 5000 RMB from 
you and refuses to pay it 
back. 
 
a b c d e 
49) Your neighbor’s dog bit 
you and caused a 5000-
RMB medical bill that the 
neighbor refuses to pay. 
a b c d e 
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Please tell me, how much do you think each of the following behaviors violates the core 
values of our society? (1—not at all, 2—a little, 3—somewhat, 4—very much) 
 NAA AL SW VM 
50) Downloading pirated copies of movies and songs 1 2 3 4 
51) Knowingly purchasing stolen goods, such as bikes 1 2 3 4 
52) Taking public water and electricity for private use 1 2 3 4 
53) Bribing a judge to influence the outcome of a law suit   1 2 3 4 
54) Tax evasion 1 2 3 4 
55) Having more children than allowed by the law 1 2 3 4 
56) Demonstration and aggregation in public places without 
official permission 
1 2 3 4 
57) Parental negligence 1 2 3 4 
58) Setting up vending spots at places not allowed by the city 
policy 
1 2 3 4 
59) Adult sons/daughters not supporting their aging parents 1 2 3 4 
Please tell me, for a person with similar social status as you, how likely you think each of 
the following behaviors might entail harsh punishment by through formal legal 
institutions? (1—impossible, 2—unlikely, 3—50/50, 4—likely, 5—definitely) 
 IP 
 
UL 50/50 L D 
60) Downloading pirated copies of movies and 
songs 
1 2 3 4 5 
61) Knowingly purchasing stolen goods, such as 
bikes 
1 2 3 4 5 
62) Taking public water and electricity for private 
use 
1 2 3 4 5 
63) Bribing a judge to influence the outcome of a 
law suit   
1 2 3 4 5 
64) Tax evasion 1 2 3 4 5 
65) Having more children than allowed by the law 1 2 3 4 5 
66) Demonstration and aggregation in public 
places without official permission 
1 2 3 4 5 
67) Parental negligence 1 2 3 4 5 
68) Setting up vending spots at places not allowed 
by the city policy 
1 2 3 4 5 
69) Adult sons/daughters not supporting their 
aging parents 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Ordinary people break official rules for various reasons. Imagine a person who share 
similar values and social status as you, how likely would you say the person would do 
each of the following things given he or she might have the need? (1—impossible, 2—
unlikely, 3—50/50, 4—likely, 5—definitely) 
 IP 
 
UL 50/50 L D 
70) Downloading pirated copies of movies and 
songs 
1 2 3 4 5 
71) Knowingly purchasing stolen goods, such as 
bikes 
1 2 3 4 5 
72) Taking public water and electricity for private 
use 
1 2 3 4 5 
73) Bribing a judge to influence the outcome of a 
law suit   
1 2 3 4 5 
74) Tax evasion 1 2 3 4 5 
75) Having more children than allowed by the law 1 2 3 4 5 
76) Demonstration and aggregation in public 
places without official permission 
1 2 3 4 5 
77) Parental negligence 1 2 3 4 5 
78) Setting up vending spots at places not allowed 
by the city policy 
1 2 3 4 5 
79) Adult sons/daughters not supporting their 
aging parents 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Now I want to ask you some questions about your experiences with the Chengdu courts 
in the past 5 years. 
80) During the past 5 years, have you appeared in a Chengdu court as part of a case you were 
involved in as a defendant or a plaintiff? 
A) Yes. 
B) NO. 
 
81) During the past 5 years, have you appeared in a Chengdu court as a witness in another person’s 
case or to observe another person’s case? 
A) Yes. 
B) NO. 
 
82) Have you had any other contact with the Chengdu courts during the past 5 years that you have not 
already mentioned? 
A) Yes.What type of contact was it? 
B) NO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83) In the past 5 years, how many times did you have direct contact with the Chengdu courts? 
A) Once 
B) More than once 
 
84) In the experience, what was your role? 
A) Plaintiff or defendant 
B) Witness (skip Q90) 
C) Other (skip Q86 and Q90) 
 
Please tell me your opinion about the following statements. For each statement, how 
much do you agree (1—strongly disagree, 2—somewhat disagree, 3—neutral, 4—
somewhat agree, 5—strongly agree)?  
 SD SW D N SW A SA 
85) I was given the chance to make my argument. 1 2 3 4 5 
86)  The judge was competent. 1 2 3 4 5 
87) The judge was polite. 1 2 3 4 5 
88) The judge was fair. 1 2 3 4 5 
89) I was happy about the outcome of the case. 1 2 3 4 5 
90) I would go to court again if I would be in similar 
situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
91) I would recommend my friends and family to go 
to court for similar situations.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
If the answer to any of questions 81)-83) is A), then read “Now I would like to ask you 
about the experience you had with the courts in the past  5 years that was most 
important to you .”.  
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Section III: Demographic Information 
 
 
 
92) (Interviewer fill out)Sex of respondent：A) female； B)Male 
 
93) Your year of Birth is?____________ 94) Your ethnicity is?____________
 
95) Are you a local Chengduer？ 
A) Yes （Skip Q94）   
B) No  
 
96) Are you a Sichuaner？ 
A) Yes  
B) No 
97) What is your residential registration status? 
A) Local Urban  B) Local Rural  C) Non-Local Urban  D) Non-Local Rurual 
E) Other. Please specify______________ 
 
98) What has been your main employment status in the past 3 months? 
A) Full-time 
B) Part-time 
C) Temporary job 
D) Agricultural Work 
E) Student（Skip to Q103） 
F) Jobless（Skip to Q103） 
G) Other. Please specify_______________ 
 
99) What is your occupation? ____________________ 
 
100) What is the type of your work unit? 
A) Party, government 
or government 
agency or office 
B) State owned 
enterprise or 
institution  
 
C) Collective owned 
enterprise or 
institution  
D) Individual business 
 
E) Private enterprise 
 
F) Foreign investment 
enterprise 
G) Other. Please specify___________________ 
 
101) What was your total income last month?_______________? 
 
102) What is your political affiliation status? 
A) Party Member B) Youth League Member 
C) Member of any democratic party 
D) None of the above
Now I would like to ask you a few questions about you and your family. You 
answers will not be released to anybody but the researchers of this project. 
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What is the year of formal education received by each of the following family members of yours? 
 Years of 
Education 
103) Respondent  
104) Father  
105) Mother  
106) Spouse  
 
What is the highest degree received by each of the following family members of yours? 
（1—less than elementary school, 2—elementary school, 3—junior high, 4—high school diploma or 
equivalent, 5—professional college, 6—college graduate, 7—master’s degree or higher）  
        
107) respondent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
108) Father 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
109) Mother 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
110) Spouse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
111) How much did your whole family (including you, your spouse and your parents and/or children 
who live with you) spend last month? (including all kinds of expenditures such as rent, mortgage, 
utility, grocery, clothing, transportation, medical bills, insurance, travelling/recreation, education, 
etc)___________________ yuan   
 
112) How much income did your whole family make from all sources in year 2011? (including all 
sources of income from your family members, such as wage, all kinds of bonus, allowance, profit 
sharing, dividend, net income from business earnings, interests from bank deposits, contributions 
from relatives and friends, etc.)_____________ yuan  
 
113) According to income and expenditure in 2012, compared to other families in the local area, your 
family’s living standard is by and large which of following levels? 
A) Upper  
B) Upper-middle  
C) Middle 
D) Lower-middle  
E) Lower  
F) Other, please specify__________________ 
 
114) What is your marital status? 
B) Single (never married) 
C) Cohabitating 
D) Married 
E) Separated 
F) Divorced 
G) Widowed 
 
115) Will you be willing to be contacted for a follow-up interview with researchers of this project? 
A) Yes. Please leave a method that you can be most easily reached : 
________________________________________________________________________ 
B) No. 
Thanks a lot for you cooperation! 
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Appendix C: Survey Questionnaire (Chinese) 
2012 年成都市居民价值观调查问卷 
 
 
1.问卷编号: [____|____|____]  
 
2.采访地点:（记录地点的名称）  
区：_______________________________（编码：__________） 
街道：_______________________________ （编码：__________）  
居委会：____________________________ （编码：__________）  
 
3.访问员（签名）：__________ 代码：_____ _____ ______  
 
4.一 审（签名）：__________  
二 审（签名）：__________  
复 核（签名）：__________  
 
5.访问开始时间：[__|__]月[__|__]日[__|__]时[__|__]分; 结束时间：[__|__]时
[__|__]  
(24小时制)(如果分开几段时间执行，请在问卷空白处标注，然后将几段时间加总
为访问长度)  
 
6.访问总长度：_____ _____ _____ (分钟) 
  
先生/女士/同志：您好！  
我叫___________，是西南财经大学社会学系的调查员。我们正在进行一项社会
调查，目的是了解当前成都市人民对包括文化在内的社会生活各方面的一些看
法，为政府进行文化建设，转变政府职能提供有益建议。经过严格的科学抽样，
我们选中了您作为调查对象。您的合作对我们了解有关信息和制定社会政策，有
十分重要的意义。 本调查秉承完全自愿的原则，问卷中问题的回答，没有对错
之分，您只要根据平时的想法和做法回答就行。对于您的回答，我们将按照《统
计法》的规定，严格保密，并且只用于学术分析，不会泄露任何个人信息，请您
不要有任何顾虑。希望您协助我们完成这次访问，谢谢您的合作。 
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入户抽样页 
【户抽样】「请问，这里只有您一户住吗？」 
□ 是 →【接被访者抽样】 
┌─ □ 不是 
└→ （我们只需要请其中一户接受访问。请问有多少户住在这里？他们怎样称呼？） 
 
称谓 编号 被访  
 
1.住户编号次序：开门者所属住户为1，其余住户
依开门者所述顺序依次填其称呼在每户称谓一栏。  
 
2. 用以下之随机表，抽选其中一户访问。  
 
3．被选编号以彩笔标记的数字为准；若数字不
符，则向右继续选取。  
 
 
1  
 
 
2  
 
 
3  
 
 
4  
 
 
随机表 
8  2  1  7  7  4  0  6  6  7  2  0  4  5  8  6  7  9  4  3  
1  0  0  4  1  9  0  2  7  2  0  2  6  2  8  9  0  2  2  1  
3  5  9  6  4  6  8  9  0  3  3  4  7  0  8  8  7  4  6  0  
8  8  4  2  0  6  0  5  4  1  6  6  6  9  1  0  6  7  4  3  
9  9  6  3  8  7  1  6  9  9  1  2  0  9  8  3  8  6  3  8  
 
 
【被访者抽样】请问，本周内住在这户，18周岁以上 70周岁以下的住户成员，一共多少人？  
 
□ _______ 无 18周岁以上 70周岁以下的住户成员   =====   从本地址所余户中随机另选一
户  
 
             如本地址只有一户   =====   停止，退出本地址，用备选
户  
 
□ _______ 人   =====   继续询问  
 
请问这些人的生日是？ 
 
其中______(编号)的生日最接近 5月 1日。我可以对他/她进行访问吗？  
下面开始访问    
编号 与户主关系 生日 编号 与户主关系 生日 编号 与户主关系 生日 
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第一部分: 社会生活，文化，历史 
我们的生活包含各种方面和人群，不同的人重视生活中不同的方面。请告诉我以下各项对您有
多重要？ (1—很不重要，2—比较不重要，3–比较重要，4--很重要) 
 很不重要 比较不重要 比较重要 很重要 
1) 您的事业 1 2 3 4 
2) 您的家庭 1 2 3 4 
3) 您的朋友 1 2 3 4 
4) 您的邻居 1 2 3 4 
5) 您的国家 1 2 3 4 
 
6) 对现在的中国来说，您认为以下哪一样最重要？ 
A) 经济的快速发展 
B) 缩小贫富差距 
C) 人们之间的相互尊重和关爱 
D) 其它，请说明_____________________ 
 
7) 以下那种说法最接近您的观点？ 
A) 政府好比家庭的家长。 
B) 政府好比人民的公仆。 
C) 政府好比公司的管理者。 
D) 其它，请说明_____________________ 
 
请告诉我您对以下陈述的赞同程度(1—强烈反对，2—比较反对，3—中立, 4–比较赞同，5—
强烈赞同)。 
 强烈
反对 
比较
反对 
中立 比较
赞同 
强烈
赞同 
8) 即使父母的要求不合理，子女也应该顺
从。 
1 2 3 4 5 
9) 单位招聘和考评员工时，能力应该是的
唯一标准。 
1 2 3 4 5 
10) 当集体利益与个人利益发生冲突时，个
人应该顾全集体利益舍弃个人利益。 
1 2 3 4 5 
11) 在家中顶撞长辈是可以接受的。 1 2 3 4 5 
12) 贫富差距是必然的，富人和穷人对社会
有同等的义务。 
1 2 3 4 5 
13) 男人在女人手下工作是很没有面子的。 1 2 3 4 5 
14) 在工作场合与资历较高的同事发生摩擦
是可以接受的。 
1 2 3 4 5 
15) 牺牲他人利益保全个人的利益是合理
的。 
1 2 3 4 5 
16) 男人和女人在职场上应该拥有同等的机
会。 
1 2 3 4 5 
17) 富人应该比穷人多缴税，对社会多做贡
献。 
1 2 3 4 5 
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我们在生活中总会遇到各种难题，以下是一系列生活中可能遇到的难题。在每个故事中，您对
当事人的做法持什么看法？（1—强烈反对，2—比较反对，3—中立, 4–比较赞同，5—强烈
赞同) 
 强烈
反对 
比较
反对 
中立 比较
赞同 
强烈
赞同 
18) 小李和女朋友分手， 原因是  
a. 小李父母反对。 
b. 女朋友阻碍了他事业的发
展。 
c. 女朋友反对他参与扶贫活
动。 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
2 
2 
2 
 
3 
3 
3 
 
4 
4 
4 
 
5 
5 
5 
19) 小陈在一家大公司工作，他利用职
务之便帮助某求职者该公司谋到一个职位，尽
管当时有另一位更优秀的应聘者，原因是 
a. 应母亲的要求——求职者
是他表哥。 
b. 为了提高业绩——求职者
是大客户的亲戚。 
c. 求职者家庭经济困难。 
 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
 
2 
2 
2 
 
 
 
3 
3 
3 
 
 
 
4 
4 
4 
 
 
 
5 
5 
5 
20) 小黄在某地方政府工作，他对某企
业网开一面，没有严格追究其手续上的缺陷，
原因是 
a. 应母亲的要求——企业业
主是家中亲戚。 
b. 该企业创造了大量税收和
就业机会。 
c. 该企业是经济困难的小型
集体所有企业。 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
2 
2 
2 
 
 
3 
3 
3 
 
 
4 
4 
4 
 
 
5 
5 
5 
 
 
人们常常用各种节日,艺术作品（比如小说，电影，电视剧，等等），场馆（比如纪念碑，纪
念堂，博物馆，等等）来展示和纪念历史。下面列举了中国历史上的一些时期和事件，您觉得
每一个有多需要被纪念？ (1—完全不值得，2—比较不值得，3—比较值得，4—非常值得，
5—不了解) 
    完全不需要 比较不需要 比较需要 非常需要 不了解 
21) 史前时期（夏朝
以前） 
1 2 3 4 5 
22) 奴隶制王朝
（夏，商，周和春秋时
期） 
1 2 3 4 5 
23) 封建王朝（秦至
满清） 
1 2 3 4 5 
24) 鸦片战争 1 2 3 4 5 
25) 辛亥革命 1 2 3 4 5 
26) 民国时期（1912-
1949） 
1 2 3 4 5 
27) 五四运动 1 2 3 4 5 
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28) 抗日战争 1 2 3 4 5 
29) 解放战争 1 2 3 4 5 
30) 中华人民共和国
初期 
(1949-1979） 
1 2 3 4 5 
31) 改革开放时期
（1979至今） 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
32) 中国历史上发生了很多重大的事件和变化，请列举其中一到两件您认为最为重要历史事件
或变化： 
a._____________________________________      
b._______________________________________ 
请简单描述您选择这些事件/变化的原因： 
a. ___________________________________________________________________________ 
b.  ___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
33) 中华人民共和国成立以后发生很多重大事件的和变化，请列举一到两件这一时期内您认为
最为重要历史事件或变化： 
a._____________________________________    
b._______________________________________ 
请简单描述您选择这些事件/变化的原因： 
a. ___________________________________________________________________________ 
b. ___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
34) 您觉得中国历史上最伟大的政治领袖是？___________________________________ 
 
35) 您觉得中国历史上最伟大的思想家是？_____________________________________ 
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第二部分：法律 
36) 以下那种说法最接近您的观点？ 
A) 法律好比家族的家规。 
B) 法律是是人民集体意志的体现。 
C) 法律是公民与政府之间的合约。 
D) 其它，请说明_________________________ 
 
人们对法律的作用有不同看法，以下问题涉及您对这个话题的看法。请告诉我您对以下陈述的
赞同程度？(1—强烈反对，2—比较反对，3—中立, 4–比较赞同，5—强烈赞同) 
 强烈
反对 
比较
反对 
中立 比较
赞同 
强烈
赞同 
37) 好的法律应该产生公正的结果。 1 2 3 4 5 
38) 好的法律应该是严格符合逻辑且没有漏洞
的。 
1 2 3 4 5 
39) 好的法律应当严格规范商品市场中的交易规
则和行为。 
1 2 3 4 5 
40) 好的法律应该符合中国的传统文化。 1 2 3 4 5 
41) 优良的执法应该优先考虑弱势群体的利益。 1 2 3 4 5 
42) 优良的执法应该人性化。 1 2 3 4 5 
43) 不管结果如何，优良的执法总是应该严格遵
循法定的程序。 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
人们对法院应当如何开展工作有不同的看法。以下情形中，您对法院做法持什么观点？（1—
强烈反对，2—比较反对，3—中立, 4–比较赞同，5—强烈赞同） 
 强烈
反对 
比较
反对 
中立 比较
赞同 
强烈
赞同 
44) 在某刑事案件审判中，检察官出示了足够
的证据证明被告有罪，但某关键证据来源不合
法，法院因此宣告被告无罪，尽管各种迹象证明
该被告确实有罪。 
1 2 3 4 5 
45) 在某谋杀案审判过程中，法院在做出判决
前以问卷调查的方式询问并参考了在场旁听群众
对案件的意见。 
1 2 3 4 5 
46) 在对某黑社会头目的审判中，最高人民法
院在没有接到上诉的情况下，直接重审了案件，
修改了地方法院的判决，将被告判处死刑，理由
为该罪犯对人民群众危害极大，地方法院量刑过
轻。  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
人们有不同的方式处理生活中遇到的困难和冲突。 下面我们为您提供了四个冲突的情境,在每
种情况下，假设 您都已经尝试与对方沟通但问题没有得到解决, 您最有可能 a) 妥协; b) 请
相关的第三方进行非正式的调解; c) 报警，d) 将问题反应到相关政府部门; 还是 e) 将案件
起诉到法院？ 
 妥协 第三方 报警 政府部门 法院 其他 
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47) 某政府工作人员不合理的
对你进行了 5000元的罚款并拒绝
纠正其错误。 
a b c d e  
48) 某生意合作伙伴上次交易
后拖欠了 5000元货款并拒绝偿
还。 
a b c d e  
49) 你的妻弟借了你 5000元后
拒绝偿还 
a b c d e  
50) 你被邻居的狗咬伤，花费
了 5000元医治，邻居拒不承担该
笔款项。 
a b c d e  
您觉得以下各种行为在多大程度上违背了我们社会的核心价值 ？(1—完全不违背，2—不怎么
违背， 3--比较违背， 4—严重违背) 
 完全不
违背 
不怎么
违背 
比较
违背 
严重
违背 
51) 下载盗版电影和歌曲 1 2 3 4 
52) 在知情的情况下购买被盗的自行车 1 2 3 4 
53) 私接水管电线，将公家水电接到家中 1 2 3 4 
54) 贿赂法官以试图改变案件结果 1 2 3 4 
55) 逃税 1 2 3 4 
56) 超生 1 2 3 4 
57) 没有合法手续在公共场合游行/抗议 1 2 3 4 
58) 父母不抚养未成年子女 1 2 3 4 
59) 违规摆摊设点 1 2 3 4 
60) 成年子女不赡养父母 1 2 3 4 
 
一个像您一样的人，如果她/他做了以下的事，您觉得有多大可能他/她会被抓到且受到法律的
惩罚？（1—完全不可能，2—不大可能，3—一半一半，4—很可能，5—一定会） 
 不可能 不大可能 一半 很可能 一定会 
61) 下载盗版电影和歌曲 1 2 3 4 5 
62) 在知情的情况下购买被盗的自行车 1 2 3 4 5 
63) 私接水管电线，将公家水电接到家中 1 2 3 4 5 
64) 贿赂法官以试图改变案件结果 1 2 3 4 5 
65) 逃税 1 2 3 4 5 
66) 超生 1 2 3 4 5 
67) 没有合法手续在公共场合游行/抗议 1 2 3 4 5 
68) 父母不抚养未成年子女 1 2 3 4 5 
69) 违规摆摊设点 1 2 3 4 5 
70) 成年子女不赡养父母 1 2 3 4 5 
 
一个像您一样的人，如果具备以下所问问题的条件和机会，可能会做这些事么？（1—完全不
可能，2—不大可能，3—一半一半，4—很可能，5—一定会） 
 不可能 不大可能 一半 很可能 一定会 
71) 下载盗版电影和歌曲 1 2 3 4 5 
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72) 在知情的情况下购买被盗的自行车 1 2 3 4 5 
73) 私接水管电线，将公家水电接到家中 1 2 3 4 5 
74) 贿赂法官以试图改变案件结果 1 2 3 4 5 
75) 逃税 1 2 3 4 5 
76) 超生 1 2 3 4 5 
77) 没有合法手续在公共场合游行/抗议 1 2 3 4 5 
78) 父母不抚养未成年子女 1 2 3 4 5 
79) 违规摆摊设点 1 2 3 4 5 
80) 成年子女不赡养父母 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
接下来我想询问一下您过去五年中在成都当地法院的经历。 
81) 在过去的五年中，您作为被告或原告出席过成都当地法院审理的案件么？ 
A) 有 
B) 没有 
 
82) 在过去的五年中，您到过成都当地法院作证或观察别人案件的审理么？ 
A) 有 
B) 没有 
 
83) 在过去的五年中，您与成都法院有过其他任何形式的接触么？ 
A) 有怎样接触的？__________________________________________ 
B) 没有 
 
 
 
84) 在过去的五年中，您与成都法院有过几次接触？ 
A) 一次 
B) 多次 
 
85) 在这次经历中，您的角色是： 
A) 原告或被告 (询问 86-92所有题目) 
B) 证人 （跳过第 90题） 
C) 其他，请说明____________________________（跳过 86和 90题） 
 
 
请告诉我您对以下陈述的赞同程度(1—强烈反对，2—比较反对，3—中立, 4–比较赞同，5—
强烈赞同)。 
 强烈
反对 
比较
反对 
中立 比较
赞同 
强烈
赞同 
86) 我得到了陈述自己观点的机会。（85为 C则跳
过） 
1 2 3 4 5 
87) 法官很称职。 1 2 3 4 5 
88) 法官很有礼貌。 1 2 3 4 5 
89) 法官很公正。 1 2 3 4 5 
90) 我对案件结果很满意。（85为 B或 C则跳过） 1 2 3 4 5 
81)-83) 答案均为 B：跳过本部分余下问题，转至本卷第三部分 
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91) 将来若遇到类似情况我会通过法院解决。 1 2 3 4 5 
92) 若我的亲戚朋友遇到类似情况，我会建议他们
去法院。 
1 2 3 4 5 
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第三部分：家庭基本情况 
 
最后一个部分，还有几分钟就结束了。现在我想询问一些您和您家庭的背景情况。您的答案将
对除本课题研究人员外的任何人保密。 
93) （调查员填写）被访者性别：A) 男； B) 女 
 
94) 您的出生年份是？____________ 95) 您的民族是？____________
 
96) 您是成都本地人么？ 
A) 是 （跳过 97 题）   
B) 不是  
97) 您是四川人么？ 
A) 是  
B) 不是  
 
98) 您的户籍状态是？ 
H) 本地非农；B) 本地农业；C) 外地非农；D) 外地农业 
F) 其他，请说明______________ 
 
99) 您最近三个月的主要就业状态是？ 
H) 全职 
I) 兼职 
J) 临时工 
K) 务农 
L) 在读学生（跳到 103） 
M) 无业 （跳到 103） 
N) 其他，请说明_______________ 
 
100) 您的职业是（请尽量详细，回答主要工作的具体行业、职位和职责）？
____________________ 
 
101) 您工作单位的类型是？ 
H) 党政机关 I) 国有企事业单
位  
J) 集体企事业单
位 
K) 个体户 L) 私营企业 M) 外资企业 
N) 其他，请说明___________________ 
 
102) 上个月您本人的收入是_______________（元） 
 
103) 您的政治面貌是？ 
E) 共产党员 F) 共青团员 
G) 民主党派成员 
H) 群众
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以下家庭成员的接受正规教育的年数是？ 
 接受正规
教育年数 
104) 本人  
105) 父亲  
106) 母亲  
107) 配偶  
 
以下家庭成员的最高学位是？（1—低于小学，2—小学毕业，3—初中毕业，4—高中毕业或同
等学历，5—大专毕业，6—本科毕业，7—硕士毕业或更高）  
 低于小学 小学 初中 高中 大专 本科 硕士及以上 
108) 本人 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
109) 父亲 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
110) 母亲 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
111) 配偶 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
112) 上个月（2012年 4月）您全家（包括您本人，您的配偶以及与您同住的父母和子女）总共
的消费是（包括所有非投资性质的开销，比如房租，房贷，水电费，食物，衣物，交通，
医疗，保险，旅游休闲，学费，等等）___________________ 元   
 
113) 2011年您全家的年收入总共是（包括工资，所有奖金，补贴，股息，分红，商业净收入，
存款利息，亲友资助，等等）_____________ （万元） 
 
114) 根据您家在 2011年的收入和支出,与本地区的其他家庭比较, 您认为您家庭的生活水平属
于以下哪个层次？ 
A) 上层   
B) 中上层  
C) 中层 
D) 中下层  
E) 下层 
F) 其它。请说明________________________________ 
 
115) 您的婚姻状况是： 
A) 单身 
B) 同居 
C) 已婚 
D) 分居 
E) 离婚 
F) 丧偶 
 
116) 您同意研究人员将来联系您以进行后续的采访么？ 
 
A) 同意. 请留下您最可靠的联系方式： 
 212 
 
B) ____________________________________________________________________________ 
C) 不同意. 
 
谢谢您的参与和合作！ 
 
 
 
 
 
